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PREFACE

This thesis is concerned with empirical inquiries into messages,
particularly with scientific attempts to assess what messages may convey
within a social communication process and how information carried by
such messages may be measured.
The advent of the mas s media of .communication has directed
attention to the social significance of communication·processes by
making changes in social structures dependent on and visible through
these media.

Their reliance on modern communication technology has,

moreover, prompted the coping with complex communication networks
from an engineering or design point of view.

Numerous social organ-,

izations being dependent on knowledge which makes the flow of information more effective have favored the generation of such knowledge.
Yet, very little has been developed in the way of a general theory of
messages and much less in the way of systematic methodologies for
empirical inquiries into their nature.
Cybernetics is perhaps the most recent and certainly the most
profound approach to the study of communication processes in relativelylarge and complex systems.

It is the science of communication

and control in all possible organizations irrespective of their materiality (12) (13) (209) (211).

The abstract nature of the knowledge

which this diSCipline aims to develop accounts for the fact that it has
stimulated such divergent activities as the design of communication
facilities, the development of electronic computers, the installation
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of automatic defence systems, the organization of libraries, social planning and the design of automatic government as well as scientific inquiries
into biological and social systems.
Although the social exchange of messages is much older than its
reliance on technical means of communication, the point of view of
"cybernetics" suggests,

as Deutsch put it, "that all organizations are

alike in certain fundamental characteristics and that every organization
is held together by communication . . . . it is communication, that is,
the ability to transmit mes sages and to react to them,. that makes organizations; and it seems that this is true of organizations of living
cells in the human body as well as of organizations of pieces of machinery in an electronic calculator, as well as of organizations of thinking
human beings in social groups" (50:77).
One of the communication

phenomena for which cybernetics

has not offered adequate explications is the psychologically and sociologically relevant attribute of signals:

"meaning."

This is not at all

surprising considering the fact that numerous philosophers have
struggled for centuries with the problems of meaning, content, symbol and consciousness neither reaching an agreement as to an
acceptable definition of the terms, nor providing adequate operational
procedures for the empirical specificatiO)l of the phenomena associated
with them.

Some have radically rejected certain problems of meaning

as "meaningless, " others have produced volumes of verbalizations
making it almost impossible to filter out some true generalizations
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which may be helpful in assessing such message characteristics in a
social context.
Such a state of knowledge seems to be all the more dissatisfying as even common sense suggests that signals such as black and
white dots on paper, irregular sound patterns, or punched holes in
IBM cards are relatively insignificant to the human sender and/ or
receiver unless he is able to interpret them in certain meaningful
ways .. It is not the physical signals but the conveyed symbolic content
that moves people; not the carriers of a message but the ideas
"behind" them that structures individuals into certain organizational
forms.

Social scientists while basically being in agreement with the

cybernetic emphasis' on communication in society maintain that the
most signific:;ant form of human communication is through some kind
of symbol, symbol structure or message that means something to the
interacting individuals or social groups.

"Ideas are expressed by

symbols," says Lasswell, "their manifest formis nothing more than
a conglomeration of symbols . . . . Symbols are to a culture as money
is to an economy" (113:65).
Inquiries into the meaning of literary works, into the symbols
contained in verbal Or non-verbal human expression or into the major
ideas that dominate the thinking of particular periods in time, are
of course no novelty in the humanities.

But·the recent awareness of

the social significance of these message characteristics together with
the advancement of empirical methodology have favored inquiries of a
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different kind.

Systell1atic and ell1pirical studies of what ll1essages

actually convey have becoll1eproll1inent with the increasing dOll1inance
of the ll1aSS ll1edia of COll1ll1unication, particularly within the last few
decades.

Such investigative attell1pts have been subsull1ed under the

label "content analysis" and are today considered the prill1ary research tool of cOll1ll1unications research.

"The technique, " as Kaplan

puts it briefly, "attell1pts to characterize the ll1eanings in a given
body of discourse in a systell1atic and quantitative fashion" (96:230),
and has by and large been associated with the study of the ll1ass ll1edia.
Although an ever increasing volull1e of literature is devoted to such
studies there has hardly been a contribution to a theory of ll1essages
or a cOll1prehensive theoretical frall1ework for inquiries into their
content.
To fill this gapwhicl::t has been noted in abstract theoretical
as well as down-to-earth ell1pirical dealings with the subject, it is
conceivable to add another ell1pirical investigation to the volUll1e
available in the literature.

It is also conceivable to postulate a

theory of ll1essage content that seell1S to be intuitively satisfactory
and consistent with SOll1e other already established theories of the
cOll1ll1unication process, thereby losing th,e ell1pirical touch which
this interest in ll1essages has heretofore had.

We therefore wish

to take the ell1pirical inquiries into the content of cOll1ll1unications
thell1selves as the raw data of our analysis.

In this way we ll1ay not

be able to forll1ulate a theory that could be deduced froll1 the
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fundamental postulates of cybernetics, for example; we may not be able
to say very much about the way particular individuals or social groups
recruit the meanings to given physical objects of exchange; but we could
abstract, and develop a theoretical framework for, the empirical inquiry into message content and answer such questions as to the 'suitable
goal of such analyses and as to the investigative tools needed to accomplish such inquiries.

Although we are very much concerned with socially

significant messages, we do not wish to be limited by this empirical
domain and therefore aim to include examples of inquiries into mes sages
from other domains as well.
Chapter One attempts to give a historical sketch of studies .conducted under the name of content analysis.

In this way the scope of the

empirical concern of content analysis is introduced.
Chapter Two then aims at a critical examination of this mode
of inquiry focus sing on the definitional is sues, on critical points concerning scientific methodology, and on the relevance of conceivable
research results to a theory of communication.
Chapter Three presents ten examples of inquiries into messages
which will provide much of the basic data for subsequent elaborations.
The examples deliberately include relatively extreme situations of
analysis for it is believed that if inquiries are somewhat removed from
obvious intuitive interpretations then they tend to exhibit more clearly
what is required of an analyst when he attempts to empirically assess
the content of given messages.
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Consistent with our aim at formulating a general framework for
the analysis of given data as messages, it is believed that all messages
are alike in certain fundamental characteristics.

Chapter Four there-

fore takes the ten working examples as a basis for discovering and
formulating the investigative goal that all such inquiries presumably

have in

COIllITlOn.

Taking the results obtained in Chapter Four, Chapter Five tries
to formalize a concept of information pertaining to message analysis
and suggests a measure and a calculus for quantities of such information.

In terms of this calculus the goal of mes sage analysis is stated

more concisely than in Chapter Four.

Some of its meaSUl:es are

demonstrated on one of the examples introduced in Chapter Three.
Chapter Six discusses some of the essential procedures which
are required for treating given data as mes sages.

It is an attempt to

operationally describe observational prerequisites, investigative
methods and evaluative criteria for assessing what messages convey
. to an analyst.

The basic procedures are outlined and their empirical

problems are discussed drawing again heavily on pJ;"actical examples
of inquiries into messages.
Chapter Seven then extends the notions developed in Chapter
Five to include some of the aspects that have been discussed in
Chapter Six.

In particular, a quantitative measure for the content

of a message is introduced and related to the informational limitations
inherent in this mode of inquiry.
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Concerned with the investigative possibility of the content of
messages of any kind, the work does not suggest a general theory of
communication on this level.

If it clarifies the issues of empirical

inquiries into message content, it lays perhaps the foundation of such
a theory as it would be the ultimate aim of a cybernetic "durchmusterung" of social-organizational phenomena.

But the work does

suggest, although not as its primary aim, a general theory of information which may be more relevant in the social sciences than Shannon's
mathematical theory of communication (175) currently is.
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CHAPTER ONE

A

BRJEF HISTOR Y OF CONTENT ANALYSIS

The following is an attempt to sketch the historical development
of a particular form of empirical inquiries into messages and their contents.

Although SOme very early incidents of very similar inquiries

have. been discovered, it will be shown that the evolution of investigative
methods for such analyses dates only from the beginning of the twentieth
century and is a predominantly North American contribution.
The currently most widely accepted term for systematic inquiries into communications is "content analysis." It emerged in the
1940's.

But its first appearance in Webster's Dictionary of the English

Language did not Occur until the third edition, in 1961, where it is
characterized as "a detailed study and analysis of various types of communication (as newspapers, radio programs, and propaganda films)
through a classification, tabulation and evaluation of the key symbols
and themes in order to ascertain their meanings and probable effects"
(204:492) .
The most striking evidence for the recency of this mode of inquiry can be found by examining the literature on content analysis
itself.

If one starts, for example, from the currently available pub-

lications on the subject as roughly described above and traces explicit
references to literature cited in such publications, a web of citation
links is revealed that indicates information flow from the past.

Many
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original sources appear around the 1920' s but none date back further than
1893.
This web of citations fu:rther reveals an apparent increase of
density over time:

as publication dates lie further back, fewer refer-

ences can be noted and the number of publications, either making use
of the method or being otherwise concerned with it has steadily increo,sed.
As early as 1948, Berelson and Lazarsfeld noted, in an account of the
state of the art, that "the output of content analysis studies has doubled
in every five-year interval over the past twenty years" (30:9).

Barcus

(20) who undertook the task of surveying over 1700 titles concerned with
content analysis between 1900 and 1958 found this trend still continuing.
During the first two decades of this century 51 studies were
published.

This figure rose to 119 during the 1920s to 199 during the

1930s to 334 studies during the 1940s and further increased to 654
studies during the period between 1950-1958 (20: 81).

It is interesting

to note that litero,tu:re devoted to methodological considerations of content analysis, which indicates awareness :regarding the instrumental
character of this mode of investigaUon, follows a similar trend, being
equally "explosive" though of a later origin.

During the first two

decades just one such study was published; during the next three decades
respectively 14, 15, 73 studies were published and rose to 141 during
the 1950-1958 period (20:79).

The volume of currently published studies

concerning content analysis seems to be expanding further.

3
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Compared with the growth rates of publications in other fields of
scientific inquiry, the expansion of content analysis literature appears
quite normal.

Studying the development of publication figures in various

branches of knowledge Price (165:92-124) argues that the "law of exponential increase" is a common characteristic of unrestricted scientific
developments.

It is the necessary consequence of cumulative use of

information customary in institutions such as science.

Smoothing and

extrapolating the known publication figures supports the conjecture that
the temporal origin of this cumulative growth lies around 1900.

Prehistory and Marginal Developments
And yet, much of the terminology and thinking that permeates
contemporary discourses about communications is undoubtedly older,
most frequently of Greek origin.

Many scholars refer to such well

known works as Aristotle's Rhetorica, his De Poetica or Cicero's
De Oratore in'order to point out the apparent age of the problems that
discourses about communications tend to be concerned with.

But,

these inherited conceptual frameworks largely remain systems of
ideas.

Such ideas had considerable normative implications concerning

appropriate oratory styles, correct human reasoning and logic, for
example, but hardly lend themselves to systematic validation.

More-

over, such systems did little to explain processes of interaction
through messages called communication.
On the other hand it is true that highly reliable quantitative
descriptions of written text have already been known to the Masoretes
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who, after the destruction of the Jewish state in A. D. 70, devoted themselves to preserving the text of the Bible by counting verses, words, etc.
As Yule points out such enumerations are presumed to have been used to
detect writing errors efficiently Or to assess the required efforts of copyingthe text (217:7-8).

But these quantifications had little to do with the

charactedstics of messages; other non.,communicative objects could
have been subjected to the same form of descripti"n.
It took the invention of the printing press to develop a critical
awareness concerning the nature of written materials, their "powers"
and their "dangers." According to Groth (79) it was not before the
middle of the seventeenth century that university professors are reported to have made use of newspaper clippings in their lectures on
civics, geography and other topics.

Concurrently a few "Zeitungs-

Kollegien" (newspaper seminars) were founded at some German universities discovering some typical features of messages which had
consistently been overlooked when written communication was either
a more personal matter or a way of standardizing religious belief.
The earliest doctoral dissertations about newspapers date back to
1690, 1695, and 1699.

They were written to obtain degrees in theology,

a disc'ipline that became interested in the dissemination and content of
newspapers because of their presumed effects, but dealt with the subject mainly in moralizing terms (79:26).
Historians in general and literary historians in particular are
almost exclusively concerned with information from the past transmitted
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to the present in some written form.

Considering the peculiarities of

historian's data and the age of this profession, it is surprising to learn
that the awareness of the message characteristics of such data is only
a very recent phenomena.

According to Garfield

l

it was as late as the

middle of the nineteenth century that von Ranke made the "document"
a technical term in inquiries into history.

Before, history had been

transmitted merely as "a kind of fairy tale."

Only since then have

historians been concerned with such problems as detecting corrupt

texts, deciding among competing attributions of authorship, arriving
at the time order in which wOJ;'ks were composed, determining the
sources relied upon by an author, and inferring historical events from
eyewitness reports, social records, and biographies, "-all problems
which are very closely related to those of a communications analyst.
The first well-documented case of a quantitative analysis of
printed material as messages sterns from eighteen

century

Sweden.

Dovring (55) (56) describes some of the crude quantitative comparisons
that were made to deter>mine whether a collection of hymns was the
carrier of a religious sect's "dangerous thoughts" suspected by the
clergy to undermine the Swedish state and orthodox church.

•

And yet, although these few incidents of analy:z;ing message
characteristics mOre or less systematically clearly presuppose some
rudimentary understanding.of the nature of communication processes
in society, they were discovered only recently, did not enter the

lEugene Garfield, personal communication to the author.
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content analytic literature and had little effect on current methodological
developments.

However indicative of the increasing awareness concern-

ing messages, such unrelated incidents maybe considered pre-historical
to the study of communications as pursued today.
Outside the United States the first empirical investigation of newspaper content seems to have appeared in France during the Dreyfus affair
in which the press was presumed to play amajpr role.

A few. years later,

the study was repeated in Berlin to obtain comparative data (143: 1 74-176).
And although such interstimulation of investigations was originally quite
evident, at this early time a cumulative growth of publications comparable to that of the American development did not occur.

As early as

1903 a book by LobI entitled Kultur und Presse (121) suggested an elaborate classification scheme for analyzing the "inner structure of content"
according to the social functions newspapers perform.

But the book,

although influential in journalistic circles, did not give birth to the
empirical investigations it held in its womb.
One of the most prominent European proponents of a systematic
analysis of press contents was Mal< Weber who, at the first meeting of
the German Sociological Society in 1910, laid down the design of a
thorough sociological investigation.

As a social scientist he explicitly

rejected such problems as "what should be made public" as suitable for
analysis.

He rather wished to ascertain the historical changes of the

convictions concerning such public issues, what "Weltanschauungen"
underliechanges in those media, and what power structure produces
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the specific newspaper publicity.
questions of content analysis:

His specific questions were essentially

What are the information sources of the

newspapers and how is the material presented?
papers foster?
objects "?

What

habits do news-

How do they influence the "super individual cultural

What kinds of mas s beliefs and mass hopes are created and

destroyed?
Suggesting that the investigation exploit the newspaper content
itself, he said
"we will have to start measuring, plainly speaking, in
a pedestrian way, with the scissors and the compass,
how the contents of the newspapers has quantitatively
shifted in the course of the last generation, ... between
feuilleton and editorial, between editorial and news,
between what is presented as news and what is no
longer offered ... and from these quantitative results
we have to move toward qualitative ones. We have to
pursue the .style of presentation of the paper, the way
in which similar problems are treated inside and outside the papers, the apparent expression of emotions
in the papers, ... " (203: 52).
In this way, Weber hoped to analyze the ideological basis, organization

and power distribution in the press that may account for newspaper contents.

He secured funds for the proposed research project but the

scientific climate was unfavorable to such empirical approaches and the
study was never carried out.
A third example of early European developments is Markov's
statistical analysis of a sample of Pushkin' s novel in verse Eugene
One gin from which he developed a theory of chains of symbols (126
c. f.

137:423).

This work was published in 1913, was revived only in 1948
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through Shannon's work oninforInation theory (175) and produced no iInpact on content analysis until 1955 when Osgood undertook his contingency
analysis (147).
Whether the total lack of references in the content analysis
literature to such earlier European approaches with their cOInparatively
Inuch stronger theoretical bases indicates that their work was not considered content analysis or whether it indicates relatively little COInInu)1ication between the two continents,

the fact reInains that the early

European work had .little influence on the evolution of the Inethod in
North AInerica.

In view of the voluIninous AInerican literature on content analysis
now available and the multiplicity of'viewpoints that can be imposed to
structure it, the evolution of this Inode of inquiry cannot be presented
along a single dimension.

Perhaps the most fruitful way of showing the

changes that occurred during the life of content analysis is a differentiation of a few developmental phases during which particular disciplines
dominated in their attemptsto solve particular social problems to which
con;ent analysis was believed to be instrumental.
distinguished below, may be called:

These stages, to be

quantitative newspaper analysis,

mass comInunications research, propaganda analysis, interdisciplinary
expansion, and computer text analysis.

Quantitative Newspaper Analysis
The earliest studies making use of what was then called "quantitative newspaper analysis" were alInost exclusively made by journalists
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and used to substantiate evaluative judgments concerning press performance.

By and large such studies employed straight subject matter cate-

gories and. compared the volume of print in each.

Probably the first

analysis, pUblished in 1893, asked the rhetorical question "do newspapers
now give the news?" (184).

The author showed how religion, scientific

and literary matters had dropped out of leading New York newspapers
between 1881-1893 in favor of gossip, sports, and scandals.

A similar

study attempted to reveal the overwhelming space devoted to "demoralizing,"

l1unwholesorne'l and r'trivial" matters as opposed to !'worthwhile!!

news items (128).
By simply measuring the column inches a newspaper devoted to
particular subject matters journalists attempted to reveal "the truth
about newspapers" (192), believed they had found a means of showing
the profit motive as the cause of "cheap yellow journalism" with its
emphasis on sensationalism (212), were convinced that they had established "the influence of newspaper presentations on the growth of crime
and other antisocial activity" (62), or concluded that a "quarteLccentury
survey of the press content shows demand for facts" (205).

•

Such uses

to which quantitative newspaper analysis was put during this phase reo

flects the transition of the press from a public service for the educated
few to an economic enterprise seeking to attract masses of readerI'.
The social consequences of such a transition were felt threatening.
Barcus, who tabulated the literature on content analysis in
·.various ways, found that the concern with typical journalistic topics,
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i. e., evaluations of press performance, media inventories and compar-

isons, took up SO percent of all studies made during the first thirty years
of this century.
Naturally, thes\" early studies which were predominantly geared
toward evaluations of pres.s performance indicate the high emotional involvement of journalists with their own medium" but are methodologically
rarely satisfactory.

If the conclusions were not formed before actual

counts were undertaken, their simple subject matter categories tended
to be implicitly biased toward intended evaluative judgments.
the results would hardly withstand critical examination.

Most of

When reviewing

these early quantitative studies on<e cannot help getting the impression
that they were largely the product of the apparent power simple statistics
or numerical expression could (and perhaps still can) bestow upon a
primarily public argument.
This time period is also marked by the growth of journalism
schools and their original concern with establishing the ideological
bases of the journalistic profession and solving juridicial problems of
the press.

Much of quantitative newspaper analysis was influenced by

the School of Journali.sm at Columbia University where investigations
began to turn away from serving immediate objectives of press criticism.

Already. in 1912 the Columbia University Professor Tenney

advocated a more global "scientific analysis of the press. "

He argued:

"why should not society study its own methods of producing .its various varieties of thinking by establishing a ...
careful system of bookkeeping? What is needed, .. , is
the continuous analysis of a large number of journals ...
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the records in themselves would constitute a series
of observations of the 'social weather' comparable in
accuracy to the statistics of the United States Weather
Bureau" (195: 896-898).
The practical difficulties were too great for suchan idea to be realized,
but various large scale descriptions of newspaper content were stimulatedand these culminated in such studies as Willey's analysis of "The
Country Newspaper" (213) published in 1926.
While a few journalism schools became mouthpieces for the kinds
of studies mentioned above, the work which was done during the first
three decades of this century remained largely that of single journalists
of small prominence without theoretical foundation and without attempts
at scientific generalizations.

By tl;J.e end of the 1920's, quantitative news-

paper analysis as an approach to content analysis was essentially exhausted.

Mass Communications Research
The second phase of content analysis may be said to be due to
at l~ast three independent developments.

There was first the intro-

duction of new and more powerful media of communication such as
film, and more importantly, radio.

The technical development of such

media, their rapidly growing popularity and their already appearant
social consequences quickly escaped journalistic understanding and
control.
Secondly, during the time period following the economic crisis
- a time period of socio-psychological insecurity, political instability

13

and ideological struggles - the free political and economic exploitation
of the public media of communication by big organizations was felt to
be a serious threat to traditional individual and public values.

Attempts

to overcome the consequences of this crisis, culminating in the New
Deal programs, assigned a major role to the new mass media.
Thirdly, the social sciences just started to be ready to extend
their theoretical frameworks and empirical methods of inquiry to such
multidisciplinary problems as the mass media of communication seemed
to pose.
For example, sociology started to make extensive use of survey
research and public opinion polling.

The experiences gained in analyz-

ing public opinion gave rise to the first serious consideration of methodological problems of content analysis by Woodward, entitled "Quantitative Newspaper Analysis as a Technique of Opinion Research" (2lS).
From writings about public opinion, interests in something
like social "stereotypes" (122:9S f£) entered the analysis of communications in vario1,ls ways.

Questions such as, how Negroes we;r:e pre-

sented in the Philadelphia press (179); how the United States presented
her wars in her history textbooks as compared to versions advanced
by her former enemies (l99); or how nationalism was expressed in
American, British and other European children's books (127)
now assumed importance.

,.'

One of the most important concepts that emerged in psychology
during this time was that of "attitude."

It suggested the association
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of su.bject matter categories with such evaluative dimensions as "pt:o-con"
or "favorable-unfavorable." In a situation of widely spread social and
political struggles, the detection of hidden biases or partisanship toward
one or another party of a controver"y were felt to be important.
tative assessments of such biases led

Quanti-

to various communication stand-

ards which -' proposed by investigators -appealed to such rational' ideals
as "objectivity, " "fairness, " and "balance." Among such explicit standards Janis and Fadner's "Coefficient of Imbalance" (93) deserves
mention.

(The, coefficient is a statistical index of the degree to which

favorable and unfavorable references to an issue cancel each other out
within some body of text).
Psychological experiments in' rumor transmis sion led Allport
and Fadner to study newspaper content from an entirely new point of
view.

Their "Five tentative laws of the psychology of newspapers"

(7) attempted to account for the transformations that information undergoes as it travels through an institution and finally appears on the
printed page.
Political science with it"interest in political symbols added
another feature to the analysis of public messages.

McDiarmid, for

example, analyzed thirty U, S. presidential inaugural addresses in
terms of symbols of national identity, of historical reference, of
reference to fundamental concepts of government, and of fact and
expectations (131).

Above all Lasswell, viewing communication

problems within his psychoanalytical theory of politics introduced
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many new perspectives to such studies.

In an early attempt to classify

symbol data (107) he suggested such categories as "self" and "others,"
forms of "indulgence" and "deprivation," etc.

His symbol analysis led

to a "world attention survey" (108) in which trends in the frequencies of
national symbols were compared for several major national newspapers.
In the course of radio and press competition the Office of Radio

Research was founded at Princeton University which paid much attention
to the effects of cornrnunica,tion.

La,zarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet,

to cite only one example, used the 1940 U. S. presidential election to
relate mass media content to "how the voter maJ<:es up his mind" (114).
Several disciplines studied their own trends in scholarship as
reflected in the contents of representative journals.

This was probably

first done in Russia regardiJ;lg physics (166) but most thoroughly in the
field of sociology (24) (25) (174) and recently also in journalism (193).
While many social sciences contributed to the scope of analysis
during the late 30's,attention of content analysts was increasingly
focused on studies of propaganda:, identifying its principles, revealing
manipulative intents and disclosing foreign propaganda sources in the
United States. This interest goes back to Lasswell's pioneering
analysis of goals in World War I propa,gal;lda and his attempt at evaluating the techniques employed by the opposing powers (106).

Foster's

study of "hoW America became belligerent" (66) reflects the then
popular belief that the United States was drawn into the war against
her will.

Federa,! courts requested content analyses to disclose
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propaganda agencies in this country and accepted their results as evidence
(111).

In a comparative study of British and German radio broadcasts to

the United States during 1940 Bruner identified nine dimensions for describing political propaganda (36).

Increased concern with propaganda

stimulated the emergence of research centers with attempts at public enlightenment.

Among them the Institute for Propaganda Research, did

much to popularize so-called "tricks of the trade" Or propaganda devices
(88) on the assumption that people would resist propaganda if they were
familiar with its techniques.

Lee and Lee's study of Father Coughlin's

speeches (116) may be cited as an example of the explanation toward
which these devices lend itself.

With the outbreak of World War II this

institute ceased to exist.
In Barcus' tabulation of co.ntent analysis literature this second
phase of content analysis showed dominant emphasis on social values
and problems other than those directly associated with press performance in the narrower sense.

Indeed 60 percent of the content analysis

publications between 1930 and the·outbreak of the Second World War
are concerned with studies of race, social prejudice, value implications
of motion pictures, standards of morality and propaganda; in short,
with the expression of social values in the mass media.
Characteristic of this second phase of content analysis is furthermore that eminent social scientists entered the public debate.
While accepting many of the social problems that had been identified
by journalists and cultural critics, attempts were made to empirically
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verify some of the propositions that were more Or less believed in.
ever, many results were not encouraging.

How-

But, investigating mass

communications systematically, more complex structures of message
characteristics became recognizable and identifiable, structures that
had some theoretical significance in the social sciences and could be
studied empirically.

Attitudes, stereotypes, styles, political symbols,

values and propaganda devices simply escaped the crude measurements
of newspaper content along subject matter categories so typical for the
first developmental phase of this investigative tool.
When this technique of analysis was applied to various media
other than the newspaper, such as books, radio programs, films,
political speeches, conversation, objects of art, and cartoons; the
original term "quantitative newspaper analysis" became "content
analysis."

The change of name did not result in a clearer definition

of the technique.
Propaganda Analysis
The third phase of content analysis began with an ended
shortly after the American involvement in the second world war.
The mere characterization of the mass media of communication,
radio in particular, as powerful agents of molding public opinion
and mobilizing large populations toward political ends was not enough.
But, such characterizations suggested their possible contribution to
the war efforts in several ways:

domestic propaganda and promotional

activities had to be made more effective; psychological warfare directed
toward enemy nations had to be planned; and systematic attempts of
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extracting intelligence from foreign broadcast had to be organized.

Such

needs favored the establishme.nt of large research organizations and in
turn the development of new methods.
In 1941 a "research project on totalitarian communication" began
its work at the New School for Social Research.

"Supported by one of

the large foundations, it was assigned to develop methods for the study
of enemy propaganda and to train American social scientists for prospective government work in this field.

The work of the project was to

be mainly concerned with propaganda by radio, the importance of which
was highlighted by the experience of the war in Europe (I03:v).
One of the directors, Hans Speier, later resumed responsibilities
at the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service of the Federal Communications Commission, a rese"rch operation with the principal task of
monitoring, analyzing and reporting on broadcasts from other countries.
This cooperation of notable social scientists offered'unprecedented
opportunities to advance the methods of content analysis.

Whether

some newspaper is biased toward one side of a controvlOrsy or whether
some speaker can be labeled a propagandist became rather irrelevant
in this context except when such knowledge could be used to draw
specific inferences to the antecedent conditions of communications or
to give evidential support to predictions concerning planned political
Or military actions of interest to policy makers.
While content analysis in previous years had been essentially
a descriptive technique, the most notable contribution of these war
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years was a demonstration of the potential inductive use of this mode of
inquiry.

Indeed, George (71), who later evaluated the performance of

this analysis operation, could report about remarkable succes ses and
attempted some generalizations concerning the methods employed.
Another important contribution of this concern with propaganda
is the recognition of the systemic nature of society within which the content of propaganda may playa certain role.

By and large, previous

content analyses had studied communications in relative isolation or in
reference to only a few personality or social variables.

Specific in-

ferences from domestic propaganda, on the other hand, required consideration of more complex models of the situation from which communications were obtained.

Such models had to consider the social structure

of the governing elites, their modes

of operation, perceptions of en-

vironmental changes and estimates regarding planned actions as well
as their political support by, and ability to control the population.
While th" former approaches did not fully develop methodologically, hence, emphasized qualitative methods of analysis and employed verbal logic to justify their inferences, a third influential group
of researchers advanced th", quantitative description of propaganda
messages.

This third approach was heavily influenced and guided by

Lasswell and his earlier work, produced numerous memoranda under
the Library of Congress's Experimental Division for the Study of
.

,

,

Wartime Communications (see 96) and led to the volume edited by
LaBswell entitled The Language of Politics (112).

In the course of
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this later approach and reflecting the nature of the material studied,
"content analysis" became characterized as the "statistical semantics
of political discourse" (96:230) and often simply referred to by the
term "propaganda analysis. "

Interdisciplinary Expansion
Following World War II, content analysis, having largely been
constrained by war objectives, enlarged its scope of attention to
problems far beyond those of mass media research.

While a distinctive

research task is very difficult to discern during the fourth phase of
content analysis, its rapid spread into numerous disciplines hitherto
almost unaware of the technique I s potential use may be noted.

Content

analysis had matured to seek new boundaries.
It took the cooperation of historians , political scientists, s ociologists and psychologists to analyze the volumes of raw documents that
had been accumulated during the war years.

Inferences made from

domestic propaganda were systematically validated as formerly inacces sable information became available (71); new political phenomena
could be linked to Some forms of communication; and many research
projects that had been delayed carne up again and were pursued from
new poil1ts of view.
For example, Lasswell expanded his idea of a "world attention
survey" to the Revolution and Development of International Relations
(RADIR) project designed to test the hypothesis that in the last 60 years
a "world revolution"has been in steady progress, a revolution that is
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manifest in extensive compositional changes of the vocabulary of the
"ruling few" (113) (160).

The project also shed light on the trends of

Symbols of Internationalism (159) and Symbols of Democracy (161).
Similarly, White could now compare values expressed in
political documents and speeches by Hitler and by Roosevelt to ascertain differences between war and peace propaganda that would shed
light on the extent to which the Soviet Union may be engaged in the
preparation of international hostilities (206).

Jacob found frequencies

of references to atrocities in German domestic propaganda to be Correlated with intended political-military agression (89).

And Lewin

analysed the social aims expressed in song books and manuals of the
Hitler Youth and the Boy Scouts of America (119).
As an outgrowth of both experiences during the early phases
of propaganda analysis and the traditional interest of literary criticism, sociologically inclined literary historians started applying content
analysis to various forms of popular entertainment provided by the
mass media.

The method seemed suitable to explore and compare

cultural pattern across time and space.

StiU during the war,

Lowenthal (123) published his pioneering study of historical changes
of biographies appearing in popular magazines.

Adorno (3) suggested

a psychoanalytic framework for analyzing the social relevance of
television content.

Kracauer (101) presented an extensive study of

the German film and placed its content in historical and political
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contexts, and Schneider and Dornbusch examined fourty-six bestsellers
published between 1875 and 1955 in order to identify trends in popular
religious themes (170).

Such approaches, plus the earlier interest in

social stereotypes, can be considered a stimulus for such investigations
as Berelson and Salter's "Majority and Minority Americans" in magazine fiction (31) and Gerbner's ... "Social Role of the Confession Mag"
azine" (73).
While studies in propaganda had taken up the majority of published
literature during the war, Barcus' tabulation for 1950-1958 shows that
the number of investigations concerned with social values, social
problems and American cultural themes again ranked first within the
content a:oalysis literature.

Although journalistic topics still occupied

a large portio:o of the publications, the seco:od highest rank was now
taken by an area of application that hitherto had not contributed much
to content analysis literature:

psychological and psychoanalytical re-

search.
"When one stops to think of it," writes Cartwright in 1953,
"it is really surprising how much of the subject matter of
social psychology is in the form of verbal behavior. The
formation and transmission of group standards, values,
attitudes, and skills are accomplished largely by means
of verbal communication. Education in the schools, in the
home, in business, in the neighborhood, and through the
mass media is brought about by the transmission of information and by the exercise of controls which are largely
mediated through written or spoken words. If one is concerned with problems of social organization, the situation
is similar. Supervision~ TIlanagem.ent, coordination, and
the exertion of influence are principally matters of verbal
interaction. Social and political conflicts, although often
stemming from divergent economic interests and power,
cannot be fully understood without studying the words
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employed in the interaction of conflicting groups, and
the proces s of mediation consists largely of talking
things out. The work of the world, and its entertainment too, is in no small measure mediated by verbal
and other symbolic behavior" (39:422-423).
Such sudden realization of the message characteristics of much
psychologically r"levant data led to the development of three interrelated
areas of inquiry and development.

The .first is concerned with studying

written material to discover motivational, neurotic, psychosocial, or
other dimensions attributable to the author of a document.

Auld and

Murray (17) reviewed numerous projective techniques and tests for
various clinical purposes, tests that require in essence a content
analyses of verbal records.

The Dollard and Mowrer "Discomfort-

Relief Quotient" presumed to be an index of a psychological state may
be mentioned as a representative example.
The second area of psychological use of content analysis refers
to the analysis of qualitative data gathered in the course of rel;learch
processes.

Recorded responses to openended questions, records of

conversations in controlled experiments, observational accounts of
social processes can be utilized in scientific inquiries only insofar as
reliable methods of characterizing their content are available.

This

need forced many psychologists to adopt content analysis fo>: processing
qualitatively recorded data.

Bales' Interaction Process Analysis (19)

is one example where content analysis merged with techniques of
small group experiments and contributed to establish theoretical
assertions concerning face-to-face cornrnunication.

But also the use

24
of available verbal material as psychological data which was one of Allport's early concern (5) must be noted here.

In an analysis of "Letters

from Jenny" (6) he demonstrated the use of personal documents for ascertaining the personality structure of a writer.
A third psychological contribution to content analysis developed
in conjunction with inquiries in the psychology of speaking.

In the new

field of psycholinguistics (146) relationships between speech characteristics and a:cceptance of symbolic material as well as of language
acquisition, attracted the attention of a large group of psychologists.
Under the leadership of Osgood numerous rigorous measuring instruments of verbal content (147) (152) were advanced and made available
for application in other fields.
Quite independently from methods of analysis developed in the
social sciences, literary scholars started to use statistical procedures
to discern stylistic features of prose.

The interest, partic)llarly that

of identifying the unknown author of a document on the basis of his
vocabulary, goes back to Yule who attempted to show that it was not
the alleged Gerson but

(217).

a Kempis who had written De

Imitatione Christi

More recently Mosteller and Wallace tackled a similar problem

regarding the disputed authorship of the Federalist Papers (139) and
Brinegar concerned himself with a statistical test of the authorship of
the Quintus Curtias Snodgrass Letters (35).
While during the phase of mass communications research and
propaganda analysis the focus of inquiries into messages was extended
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to include such media as books, radio, films and to some extent television;
during the interdisciplinary expansion stage this focus was furthermore
broadened.

Studies have been made of proverbs (100), folktales (130),

inscriptions on Greek vases (11), private letters (153) (6}, diplomatic
documents (82) (84), rumors (49}, results from openended interviews
(157), pauses in psychodiagnostic sessions (40).(61), speech disturbances (124), photographs (201), paintings (155) and even dreams (80).
This widespread use of content analysis in hitherto untouched
fields is also reflected in the composition of the participants at the
first work conference On content analysis which the Committee on
Linguistics and Psychology of the Social Science Research Council
held in Winter, 1955.

The researchers whose contributions were sub-

sequently published. in book form (162) carne from such areas as
political science, psychology, psychoanalysis, linguistics, anthropology, folklore, literature and history.

When discussing new content

analytic methods in their respective fields the participants found themselves surprised to discover numerous common empirical problems.
In this interdisciplinary climate several suggestions for further improvement of the technique emerged.
Among the most notable contributions of this conference is
probably George I s clarification of the virtues and limitations of
quantification in content analysis (70).

Evidence for the success of

so called qualitative methods rendered these hitherto often disqualified
techniques as important alternatives.

Osgood's methodological
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suggestions, his contingency analysis in particular, designed to overcome
some of the earlier limitations of frequency descriptions, has since then
found numerous applications (147).

And Mahl raised the problem of the

instrumental use of language and derived

,methodological consequences

(
of analysis (124).
The time period following the first working conference is still
too short to allow for an adequate evaluation.

Yet, a new branch seems

to have emerged.
As a result of the Cold War various research organizations concerned with international relations found content analysis instrumental
for their tasks.

Since first-hand information about political- organiza-

tional changes in foreign nations is rarely directly accessable, an examination of political documents can provide indicants of otherwise hidden
transitions.

For example, Angell and Singer tried to ascertain and

compare the values of Soviet and of American elites and their attitudes
toward foreign policy from their articulations in the respective mass
media (9).

While this problem is still reminiscent of the type of propa-

ganda analysis that had been done during World War II, North, Holsti
and collaborators (84) (142) tried to measure the interaction of national
tensions during international crises and thus added a new dimension to
the content analysis of political documents.

Singer (180) even went so

far as to investigate the possibility of inspection for disarmament exclusively by means of analyzing mass media material in place of the
then disputed international control stations.
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While the spread of the technique into new fields and its subsequent
assimilation with other modes of inquiry is still continuing, a process that
was identified with the fourth phase of content analysis, a fifth phase is
already emerging.

Computer Text Analysis
Probably the most important impact on the technology of content
analysis during the current decade is to be expected from the uSe of
electronic computers in the behavioral sciences (32).

The quantity of

symbolic mate rial that needsto be proce ssed in typical content analysis
projects is often very large and easily exceeds available manpower and
other human limitations.

To overcome some of these barriers, computer

analysis and transformation of data to which some meaning is attributed
now appears almost everywhere and suggests most significant research
problems.
One area of recent advancement of immediate relevance to content analysis is the use of mechanical devices to retrieve information
stored in large libraries, to search for literature,· to assemble bibliographies relevant to a given problem domain, to make abstracts, to
index, etc.

Theoretical frameworks and software suitable to this end

are in the proce.ss of development (26).
Closely related to such efforts is the considerable progress
that can be noted in translating languages automatically, particularly
between Russian and English (144).

Although much justified criticism

referring to premature claims and much too optimistic expectations
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has been heard (23), computer programs that actually do such translations
within a limited discourse and theories that could lead to appropriate
algorithms corne more and more into prominence.

Katz and Fodor (99)

provided such a theoretical framework for semantic interpretations of
sentences.

An example of more immediate and p;ractical application of such
technologies is the automatic manipulation of medical records for diagnostic ends.

After applying proper codes on autopsy records in natural

English, Smith and Melton (182) could show how a data bank of protocols
of pathological processes can be utilized to aid autopsy diagnoses.
Quite different is an example by Allen (4) who is interested in
the use of computers for legal purposes and who tried to determine the
numb"r of ways a section of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests
in Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater is structurally ambiguous
and can lead to different interpretations.

The existence of structural

ambiguity, a serious problem in language translation, turns out to become of great value to the content analyst who wishes to ascertain the
alternatives available to the partners committed to such an agreement.
Literary inquiries into style, mentioned above, have largely
been facilitated by the use of computers.

Mosteller and Wallace (139),

for example, were aided by automatic data processors in their attempt
to provide further evidence in the case of the disputed authorship of the
Federalist Papers.

Computer programs that discriminate subject

content in scientific and technical prose (198) are in theory identical to
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those that distinguish authors by their· style of writing.

Such and other

forrnal similarities have led to a new mode of literary research called
"computational stylistics" (172).

It is needless to say that the volume

of text that has to be handled statistically strongly links this mode of
inquiry with the use of computers (117).
Examples of this kind could be extended at length.

They suggest

considerable advances in natural language processing for still very
limited purposes.

Oile computer program that claims to be a general

one and has been developed to aid traditional types of content analysis
(189) deserves to be mentioned, however..

It is called "General In-

quirer" and maps written text into sets of terI7's of interest to the
analyst such that various statistical computations can be made.

The

program has been successfully applied to a wide range of problems
such as establishing cultural differences manifest in folktales, predicting the inclination of the writer of a letter to commit suicide,
finding differenti'lting issues in arguments for or against a proposal
(190), and measuring international tension (84).

While this program

cannot handle the complexity many problems of analyzing natural
l'lngu'lge text m'ly require, it is indic'ltive of a trend that has barely
begun, a trend that is believed to be dominant in the fifth phase of
content analysis.

Summary
The historical sketch of the development of content 'lnalysis
in its social-historical context may now be summarized as follows:
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from the above it is clear that the acc1J.m1J.lative concern with analyzing
messages systematically dates from and has not beeninterr1J.pted since
the beginning of this cent1J.ry.
Originating as "q1J.antitative newspaper analysis, " the first phase
of this concern was clearly dominated by j01J.rnalistic attempts to eval1J.ate press performance.

Primitive q1J.antitativemeas1J.rementsalong

s1J.bject matter categories were merely 1J.sed in s1J.pport ofp1J.blic arg1J.mentation involving j01J.rnalistic val1J.es and concerns.
D1J.ring the 1930' s prominent social scientists replaced the
analyzing j01J.rnalist and c1J.lt1J.ral critic . . New concepts and more refined
descriptive techniq1J.es entered what was s1J.bseq1J.ently termed "content
analysis," and its scope was extended to other mass media.

B1J.t, the

analytical tasks, prompted by the prevailing social concern with the
new media of comm1J.nication remained essentially the same.

The

content analytic res1J.lts of :mass comm1J.nications research were
rela tively inconseq1J.ential.
D1J.ring World War II, the third phase of the analytical concern
with messages, content analysis became primarily a tool for analyzing propaganda either in the sense of detecting hidden agents of foreign
c01J.ntries orin the sense of drawing military intelligence from known
propaganda S01J.rces.

An ind1J.ctive element was added to the hitherto

entirely. descriptive techniq1J.e and the systemic character of propaganda
was realized altho1J.gh its methodology did not develop f1J.lly.
The f01J.rth phase has been characterized as a rapid spreading
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of content analysis into numerous empirical domains, thereby losing its
previous association with the mass media.

Perhaps it is this dissocia-

tion from a specific subject matter and from particular disciplines
which gave content analysis a chance of developing .into an interdisciplinary method in its own right.
The still infantile fifth phase, it is believed, will be dominated
by the emergence of new computer techniques designed to analyze large
quantities of text for various

~cientific

and practical tasks.

More than

before such techniques presuppose the development of sound theoreticalanalytical groundwork.
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CHAPTER TWO

CRITICAL ISSUES IN CONTENT ANALYSIS

Critical issues always have a historical dimension.

Their com-

ing into the focus of discourse is the result of a long-term intellectual
preparation and is typically preceded by an unqualified acceptence of the
subject matter of these issues.
As the previous chapter showed, content analysis was originally
used mainly as a rhetorical device to support public judgements regarding press performance by supplying figures to the journalistic argument.
Figures suggested objectivity regardless of the adequacy of the methods
by means of which they were obtained and hence, regardless of how
I

validly they represented whatever they claimed to represent.

With the

intrusion of the social sciences into content analysis, computational
techniques became more sophisticated and con<:eptual categories more
"

detailed.
issues:

This transformation led to the emergence of a few critical
the explicit- impressionistic dilemma (110); the quantitative-

qualitative dilemma (70) (20:21-23) and the manifest-latent dilemma
(30:7-8) (20:19-21).

Commitments towards either side of the contro-

versy often had ideological overt,ones.
Although such issues can be viewed in a historical context
they can also be discussed in the context of scientific methodology.
This chapter proposes to do just this.

It seems that the critical

issues mentioned above as well as others that have not been covered
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in the literature can be subsumed under three main headings:

definitional

issues, methodological issues and theoretical issues.

Definitional Issues
Definitions seem wholly arbitrary agreements and yet, in the context of technical discourses, their relative utility may be evaluated.

For

example, a good definition is expected to abbreviate and sharpen a specific
discourse; it ought to improve the efficiency of communication.

Another

criterion of a good definition, one of interest here, is its organizing power,
i. e. the degree to which it structures similarities among events and leads

to unambiguous distinctions in the universe of possible phenomena.

With

respect to the latter criterion, we may suppose that methodological discourses attempt to define investigative techniques(a) in terms of their
empirical domain or the domain of possible observations to which they
are assumed applicable, (b) according to their specific purpose or the
class of problems for which they are claimed to provide solutions, or,
(c) on the basis of specialized procedures and evaluative criteria they
contain.

FOllowing is an attempt to critically evaluate existing defini-

tions of content analysis along the above mentioned lines.
Kaplan's "statistical semantics of political discourse" as a
paraphrase for "content analysis" has already been mentioned.

The

same author continues to say that " ... the technique ... attempts to
characterize the meanings of a given body of discourse in a systematic
and quantitative fashion" (96:230).

This, being an early (1943) attempt

at clarification, already includes most of the concepts that were
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'relevant during the second developll1ental phase of content analysis.
Berelson and Lazarsfeld, reviewing several sill1ilar definitions that
had been advanced in the technical literature of that till1e, proposed a
definition which is claill1ed to include all essential distinguishing
characteristics:
Content analysis is a research technique for the objective,
systell1atic, and quantitative description of the ll1anifest
content of cOll1ll1unication (30:5-6).
Due to Berelson' s subsequent book on content analysis (27) and his review in The Handbook of Social Psychology, this definition becall1e by
far thell10st widely accepted and 1l10st frequently cited definition of
content analysis to date.

It can very well be taken as representing

the dOll1inant conceptualization in the field.

It seell1S that one of the

reasons for the surprisingly widespread acceptance of this definition
is its inherent indefiniteness concerning the ell1pirical dOll1ain of the
method.

Note that the key terll1 "content" appears in both, the definiens

and the definiendull1 of the definition.

How little such a definition

delineates can easily be seen when replacing the critical term with,
say X.

The definition then reads:

'X-analysis is a research technique

for the ... description of. .. X of cOll1ll1unicati<;m.' If the terll1 "content"
is not already well defined, which,as we shall discuss under theoretical
issues is indeed not the case, rOOll1 is provided for alll10st any intuitive
interpretation of the terll1 and hence alll10st any ell1pirical domain is
acceptable for content analysis.

While this indefiniteness is clear

without giving further exall1ples, it is 1l10st probably not intended.

35
Slightly less indefinite concerning an empirical domain are two
definitions that succeeded Berelson's.
itynor been frequently cited.

Both have neither gained popular-

From a psychological point of view,

Schutz argued that almost all human behavior is symbolic in some sense
and must therefore be said to have content.

On the basis of such reason-

ing, he suggests the definition:
Content analysis is a research technique for the objective,
systematic and quantitative description of human behavior,
particularly linguistic (171:3).
Cartwright, elaborating on Berelson's definition from the same vantage
point, caITle to a silllilar' conclusion:
Communication should be thought of as any linguistic expression, and the restriction to 'manifest' content should
be removed. With these modifications, we have an
adequate designation of all the kinds of analysis of quantitative materials of interest to social psychologists .
.. . we propose to use the terms "content analysis",and
"coding" interchangeably to refer to the objective,
systematic and quantitative description of any symbolic
behavior (39:424).
Although these two formulations give the appearance of avoiding
the circularity of Berelson's definition, they replace "manifest content
of communication" by terms which are not very well defined either,
and do not possess the necessary discriminative power.

As far as

the distinction between symbolic and non,- symbolic behavior is concerned, agreement exists only at the extremes of such a dimension.
To identify the empirical domain of content analysis with that of human
behavior is equivalent to the suggestion that all research techniques in
the social sciences should bl" subsumed under the label content analysis,
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which amounts to making no differentiation among those techniques as far
as content analysis is concerned.
The three definitions agree, however, that content analysis has
to be "objective, systematic and quantitative."

This triple requirement

refers neither to the empirical domain of the technique nor to its purpose, but to evaluative standards imposed on its use.

With "obj ective ...

description" Berelson wants to assure "reliability" of the analytic procedure.

The analysis must be replicable, leading to identical results.

With "systematic ... description" he wants to exclude "biases" of the
analyst by r'l'quiring that "all the relevant content is to be analyzed in
terms of all the relevant categories" as well as "to insure (that the)
data (be) relevant to a scientific problem or hypothesis" (27:17).

The

requirement of quantification is, according to Berelson, "the most
distinctive feature of content analysis" (27: 17) and refers to an enumeration of instances found in the material under analysis.
Many early writers concerned with the subject insist very
strongly on the attribute "quantitative" as a definitional requirement
of content analysis.

For example Lasswell emphasized this point in

a paper entitled "Wby be Quantitative" (110).

And Pool characterized

"content analysis" briefly as "the statistical tabulation of the things that
have been said" (161 :3).

Even most recently Stone makes quantifica-

tion the central prerequisite for content analysis when defining:
"Content analysis" refers to any procedure for assessing
the relative extent to which specified references, attitudes,
or themes permeate a given message or document (188).
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With "permeation, " Stone wants to include both frequency and distribution
of identifiable characteristics in texts, thus being quite specific concerning the quantitative descriptions that a content analysis is to provide.
On the other-hand, quantification in content analysis has been an
extremely controversial issue as McGranahan points out.

)

Quantitative techniques in content analysis _can provide a
defense against subjectivity and bias. They_ cannot, however, provide a substitute for serious thinking. Unfortunately, as in many other fields of social science, some
authors seem tempted to quantify for the mere sake of
appearing scientific, and produce elaborate statistics
that are meaningless or, at best, trivial. Content analysis
will be useful if it supports but not if it suppresses the inquiring intellect (133:559).
Smythe referred to the use of inadequately simple statistical

,

t<;!chniques to describe mass communications as an "immaturity of
science" (l83).

Kracauer (l02) and George (70) challenged quantifica-

tion as a definitional requirement of content analysis on similar grounds.
Underlying this controversy seems to be the association of "quantitative"
with "objective" _as opposed to "qualitative" with "impressionistic"
approaches, an association which Goode and Hatt try to eliminate by
pointing to a more reasonable goal for scientific inquiries.
Modern research must reject as a false dichotomy the
separation between "qualitative" and "quantitative" studies,
or between" statistical" and the "nonsta tistical" approach.
The application of mathematics ... does not ensure rigor
of proof, any more than the use of "insight" guarantees
the significance of the research.
The fundamental
niques are those
and relevance of
observations are

question to ask about all research techdealing with the precision, reliability,
the data and their analysis. . .. If the
crude, casting them in a statistical

"
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form will not help the research. If other scientists
cannot repeat them, mathematical manipulation is
futile. If the data do not satisfy a rigorous logic of
proof, the conclusions rem.ain doubtful (77:313).
While quantification seem.s not to be an agreeable prerequisite
for content analysis, virtually no objection-hf'.s been raised against the
two attributes "objective" and "systematic" in the aforem.entioned definitions.

But these two definitional requirements refer to the m.ost general

presuppositions of any scientific m.ethod and could very well have been
taken for granted without loss.

When discarding the controversial re-

quirement of quantification, Barcus com.es perhaps closest to the points
of agreement by asserting:
The term. "content analysis" is used here to m.ean the
scientific analysis of com.m.unications m.essages.
He then continues realizing that:
The method is broadly speaking the" scientific method, "
and while being catholic in nature, it requires that the
analysis be rigorous and systematic (20:8).
At this point it seem.s that the definition of content analysis has
lost almost any organizing power within methodological discourses.

If

no way can be shown to differentiate content analysis from. other m.odes
of scientific inquiry, then hardly any justification exists to call content
analysis an investigative technique in its own right.

But before we are

to pass a final judgem.ent let us examine definitions of content analysis
with respect to explicitly stated purposes and procedures.
Kaplan, Berelson, Schutz, Cartwright and probably Stone are
quite clear on the point that content analysis aims at som.e form of
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description, and yet Berelson insists in addition that the data be relevant
to a scientific problem or hypothesis .
cerning the goal of content analysis.

Cartwright too is ambiguous con"
While explicitly defining the tech-

nique as a descriptive one, he goes on to say that "as a rule the content
analyst is not interested in limiting his conclusion or findings strictly to
the content actually analyzed . . Almost invariably he undertakes his
specific analysis in order to reveal something about a more general universe of data thaIl- just those symbolic materials (produced at a certain
place and time) with which he deals" (39:449).

1£ - so one is forced to

argue -the job of a content analyst is not conceptualized here as something quite distinct from performing a content analysis, then at least the
terms "description" and "interpretation" are seriously confused.

This

confusion also seems to be manifest in a recent unpublished definition
of content analysis that makes no distinctions between the process of
identifying characteristics within a text and that of making inferences.
This definition has been proposed by Holsti and reads:
Content analysis is any technique for making inferences
by systematically and objectively identifying specified
characteristics within text (83:10).
So far the clearest description of a purpose in content analysis
has been given by Osgood who wrote:
..• if we define content analysis as a procedure whereby
one makes inferences about sources and receivers frorn
evidence in the messages they exchange, then the probletn
falls precisely in the field of special interest of the psycholinguist. . .
This is because it is the psycholinguist who,
by definition, is concerned with discovering and etnploying
lawful relations between events in tnessages and processes
transpiring in the individuals who produce and receive
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them . . • . when the interest of the content analyst lies in
making inferences about the SOl,nce of a message, he must
rely on encoding dependencies, that is, the dependencies
of message events upon psychological processes in speakers
and writers. When his interest lies in making inferences
about the effects· of a message upon its receivers, on the
other hand, he relies upon decoding dependencies, that is,
the dependencies of events in listeners and readers (their
meanings, emotions, attitudes, and the like) upon the content and structure of messages. (147:35·-36)
Such a proposed restriction of content analysis to the making of certain
kinds of inferences of interest to the psychologist is quite powerful in
differentiating between several investigative techniques.

Controlled ex-

periments, field observations or interviews are not usually directed
toward the inferences referred to above.

On the other hand, Osgood'.s

strictly psycholinguistic orientation· is most probably the reason why
his definitional attempt has not ·been fully appreciated or further
developed in the literature.
Since the purpose of the method is not unambiguously ascertainable from given definitions or not

unani~ousl yagreed

upon in the litera-

ture, let us now turn to those definitions that attempt to characterize
content analysis in terms of specific procedures.
In his Language and Communication, for example, Miller casts

his very clear description of the content analytical procedure in definitional form:
In order to handle larg.e blocks of verbal materials in a
statistical way, it seems necessary to reduce the variety
of alternatives that must be tabulated. This can be accomplished by putting a wide variety of word patterns
into a single category . . . . when ... the frequency of occurence of word patterns in each category of a classification
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scheITla is counted, the result is called a "content analysis"
(136:95-96).
The second definition that delineates required analytical procedures
has been proposed by Janis in his atteITlpt to COITle to grips with SOITle ITleth.odological probleITls of content analysis:
"Content analysis" ITlay be defined as referring to any technique (a) for the classification of sign-vehicles, (b) which
relies solely upon the judgeITlents - which theoretically, ITlay
range froITl perceptual discrimination]> to sheer guesses - of
an analyst or group of analysts as to which sign-vehicles
fall into which category, (c) on the basis of explicitly forITlulated rules, (d) provided that the analyst's judgeITlents are
regarded as the reports of a scientific observer. The results of a content analysis state the frequency of occurrence
of signs - or groups of signs - for each category ina classification scheITle (91:429).
Both definitions depict the content analytic procedure quite adequately.

Miller's forITlulation, although very specialized and geared to

a consideration of analytical probleITls in the psychology of language,
leads directly to the kind of perITleation ITleasures Stone suggested in his
definition.

Janis' forITlulationessentially agrees with the definition above

but eITlphasizes the process of controlled hUITlan judgeITlent that is iITlplicit in the procedure as depicted by Miller and ITlust precede any kind
of enuITleration.

It is fahrly obvious that the analytical procedure as

described by both authors can hardly lend itself to the kind of interpretations Cartwright observed as being the rule in content analysis.

Such

interpretations are clearly outside the scope> of a technique that categorizes sign-vehicles according to SOITle explicit rules.
The two definitions seeITl to iITlply a distinction between content
analysis and those analytical techniques that provide the basis for both
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more definite and more sophisticated measurements.

By suggesting

distinctions such as (a) between procedures that lead to such standardized
measures as of age, weight, or temperature, and those that solely depend on human judgements; or (b) between measuring scales possessing
various types of order and simple (nominal scale) categorizations of
qualities, content analysis appears as a method of systematically exploiting controlled human judgements in the absence of more refined
measuring operations.

Given the fact that science has always proceeded

from qualitative differentiations to quantifications of such differences,
content analytic procedures here appear formally identical with measur_
ing operations but simply of a more primitive kind.
In summary then, we attempted to inquire primarily into the

organizing power of proposed definitions of content analysis.

With

respect to the empirical domain of the technique, none of the definitions
can be said to be explicit enough as to make adequate distinctions within
the universe of possible data to which the technique is deemed applicable.
With respect to the goals toward which the use of content analysis may
be put, the definitions do little but give conflicting requirements.

The

definitions that attempt to delineate specific analytical procedures do
indeed succeed in suggesting differentiations within the repertoire of
investigative methods in the social sciences, but the question remains
to be answered whether the dimension along which this differentiation
. is proposed is indeed intended by those making frequent references to
the technique.

Most of the definitions cited above are of little prominence.
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The only one that has indeed gained wide popularity has almost no organizing power and must be judged inadequate with respect to this criterion.
We were almost exclusively concerned with the organizing power
of definitions of content analysis and mentioned the efficiency of a good
definition only in pas.sing.

But a good definition .of an analytical technique

can also be expected to have some heuristic value in that it directs attention to specific methodological problems.

Some such problems, whether

generated by the definitions or derived from analytical difficulties will
be taken up in the following section.

Methodological Issues
This section is devoted to content analysis as investigative technique, that is to say, to some of its critical problems pertaining to
methodology.

Methodology examines principles and procedures of

scientific inquiry with respect to their ability to provide certain knowledge but abstracts from the particular use to which such inquiries may
be put.

From a methodological point of view, the two chief criteria for

evaluating investigative techniques are reliability and validity.

There

are other evaluative criteria such as their efficiency or the costs per
unit of information gained which are important when making choices
among possible research tools, but we will confine ourselves to considering reliability and validity only.

Before the pertinency of these

criteria to content analysis can be discussed some of the peculiarities
of the technique have to be clarified.
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As a point of departure, Janis (92:55) and Miller's (136:95-96)
definition of content analysis, cited above may be taken as giving an
adequate description of the analytical procedure to be considered.
short:

In

a scientific observer applies explicitly formulated rules for

categorizing sign-vehicles to a usually large body of data.

The date or

collection of sign-vehicles, to use Janis' term, can consist of almost
anything: themes, characters, items (30:78), letters, phonemes,
words (136), topics, propositions (76), headlines (75), music scores
(c£. 30:17), cartoons (18), proverbs (lOO), films (95), etc.

Similarily

as we shall see no restriction seems to exist as to the category
schemes that may be employed,
"Rules for categorizing" sign-vehicles are logically equivalent
to operational definitions of categories that make explicit the criteria
according to which a particular sign-vehicle is either included in or
excluded from a particular category.

It is generally required that

definitions of categories be such that (a) a category scheme be exhaustive and (b) each of the categories within that scheme be mutually
exclusive (34:l0).

Thus, the rules for categorization must be every-

where defined and single valued.

In short, the rules effect a mapping

in the mathematical sense of a set of sign-vehicles into a set of categories.

Since these rules are required to be explicitly formulated,

the scientifically trained observer is expected merely to ensure that
they are implemented o.r followed consistently apd reliably.
see the implication of such a method shortly.

We shall
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Consider first the number of possible mappings that can be well
defined over a given body of data or the number of explicit categorization
rules that are formulable: If m

is the number of discriminable sign-

vehicles in the domain of such a mapping and n the number of categories
in the category scheme chosen, then the number of possible mappings
,

1S

n

m

Now imagine that only a single issue of the New York Times

has to be content analyzed, say with words as sign-vehicles,
already becomes a very large number.
possible rules for categorization m

m

then

Note that in the number of

appears as the exponent of

n.

Thus, in the presence of this unimaginably large number nm the content analyst is faced with an extremely difficult problem of selection, for
he has to choose one out of nm possible mappings!
By definition the product of anyone of the nm possible mappings applied on the text constitutes an objective and systematic description in the sense of Berelson and Lazarsfeld's requirement for
content analYl'is.

Waples, Berelson, and Bradshaw may have realized

the large number of alternatives available to content analysts when
writing:

"There are as many ways of describing publications as there

are reasons for wanting to know about them" (200:63) to which Berelson
and Lazarsfeld add " ... it opens the door to the indefinite expansion of
categories" (30:101).

If no constraints on this large set of pos sible rules for cate0'

gorizaticin.,are discernable then any arbitrarily chosen one would do.
Although there appear few guidelines as to appropriate choices among
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those rules, the existence of relevant constraints is suggested in the
following statement by Berelson and Lazarsfeld:
Content analysis stands or falls by its categories ... Studies
done on a hit-or-miss basis without specific problems for
investigation and with vaguely or poorly articulated categories
are almost certain to be of indifferent or low quality as research productions. Although competent performance of
other parts of the analytic process is also necessary, the
invention and definition of appropriate categories takes on
critical importance. Since categories contain the substance
of the investigation, a content analysis can be no better than
its system of categories (30:88).
The authors continue:
.•. Since communication materials contain almost everything people say or do, the production of relevant categories is limited only by the analyst's imagination in stating a problem for investigation and designing categories
to fit the problem (30:101).
Although much of the quotation merely asserts the importance of
appropriate choices, key criteria for such choices seem to be derivable
from a "problem of investigation." Osgood also emphasized this point
when stating that "the nature, number and breadth of categories ... depend upon the purposes of the investigation.

If the analyst has a very

specific purpose, he will select his content categories around this core"
(147:62).

But what is the formal nature of those problems of investiga-

tion that are presumed to affect decisions concerning particular category schemes?

As it has been mentioned earlier, Berelson, Lazarsfeld

and others require of a content analysis that the categories be chosen
to test some hypotheses.

Although this is not included as a definitional

requirement they make the point quite clear:
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The derivation of hypotheses for a content analysis study
is of central importance, since the hypotheses determine
the nature of the categories as well as the framework of
actual results. The hypotheses derive out of the nature
of the problem and they in turn are translated into categories for analysis. It can hardly be over-stressed that
the prior construction of appropriate hypotheses is indispensable for a sound and fruitful analysis ... if the problem
was not clarified to the point where several worthwhile
hypotheses can be formulated (in advance), then the projected content analysis should be abandoned. One should
not analyze unless or until he has something concrete
and specific to analyze for (underlined in the original)
(30:92).
At this point we cannot stress strongly enough the methodological
implications of making decision criteria concerning category schemes a
derivative of the apriorily stated hypotheses tobe tested:

if a content

analyst chooses his categorization rules only according to the set of
hypotheses upon which the data to be categorized are supposed to bestow some significance, then the validity of the result is either entirely
. accidental or solely dependent on the analyst's prior intuition concerning that result.

In either case the method is fallacious.

For proof of the above proposition let the number m

of dis-

criminable sign-vehicles in a body of text be very large compared
with the number n

of analytical categories.

To keep the example

simple let the categories be cells in a two-way contingency table.

A

hypothesis defined within the terms of the contingency table can be
said to be accepted if the frequency distribution in that table differs
significantly from the one for which the complementary null-hypothesis
would account.
into which the

Since frequencies are additive, the size of the sets
m

different sign-vehicles are grouped are assertedly
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arbitrary, the nm possible mappings from the text into the table can
produce almost any desired frequency distribution.
sterns from the magnHudes of nand m.

The only limitation

Hence, the mapping can

almost always be chosen in such a way that any hypothesis with terms
contained in the mapping's range, i. e. our contingency table, can be
II

supported."

Thus, if decisions concerning rules for categorization

are completely. arbitrary or made without reference to criteria that
are external to the analysis, then the degree to which a content analysis
provides factual evidence for a set of hypotheses is absolutely indeterminate.

The confidence that can be associated with some statement so

"tested" is zero.

The validity of such a statement cannot be better than

chance unless the content analyst has some prior intuition as to which
of the hypotheses is to be refuted or accepted and selects categorization rules correspondingly.

Hence the analysis does not provide any

evidence beyond the prior intuition of its designer and is in fact quite
superfluous if not seriously misleading.
This fundamental fallacy which seems to be inherent in contemporary conceptuq.lizations of this investigative technique must be considered the most critical single issue in methodological concernS with
content analysis.

It appears whenever content analysts are completely

free to choose any category scheme they feel is applicable for whatever
reasons.

In practice, however, the analysts cannot choose quite so freely
among the possible rules for categorization.

His choices are subject
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to at least two kinds of constraints.

The first type of constraint refers

to the limitation of the content analyst's imagination - as Berelson and
Lazarsfeld (30: 1 01) mentioned in passing.

This limitation need not con-

Cern uS here, but it is obvious that the analyst cannot evaluate the
astronomical number of possible mappings systematically.

His imagin-

ative capability delineates only a small manageable set of categorization
schemes for examination.

The second constraint refers to the limited

instructability of the scientifically trained judge who is supposed to
categorize the data under consideration.

..z

Neither of these constraints have been discussed in the literature.
On the face of it, it appears that they are disadvantageous to content
analysis; but the case is quite the opposite.

Since the method - if strictly

followed as stated - leads to fallacious results, it seems that these constraints provide the only source through which some validity can enter
the analysis.
able,

They may help to bring about results that are,if not accept-

at least

not completely arbitrary.

Before we can examine the

role of these constraints in full detail, some theoretical framework has
to be adopted on the basis of which a definition of validity and reliability
can be proposed and within which the methodological
implications of
,
such constraints become apparent.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section one important
evaluative standard that any investigative technique ought to meet is
"validity." Roughly stated, a measuring instrument is said to have
validity if it measures what it proposes to measure; if its results,
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which range from the numerical value of a variable to a complex statement, represent what they claim to represent.

From an empirical point

of view the validity of an investigative technique can be assessed by
measuring the agreement between its results and those obtained from
other already validated research procedures that are applied to the
same phenomena.

To be an acceptable investigative technique, content

analysis must produce results that are valid in the above mentioned
Sense.

The validity of content analysis is in this respect extremely
difficult to establish as it is not altogether clear what the product of
the analysis is supposed to represent.

As we have shown in the

previous section, the definitions are quite ambiguous with respect to
the empirical domain of content analysis.

Hence, they do not offer

satisfactory explications of the term "content" that would easily lend
itself to validations.

It is conceivable that this crucial indefiniteness

concerning the empirical domain of the technique is the cause of the
fact that almost none of the published content analyses aitempt to
validate their results by comparing them with evidence obtained by independent means.
In the absence of a simpler framework and without attempting
to anticipate the topic of the final section of this chapter, let us accept
Janis' sign-theoretical position (91) (92) and argue that the purpose of
a content analysis is to represent the" signification response" by, say,
members of an audience to a message composed of sign-vehicles.
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Without suggesting any formal definition of this term let us assume that
each member of the audience has acquired some "signification habits" to stick to Janis' terms - or culturally conditioned competencies for
distributing sign-vehicles into some notational scheme of possible signification responses.

These signification habits may be thought of as being

intuitive rules for conceptualizing.

There is no need to suppose ex-

haustiveness of andmutually exclusiveness within the notational scheme
and no reaSOn to expect perfect agreement among the communicators or
respective members of an audience.

Assuming there are ways for

assessing the signification responses to a given set of sign-vehicles,
then content analysis can easily be validated by comparing the distribution of sign-vehicles in the category scheme of a content analysis with
those in the respective notational scheme obtained from the individuals
Concerned.

Thus, if the product of applying explicit categorization

rules is identical with or at least sufficiently similar to an audience's
signification responses to the same set of sign-vehicles then the content analysis can be rendered valid.
Signification responses may not be directly accessible in the
case of which it becomes difficult to measure the amount of agreement
between content analytic results and signification responses referred
to.

Under these conditions, Janis argues, a content analysis may be

validated indirectly if some other variable that is dependent on the
audience's signification response can be shown to correlate highly
with the content analytic results.

Such a situation may exist if
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sign-vehicles cause some behavioral responses that are mediated through
and moreover linearly dependent on the signification responses to that
set of sign-vehicles.
Unfortunately it is not only the lack of adequate explications of
"content" and the empirical restrictions on the observation of signification responses that make validation of content analysis so difficult.

The

analysis of historical documents, of domestic propaganda obtained from
enemy nations or political speeches by otherwise inaccessible political
leaders exemplify typical content analytic situations that exclude the
possibility of obtaining validating instances.

In such cases at least one

other evaluative standard can be employed that is logically prior to
validity and refers to the degree to which a research technique leads to
replicable results.
This evaluative standard is neces sary, for it is sometimes quite
a difficult task, even for a scientific observer, to map such signvehicles as words

J

propositions, or sentences into exhaustive sets of

mutually exclusive categories and to maintain consistency in such
classification over a longer period of time.

It is therefore of some

interest to measure the degree to which the actual categorization
performance of the scientifically trained judge deviates from the ideal
of a mapping.

This measure is called "reliability" and given an im-

portant place in methodological consideration of content analysis.
example, Kaplan and Goldsen write:

For
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The results of content analysis, like those of other processes of measurement) lllUst meet certain conditions of
reliability before they can be accepted as data for
hypotheses. By reliability of a measurement with respect
to a given variable is meant the con$istency of its re sults
as that variable assumes different values. The variables
usually considered are: the measuring event (e. g., the
same person using the same value in successive measurements of the same object); the measuring instrument i~. g. ,
different "forms" of an intelligence test); the person doing
the measuring (e. g., different eyewitnesses on the same
event) .
The importance of reliability rests on the assurance it
provides that the data obtained are independent of the
measuring event, instrument or person. Reliable data,
by definition, are data that remain constant throughout
variations in the measuring process (98:83-84).
In content analysis reliability is measured either as inter-judge

oras intra-judge agreement whereby each measure may be applied to
evaluate anyone component of the category scheme or focus on the
categorization procedure as a whole.

Whatever the focus of evaluation

maybe, reliability is logically prior to validity insofar as high validity
presupposes high reliability but is not ensured by the latter.

The

measure of reliability sets only the upper boundary for the validity a
content analysis can be expected to achieve.

This fundamental relation

between reliability and validity is not always realized in the literature
when attempts are reported to evaluate a content analysis methodologically.
Only a few studies care to measure the reliability of the analytical tool
employed while most of them pay at best lip service to the problem of

How does the limited instructability of judges affect both of these
methodological standards in content analysis?

Schutz (171) is probably
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the first who realized a direct relationship between the reliability of a
content analysis and the nature of the explicitly stated rules for categorizing sign-vehicles.

These rules are given to a scientific observer

in the form of instructions with the obligation to follow them.

Searching

for an adequate measure for reliability he argued that the mere act of
giving instructions to a set of judges would almost ensure a level of
agreement better than chance.

Instructions are at least intended to

specify and to determine the behavior of persons employed in the categorization process.

1£ the reliability is low, Schut", argued, then the

instructions have not been perfectly understood by the judges.

1£ the

reliability is high he infers that the instructions were successfully communicated to them or at least that the judges make consistent use of
some rules that give the same results regardless of the individual idio'.)

syncrasies of the persons involved.
The assumption of an initial chance agreement can most certainly not be maintained.

Even a scientifically trained judge brings

with him a host of intuitions concerning the categorization process.
By virtue of the fact that he grew up in a certain culture, a certain
social stratum and assumed certain roles when exposed to the mass
media, for example, signification habits are inevitably acquired that
ensure agreements better than chance.

Signification habits are

already present prior to accepting the role of the objective judge in a
content analysis and to a large extent determine which rules for categorizing sign-vehicles can be acquired in a reasonable period of time
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and which are followed with some degree of consistency.
Almost all of the few studies reporting on the reliability of the
analysis describe how training sessions and extensive instruction programs had to be arranged in order to make the categorization rules
sufficiently understood.

O'Sullivan, for example, conducted a training

seminar over a whole semester period to prepare judges for participating in a content analysis of writings in international relations (154).
When categorization rules cannot consistently be followed by the judges,
it is customary to arrange discussions among them that frequently lead
to special interpretation and successtve modification of the explicit
rules until the categorization process reaches an acceptable level of
reliability.

For example, in "a study of the values of Soviet and

American elites" Angell "found that ... agreement among coders on
whether or not a dimension was involved in a story or editorial - (was)
most discouraging for a long time ... a rule adopted on this subject
helped a great deal.

Discussion and analysis of the differences between

coders on their practice runs also increased reliability.

We believe

our statistical tables represent 80% reliability ... " (9:13).
Thus reliability is not solely the product of understanding explicitly formulated instructions--as Schutz seems to suggest - but may
be said to be the outcome of an interaction between the rules for
categorization, the judges' intuitive signification habits and the communication situation in which the judges are participants.

On the one

hand, the categorization rules rarely ever specify the process so
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completely as to serve as an algorithm.

They almost always require

situation-dependent interpretations by the user.

On the other hand,

there seems to be ample evidence- -and the two examples mentioned
above are only suggestive in this direction - that during the judge's
training period categorization rules are being imposed upon and
partially override the stock of signification habits.

Categorization

processes in which a person is engaged when assuming the role of a
judge in content analysis are typically quite alien to the intuitive conceptualizations that may go on when assuming roles.in an audience.
Whether and the extent to which explicit rules for categorization and
intuitive signification habits override', each other is crucial for the
degree of validity that a content analysis can achieve in a given situation.
The situation in which a content analyst's choice of pos sible
categorization rules is solely guided by his intent to test some hypothesis can now be reconsidered in the light the existing constraints
on the judge's performance.

It represents one extreme where explicit

rules for categorization completely specify the procedure without
being affected by any of the intuitive signification habits a person may
have had prior to becoming a proficient judge.

Such a situation exists

particularly when comp1,lter analyses are attempted.

A computer

program can not delegate "intuition" to an information processing
device.

Such a situation is not very likelyt'o arise when human

judges are employed in the categorization process.

For such an
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extreme it has been shown that even when reliability is perfect, validity
solely depends on the analyst's intuition concerning those categorization
rules which he feels will produce results that are most likely valid to
him.
The other extreme is found in the situation in which categorization rules either are not made explicit or are completely ignored by
competent judges (i. e. judges who possess sufficiently. developed signification habits to respond consistently to the sigh-vehicles presented to
them).

Here object of validation and criterion against which validation

is to be made become confused.

According to the definition of validity.

in content analysis, the outcome such a . situation would produce is valid
to the extent that judges are representative of those communicators or
audience members whose signification response their outcomes claim
to represent.

Such a situation comes closer to being a psychological

experiment than a content analysis:

The qbsence of explicit rules make

the data obtained dependent on the personality of the individual who
performs the categorization operation, and "lack of validity" becomes
simply equivalent to the sampling error.

While this situation avoids

the troublesome fallaciousness of the other extreme, it is not a content
analysis according to Janis's definition and, lacking explicitness and
most probably replicability, does not

sati~fy

the methodological re-

quirements of an acceptable measuring technique.

Actual content

analyses tend to assume a position somewhere between the two ITlethodologically defective extremes and create what ITlight be called the content
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analyst's dilemma: the more the content analyst pushes in the direction
of non-directiveness concerning the judges signifying behavior the more
his procedure becomes questionable as an investigative technique for
assessing content.

Since he is most often rewarded for exhibiting rigor,

showing "objectivityj

It

"systelllaticness,

It

and "quantitativity" in his

analysis, he is pushed into a methodologically fallacious situation which
he cannot easily recognize as such.
The crux of the matter is that validity in content analysis simply
does not follow from those evaluative criteria in terms of which the
analyst habitually justifies his pursuit.

The conception of the content

analytic procedure not only makes validation very difficult but also
renders no provisions for keeping track of the actual sources of
validity.

For instance, content analysts are not expected to justify

their choices of judges on the basis of the . representativeness of their
signification habits.

Content analysts are not expected to - and indeed

never do - assess the degree to which the explicitly formulated categorization rules approximate the signification habits of the audience
Or communicators to which the analysis generalizes.

Even if a content

analyst were able to eliminate such uncertainties he has no idea about
the extent to which explicit categorization rules and intuitive signification habits mutually override each other during the categorization process.
The two actual sources of validity in content analysis seems to be
(al the existence of intuitive signification habits of judges as far as they
are representative of those held by the respective audience and the
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extent to which such habits are either not subject to explicit constraints
or effectively override the categorization rules, and (b) the prior intuition that lead the designer of a content analysis to the selection of categorization rules that are equivalent to the signification habits of the
respective audience and effectively override those of the judge I s signification habits that are not representative of the ones held by the respective
audience.
The surprising result of the methodological examination is this:
while investigative techniques are generally designed in such a way as
to ensure the validity of a scientific inquiry, content analysis can in no
way guarantee valid results.

1£ validity emerges in content analysis,

then it does not stern from its explicitly stated procedur.e but from a
hidden interaction process in which intuition plays a decisive part.
This interaction process is neither under the control of a content analyst
nor accessable to a methodological evaluation.

Thus only luck and

intuition ensures what is believed to be derived from explicit rigor
and apparent objectivity.
The content analyst's dilemma becomes even clearer in a flow
chart of the defective process (see Figure 2).

Although the presentation

is a simplified one,the critical feature appears in form of an iterative
loop adapting the explicit categorization rules to the nature of the signvehicles and the stock of intuitive signification habits until the product
of the categorization process passes the reliability test.

When that

product has reached the desired level of reliability the content analyst
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knows little more than that some rule has been applied consistently. Since
he has no control over the nature of this rule as it emerges from the interaction between intuitive signification habits and·explicit instructions,
he can hardly

~e

certain about the possible validity of the results.

Assum-

ing that the signification habits of judges and respective audiences are
initially identical, it is almost certain that instructions only diminish the
validity of a content analysis.

Validation is at least theoretically con-

ceivable but practically never done.

In the diagram, communication be-

tween defective content analysis and validation procedure is denoted by
dotted arrOws.
Essentially two means seem to suggest an immediate resolution
of the content analyst's dilemma.

Both require some conceptual modifi-

cations of the analytic technique.

The first would require the explicit

rules for categorization ideally to be made identical or at least not of
such a nature as to interfere with the judge's signification habits as
far as they are representative of the r",spective audience . . Then content analysis could most probably achieve explicitness, reliability and
validity of the categorization process.

This resolution presupposes

the content analyst to acquire and possess a considerable amount of
information about the signification habits to a givenset of sign-vehicles
and about the learning process for acquiring such habits before he can
ever start formulating appropriate rules.

In fact he must have a well

established theory of signification which seems currently very far from
being conceivable.
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The other means of resolving the analyst's dilemma is standarization of the procedure, ,If a set of explicit categorization rules - as arbitrarily as they may have been chosen - are employed consistently,
exhibiting high reliability in a large variety of situations, then differences
in the results do represent differences in the data.
mean ,is another problem altogether.

What such differen,:es

They certainly cannot be so easily

, interpreted as representing some signification response as it ,has been
customary in content analysis to date.
Little use has been made of either ways of ,resolving the methodological dilemma.

Perhaps the attempt to make use, of Osgood's meas-

ureS of afiectivemeaning (149) (152) as a basis for a computer content
analysis program (84) may be mentioned as a timid experiment in the
direction of the former means of resolving the dilemma.

Lasswell's

attempt to standardize categories for detecting foreign propaganda

'.

SOurCes in domestic mass media (Ill) suffices as an example for the
latter.

But neither approaches have been widely accepted.

Many con-

tent analysts, including Berelson argue "against the development of a
single set of categories. "Proponents of this view, " as Budd put it,
"maintain that every content analysis is unique, presenting"its own
individual problems that require individual handling" (34:13).

Pool

believes that not enough research has been done to establish standardized measures in content analysis.

!1Such a measure is convenient

when a considerable number of researchers are working on the same
variable, and when someone suc:aeeds in working out good categories
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for that variable.

It is doubtful that either of those criteria can be met

in most areas of content analysis ... until that time there is a good deal
to be said for ~hoc categories ... " (162:213-214).
How little various ad hoc category schemes, content analysis
measures and indices yield comparable results and, hence, how little
they validate each others results was the lesson of a study made by the
Institute for Communications Research at the University of Illinois (191).
The investigators took as many as 70 written passages of about 300 words
each from such varied sources as The Bible, the Chicago Sun- Times
and a manual for operating a Remington typewriter.
passages were analyzed in 55 different ways.

Each of these

The 55 different analyses

had been suggested in the content analysis literature and claimed to
measure some effects a text may have on its reader, e. g. retention,
interest, willingness to read more material of a similar nature.

The

analyses involved simple counts such as the number of first, second,
and third person pronouns, various indices such as readability sCOres,
the average number of.meanings per word, and scaled judgements such
as "interestingness of .subject matter," "how well written." In total
the study was a gigantic design, "a content analysis, to end all content
analyses.

11

A factor analysis revealed 10 factors accounting for some 620/0
of the total variance.

But most of the factors could not be interpreted

in a meaningful way.

To validate the factors, it was argued that they

should at least be able to distinguish among texts of different sources.
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Some positive results were present but they were only slight.
Then a set of texts scoring high, medium, and low on four factors
believed to be meaningful were given to readers who were subsequently
subjected to a series of tests known to measure interest, evaluation,
comprehension and retention of the content.

Correlation of the test re-

sults with each of the factors yielded no satisfactory result whereupon
work on the content analysis variables was suspended.
This was the only extensive and sophisticated study designed to
throw some light on the validity of the numerous content analytic schemes
in a fairly limited domain.

The rules for categorization varied from

the highly explicit type quantitative measure to the kind using intuitive
judgements on simple scales.

Its results provide empirical evidence

for the reality of the content analyst's methodological dilemma.

Theoretical Issues
Reviewing studies in content analysis one cannot but detect the
feeling of those who are not absolutely satisfied with the quality of the,ir
products that more adequate results would quickly be forthcoming if
there were more studies and better quantitative methods.

Yet an in-

crease in the number of such studies is not likely to bring about the
expected improvements, although investigative technology undoubtedly
plays a major role in determining the quality of content analysis.
Barcus I survey (20) of over 1700 content analyses displayed the great
variety of subject matter to which researchers had devoted themselves
but he could not point toward qualitative improvements.

As "a content
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analysis of content analysis" Barcus! method is subje ct to a well known
logical constraint:

no method can uncover its own explanatory power and

limitations, much less go beyond it.
Dissatisfactions that are sometimes associated with content
analysis do not always arise from methodological considerations.

They

can often be traced .back precisely to the point when empirical research
stepped in where hitherto socially responsible journalists and cultural
critics had reigned supreme.

To the latter there was never any doubt

of what content is, what communications are about and that their mass
distribution act as great social forces.

But when specific inquiries

into mass media content and their effects on election campaigns,
audience evaluation of educational radio programs, etc., were made,
these presumed facts could rarely be demonstrated.

It is certainly

conceivable that the social philosopher's judgments were severely
biased or that such analyses, were objectionable on methodological
grounds, but it is also possible that informed authorities on social,
political and public matters make use of concepts of content that are
incompatible with those underlying a particular content analytic
technique.

Under these conditions dissatisfaction may be due not to

the methodological dilemma but rather to the il;ladequacy of the
theoretical frameworks that are built into the investigative technique
employed.
As we argued in the section on definitional issues, the empirical domain of content analysis is delineated only on intuitive
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grounds.

And yet each content analysis is explicitly or implicitly required

to ope rationalize the term "content" in some way.

This section is devoted

to a critical examination of such built- in conceptions of content.

Content as a Permeating Characteristic
There can be no doubt that the volume of data upon which content
analyses are most typically based calls for the use of procedures for
rigorous simplification.

In content analysis such simplification is most

commonly achieved by enumerating the relevant units (sign-vehicles,
words, sentences, paragraphs, cooccurrences, etc.) that are found in
each category after a suitable categorization process has been applied
on a given text.

Enumerations of this kind lead to relative frequencies

or other statistical indices of the distribution of category assignments
within a category scheme.

The most significant feature of such simpli-

fications is that the relative position of the categorized units within the
text is not maintained.

Thus, the statistical measures so computed

are always measureS of permeation.
A logical prerequisite of categorization and enumeration is the
discriminability of mutually exclusive units within the symbolic
material to be analyzed.

Even at this point sound theoretical frame-

works are not available to justify a particular unitization in terms of
the meanings conveyed by a given message.
According to Pool the problem of whether there exists a "basic
unit of meaning of relevance to content analysis" had been considered
at the first working conference on content analysis mentioned above.
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The working definition that apparently emerged at this conference is an
entirely. statistical one.

It identifies "a basic unit of meaning" with

"relatively little freedom for variation within it, but much freedom at
its boundaries.

Habit strengths are strong, transitional probabilities

high within it but low across its boundaries.

Such a unit, if it exists,

is a kind of building block" (162:203) that can provide the logical basis
for categorization and enumeration.
The conference discussed this issue, could not find a satisfactory
solution, and had to leave the matter of "basic units" vague.

"It is

one of the problems, " writes Pool, "to which psycholinguistics may
help to produce an answer.

But as of now it is not clear how one identi-

fies a basic unit of meaning" (162:203-204).

Linguists, on the other

hand, start out with the assumption that words, while isolable on
statistical grounds are inherently relatively meaningless unless viewed
in the context of the syntactic and semantic structure of a language.
Such a structure, however, is precisely "counted away" when applying quantitative measures of permeation.

It enters at best through the

backdoor of an extra analytical interpretation.
While the problem of basic units of meaning that are sufficiently
general for all content analyses has not been solved, the requirements
on the nature of the units that are distinguished in content analyses
seems to vary with the specific purpose of the investigation.

For

example, if the research tries to ascertain the amount of attention devoted to some country it might be adequate to enumer:ate the number
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of words explicitly referring to that country.

If more elaborately

structured images of that country are the focus of analysis it seems
necessary to define units of enumeration in terms of propositions that
include respective references etc.
Whenever actual counts are presented of, say, words, political
symbols, propositions, themes or even silences that have been identified within a speech or body of text, a critical attitude often leads to
the question "so what?"

When for example, the political symbol

"freedom" appears in a country A with the hi!jhest relative frequency
while the political symbol "dictatorship" takes the first rank among
the political symbols mentioned in country B, what does this indicate?
Are the people of country A more free than those of country B?

The

premise which seems to suggest a confirmatory answer to this question could very well be reversed on the assumption that people talk
about what they don't have.

The inferences that can be drawn from the

degree to which kno"l;n symbols permeate particular communications
are most certainly not obvious.
Since Lasswell's World Attention Survey (108) content analysts
have become more modest in their claims and take the relative frequency with which a symbol, theme, etc. appears as a measure for
the amount of attention devoted to the phenomena signified by it.

But

analysts identifying relative frequency with relative attention cannot
consider themselves on safe grounds either.
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Symbols may, for instance, be purposively selected whereby attention is devoted to something instrumentally linked but not manifestly
contingent with that symbol.

For example, someone living under

Stalinist domination who is primarily concerned with opposing this form
of government would be a fool to use the symbol "dictatorship" or even
"decentralization" too freely in public.

He is mOre likely to argue in

economic terms or express concern with the working conditions of the
people or their living standard, thus making the link to his attention
non-manifest.

When early psychological theories of stimulus reinforce-

ment were applied to political propaganda the sheer frequency of stimulation gained considerable significance.

But as it now turns out, such

theories cannot account for instrumental usages of communication,
probably not even for content as distinguished from physical stimuli.
They reduce communicators and audiences to rather primitive mechanisms of habituation.
To give another example that critically opposes the frequency
attention identification:

symbols when repeated frequently may lose

their original meanings up to the point where they become habitua,!
utterances devoid of cognitive or behavioral consequences.

This is

the essence of recent experimental work on "semantic satiation" (105) .
. It suggests that high relative frequency of a symbol may under certain
conditions be indicative of quite the opposite of high attention.
Neither is there any a priori reason for the units used in content analysis studies to be concerned with meanings in the linguistic
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or psycholinguistic sense nOr for permeation measures to be in accord
with any particular sociological or political theory.

But in order to have

any practical or theoretical significance at all, such statistical permeation measures of message characteristics have to be indicative of some
phenomena, whatever the basis of this indication may be.

This hypothe-

sized significance has yet to be substantiated in each individual situation.
One rare example of an attempt to give some significance to a
content permeation measure appears in Holsti, Brody and North's
study of the 1962 Cuban crisis (84).

The researchers subjected all

available documents issued by the major decision makers in the crisis
to a computer content analysis.

Empirical results in psycholinguistics

had gone into this analytic device which could now be used to identify
the intensity of affective meaning of each word appearing in the documents and compute an average score for each SOurce of documents on
a day- by,cdaybasis.

While the resulting scores are not strictly
.. :;

. frequency characterizations their permeation .measures are s:fficiently
similar to them.

During this crisis situation the fluctuations of Holsti,

Brody and North's permeation measures were found to significantly
correlate with those of the Dow-Jones Average of Industrial Securities.
Although this correlation is indicative of a relation between the two
measures, since the meaning of the Dow-Jones Average is not perfectly understood the significance of the content permeation measure
is still merely suggestive.

In this case the_analysts interpreted their

measures as indices of international tension.
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The content analysis described above moreover exemplifies the
maximal indicative power that can be expected from a concept of content
as a permeating characteristic.

It is limited to uncovering only the most

general tone <;>r attitudinal coloring that prevails in the communication
situation from which messages
are sampled:
,

international tension,

affective orientation, public attention or something akin to the dominant
social climate.

Since more complex syntactic and semantic structures

are discarded when the analysis focus$es on such simple statistical
measures of permeation, the organizational condition of the communications must largely remain hidden.
While also interested in such permeating message characteristics
as "the German war-mood," George (71), who participated in an extensive analysis of enemy broadcasts during World War II, provided
many irrefutable examples in which statistically insignificant occurrences, (the simple presence or absence of a reference in a political
speech or newscast) yielded reliable bases of prediction.

The propa-

ganda analysis operation of the FCC which George evaluated after the
war was of importance for policy makers in need of valid intelligence.
Under these conditions it was of little importance how standards of
reliability were assessed, which concept of content was utilized or
whether the method qualified as a content analysis by definition.

The

experiences gained during this time period seem to indicate that under
.. certain conditions non-statistical characterizat.i.ons of messages can
have more theoretical and practical significance than frequency type
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characterizations of permeation.
The problem of the theoretical significance of permeation measures has unfortunately become an issue of qualitative versus quantitative
analysis and remained as such at least since Kracaueris 1952 iiChallenge
of quantitative content analysisii (102) without getting to the basic argument.

We touched on this apparent controversy under definitional
As it seems, the critical point is that the convenient method

issues.

of measuring simple frequencies of occurrence becomes inadequate
when message sources and/or receivers exhibit higher order dependencies, much more so when they follow a complex logic; and are even
out of place when source and/ or receiver pos sess some intelligence,
e. g. produce novel instrumental communications according to particular
objectives.
The problem of whether the products of a content analytic procedure ought to be statistical or non- statistical, quantitative or qualitative, becomes rather immaterial when viewed in isolation from the
nature of the particular system from which mes sages are obtained for
analysis.

Thus, criteria for differentiating analytical units within

given mes sages and analytical procedures including their evaluative
criteria obtain their appropriativeness only in reference to a suitable
theoretical framework that is expected to predict some features of the
system under analysis.

Content as a statistically formulated permeat-

ing characteristic has not proven to have much theoretical significance
except when interpersonal or social systems can be reduced to almost
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structureles s entities.
The history of quantification shows considerable success in its
attempt to numerically represent what appeared hitherto "unanalyzable
qualities" - the componental description of color qualities in the late
19th century or the recent success in quantifying such apparent intangibles as information and intelligence may suffice as examples.

In

order to have any theoretical significance it is quite conceivable that
the analysis of message content within social systems of some complexity requires quantitative techniques that go far beyond simple
statistical permeation measures.

Such analyses may require, for

example, quantizations and transformations of syntactic structures or
computational procedures making use of elaborate models.

Quantitative

measures that are more sophisticated than simple frequencies may
prove more appropriate for the analysis of complex messages even
though such messages may appear to their receivers as non-analyzable
qualitative varieties.

Content as Intersubjectively Verifiable
A second issue which leads to theoretical implication is the role
of the "manifestness" of those message characteristics that content
analysis can supposedly handle.
It will be recalled that Berelson made it a definitional requirement of content analysis that the content to be analyzed be manifest
while Cartwright later rejected this requirement on the grounds that
latent message characteristics can also be of interest to social
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psychologists and should hence not be excluded.

The controversy and the

social psychologists' position becomes quite understandable when "manifest content" is identified - as it usually is - with a kind of dictionary
interpretation while "latent content" then becomes more like a depth interpretation as it would be given by a psychoanalyst.

But the "manifest

latent" controversy can become too easily a quibbling over words without
corning to the point.

Berelson and Lazarsfeld, for example, conceive

of this differentiation quite differently.

They argue:

If one imagines a continuum along which various communications are placed depending upon the degree to which
different members of the intended audience get the same
understandings from them, one might place a simple news
story on a train wreck at one end (since it is likely that
every reader will get the same meanings from the content) and an obscure modern poem at the other (since it is
likely that no two readers will get identical meanings from
the content). Other kinds of content will fall at various
points along this continuum. Thus analysis of manifest
content is applicable to materials at the one end of the
continuum where understanding is simple and direct and
not at the other. Presumably, there is a point on the
continuum beyond which the "latency" of the content (i. e. ,
the diversity of its understanding) is too great for reliable
analysis (30: 7 -8).
Here, "manifest content" becomes operationally. identified with
some message characteristic that produces "uniformity of comprehensian al;ld understanding" for a large majority of receivers.
other words, intersubjectively verifiable.

It is, in

Intersubjective verifiability

is also the underlying conception of content in Janis' sign-theoretical
framework that was employed as an example for explicating reliability
and validity in content analysis.

In the light of the discussion in the

section on methodological issues, we can see that in order to satisfy
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any of the methodological standards, a content analysis that regards content as an intersubjectively verifiable message characteristic is absolutely
limited to the investigation of manifest content in the sense of Berelson
and

Lazarsfe~d's

definition.

This is true even if some content analysis

proposes to investigate latent content in the sense that Cartwright presumably had in mind.

Whenever an analysis makes use - as it commonly

does - of content as an intersubjectively verifiable characteristic it must
exclude highly divergent message interpretations on the ground that such
divergent interpretations only reduce achievable levels of reliability and
hence have a diminishing effect on the probable validity of the result.
If content analysis accepts a concept of content that is existent-

iallylinked with its intersubjective verifiability it is of course compelled
to uncover only the most obvious oontent characteristics of communications.

The limitation which the so.conceived content imposes becomes

apparent when one consults, for instance, Adorno's discussion of
"various superimposed layers of different degrees of manifestness or
hiddenness that are utilized ... as a ... means of 'handling' the audience"
of television.

His main hypothesis is that the "hidden message may be

more important than the overt, since this hidden message will escape
the controls of consciousness," (3:479-480) and will therefore not be
subject to the same modes of interpretation.

Adorno gives two examples

of television plays which are overtly intended to be amusing and comical.

Their" 'hidden meaning' emerges simply by the way the story

looks at human beings; thus the audience is invited to look at (and
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identify with) the characters in the same way without being made aware
that indoctrination is present" (3:480-481).
Analyzing verbal behavior, psychoanalysts in particular have
found it useful to deal with "underlying motivations" or "deep-rooted
assumptions" quite different from those explicitly expressed.

This

approach may take, say, two political speeches both overtly supporting
the officially accepted ideology of the state, but, by utilizing fairly
complicated metaphors, symbolisms, Or allusions, may show that one
makes indirect references to peaceful coexistence, economy, and eliminating previous obstinacy, while the other stresses a revolutionary
phi,losophy. and fight against revisionism.

In certain critical political

situations such a 'hidden content' may not only be intended, but moreover, may be used instrumentally in such a way that the content is not
easily detectable by everybody. who receives the message carrying it.
The argument is not sOlely meant to be in favor of including
Adorno's '!hidden content" in the empirical domain of content analysis.
This would only replicate Cartwright's earlier cited definitional demand.

The example is mainly meant to show what is implicitly ex-

cluded from the scope of analysis when the idea of content as an intersubjectively verifiable characteristic is accepted.

The investigation

of message characteristics that can not be recognized Or of which a
large majority of audience members is unconcious can hardly ever
be validated for it would presupp.ose "uniformity of comprehension
and understanding" by the audience which those message characteristics
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will not yield by definition.

The analysis of possible effects of commun-

. ications must also be excluded on the same grounds, for the probability
of obtaining valid results (valid again in the sense of high intersubjective
agreement) from such analyses which are sometimes called "pragmatical" can, according to Janis, (91) be expected bnly to,Jje very low.
The way the concept of an intersubjectively verifiable content is
intimately interlocked with the methodology of content analysis has
theoretical consequences of even more importance.

Lasswell wrote

that "although word counting is involved in the study of communication,
not all quantitative procedures are necessarily 'content analysis.'

The

term can legitimately be applied only when 'counts' are undertaken
with reference to a general theory of the communication process"
(110:387).

Not only has such "a general theory of the communication

process" not emerged in content analytic pursuits, but the assumption
of the intersubjective verifiability of content seems fundamentally
alien to the basic ideas of communication.

This assumption is not

only opposed to tolerating possible differences in interpretative
capability between scientifically trained judges and persons presumably
handling the analyzed communications intuitively, but also fails to
account for differentiations among the specific roles, intentions and
positions those persons may occupy when constituting the communication network from which the messages were taken.

This becomes

explicit in a quotation from Berelson, who requires that
... the content be accepted as a "common meeting-ground"
for the communicator, the audience, and the analysts.
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That is, the content analysts assumes that the "meanings"
which he ascribes to the content, by assigning it to certain
categories, correspond to the "meanings" intended by the
communicator and/ or understood by the audience. In
other words, the assumption is that there is a common
universe of discourse among the relevant parties, so that
the manifest content can be taken as a valid unit of study
(27:19).
From the point of view of any conceivable theory of communication the avoidance of differentiations between the constituents of a communication network .- whether such network is an interpersonal one or
one. in which mass communication processes take .place - is ciducial.

Un-

symmetric relations between social roles, conflicts (whether centered
around unequal distribution of power, capabilities or opportunities), and
differential access to information are but a few prerequisites of social
communication processes.

Differences in the interpretation of com-

munications that may stern from such conditions can very well be indicative of the dynamics of the communication process itself.

The concept

of an intersubjectively verifiable content can hardly obtain an exclusive
position in any communication theory.
For instance, a rrlost prhnitive conception of a cOITlITlunication

situation may postulate that messages flow only from someone informed
to SOmeone ignorant of the issue.

Assuming this to be the case, a given

message must consequently be interpreted differently depending on who
is asked to reproduce its content.

Interpretative differences of a given

message may very well indicate the possible communication structures
that a message may facilitate; they may very well provide the basis for
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predicting the probable pattern of information flow within a social group
or throughout a population.
Or, consider the phenomena of propaganda, the manifestation of
social power in messages.

Dahl, for example, considers political power

as measurable in two respects: the first is the ability of an actor to
produce a change in the probability distribution of a class of repetitive
outcomes, the second is the frequency of association of an actor with
outcomes that appear successful from the actor's presumed point of
view (48).

Political power lies in the essentially unsymmetric nature

of a communication relation and appears by analyzing the interpretative
differences and their peculiar interlinkages.

Thus, the influencee

might find himself increasingly involved in watching a popular television
program while the growing popularity of the program helps the sponsor
to sell his goods.

For the one the program provides entertainment,

for the other a convenient means to focus popular attention.

To neglect

such differences is to eliminate the possibility of inferring even the
most rudimentary. social relationships of communication situations
from which such messages are taken.
And yet there seems to be no a priori reason for not allowing
an analysis to account for those interpretational differences that
provide re lia ble
processes.

of

pos sible

dynamics

of

comn1.unication

Prerequisite for such analyses is, of course, the abandon-

ment of the idea of content as something unique which is supposedly
recognizably manifest in some physical stimuli for a large number of
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individuals including the scientifically trained judge, or simply the rejection of the idea of an intersubjectively verifiable content.
In asking the question as to whose meaning is supposed to be

categorized by a content analysis, Janis recognized that these messages
may be different for different audience s or communicators whose signification responses are intended to be estimated.

"The classification

procedures of semantical content analysis ... require the classification
of sign-vehicles on the basis of the coordinated signification responses
of some class of sign interpreters" (91:432).

In this case the inter-

s:ubjective verifiability. is not abandoned but only limited to a specialized
audience delineated in advance.

Results that such an analysis can pro-

vide still cannot be expected to have significance in the light of a theory
of corrnllunication

Q

But it is quite conceivable that a series of analyses of a given
sample of communications could - as suming various information processing regularities that derive from the structure and constituencies
of the communication situation - yield results that not only differ from
each other but moreover make no attempt to represent something like
signification responses of the persons involved.

These analytical re-

sults, though not necessarily intersubjectively verifiable, may indeed
provide the empirical basis for reconstructing the underlying communication network of the system under consideration as well as for
inferring some of its inherent dynamics.
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What we are arguing for is the liberation of content analysis from
the idea of an intersubjectively verifiable content in order for its results
to be relevant for a theory of communication.

Since this content con-

cept is so deeply built into the analytical technique its change would require considerable modifications of the procedure.

Content as Individually Realizable
A third quite serious theoretical issue is the dominantly psychological formulation of the content analytic process and hence the conception of content as only individually realizable.
By "psychological formulation of content analysis" we do not
suggest that categories are held to be of psychological significance only.
As Barcus' tabulation of the content analysis literature shows, categories of content refer more often to social matters such as prejudice,
social stereotypes, majority and minority representation (31) or to
political matters such as attitudes toward ideological complexes, pro
and con fascism (111), political symbols (113) and values of elites (9).
Berelson explains what the individual realizability of content encompasses:
In a sense, content analysis occurs whenever someone
summarizes and/ or interprets what he reads or hears
... But in the more limited sense in which it is used
here, content analysis denotes a ... method ... intended
to provide precise and concise descriptions of what the
communication says, ... : (l60:iii).

As we have shown, Janis,too,presupposes a judge'S ability to
estimate the signification responses of a class of sign interpreters
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to a given set of sign-vehicles.

Whether content is here conceived of as

the "what" that a communication" sa ys, " connoting a unique and manife st
quality or whether it is viewed as an estimate of the signification responses that is intersubjectively verifiable with respect to members of
a particular audience

1

it is always

11soll1eo.tlAel~11'

who sUInn1arizes, inter-

prets or estimates an apparently otherwise intangible message characteristic.

This is true whether this "someone" is a scientifically trained

judge who becomes an essential part of the analytical procedure or
whether' it is a communicator and/ or audience member who is regarded
as providing validity criteria for the analysis, the meanings, significations, and contents are assumed to be housed solely in an individual
human being.

They are, so to speak, ethnocentral attributes.

As a consequence of this built-in conception of content as only
individually realizable, one obse rver of content analysis, S'chutz (171),
whose definition was cited above, goes even so far as to declare that
content analysis basically a psychological method of inquiry which is
in this respect in agreement with Osgood"s view.

He correctly per-

ceived that the content analytic procedure as 'currently followed is
essentially analoguous to the psychological technique of projective
tests.

Both, content analysis and such projective tests as the Rorschach

and the Thematic Apperception Test,o££er a person texts, visual displays and other material for a symbolic interpretation.

The difference

lies only in the interpretation of the results obtained in such situations.
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While response variations in content analysis are assumed to be
due to some characteristics in the material presented to the respondent,
response variations in projective tests are assumed to be due to variations in the respondents personality.

By controlling for reliability and

forcing judges to follow explicit categorization rules, content analysis
at least aims at setting possible personality differences of the respondents at invariance.

Projective tests, on the other hand, try to standard-

ize the relatively ambiguous material presented to the respondents and
thus hope to gain certainty about the way mental mechanisms are expressed in the responses and the way in which elicited projections
are to be interpreted reliably.

While most of the tests are by now

fairly well understood to "tap the durable essenCe of personality" (8),
content analysis is in a triply difficult situation, for (al the content
categories are rarely ever standardized, (b) the universe of possible
projections is virtually infinite and (cl there seems to be no adequate
theoretical framework that could account for personality-independent
projections elicited by the material presented.
In a self-critical momeht,' Lasswell and associates, whose

work is almost entirely devoted to the content analysis of political
symbols in the above mentioned fashion, admit that
..' . there is as yet no good theory of symbolic communication by' which to predict how given values, attitudes, or
. ideologies will be expressed in manifest symbols. The
extent theories. tend to deal with values, attitudes, and
ideologies as the ultimate units, not with the symbolic
atoms of which they are composed. There is almost no
theory of language which predicts the specific words one
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will emit in the course of expressing the content of this
thought. Theories in philosophy or in the sociology of
knowledge sometimes enable us to predict ideas that will
be expressed by persons with certain other ideas or
social characteristics. But little thought has been
given to predicting the specific words in which these
ideas will be cloaked. The content analyst, therefore,
does not know what to expect (113:49).
"
In a situation that lacks adequate theoretical frameworks, not

to speak of established theories, the ease with which individually
,realized mes sage characteristics are projected onto socio- political
structures seems surprising, especially since judges are considered
to be scientifically trained.

But even if some' certainty could be gained

concerning this critical theoretical issue, when data are obtained from
more complex social systems it is quite conceivable that the concept
of content as an individually realizable message characteristic is
entirely inadequate for providing information about viable structures
of that system simply because the information processing capacity of
an unaided human individual is fairly limited and even more restricted
by particular points of view that are inevitably acquired.
Let us consider a very common example from the customary
empirical domain of content analysis:

products of modern mass

culture in industrialized societies such as books, records of popular
mus'ic, television shows, fads or fashions, popular celebrities.
While these messages are distributed on a mass basis to very large
audiences whose members enjoy them and respond to them more
or less as individuals they are undoubtedly the outcome of highly
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organized collaborations of man and machines, each participant of which
fulfills specialized functions in, derives motivations and obtains rewards
from those complex organizational frameworks.
It is, of course, always possible to apply a psychologically based
content analysis procedure

to industrially produced messages and corne

up with some subjectively satisfying description of their characteristics
which may - in a case that is considered ideal in content analysis - even
be congruous with the signification responses of those audience members
toward which the communications were directed.

However, the discovery

of antecedent conditions of such communications which go beyond the
habitual interpretations by single individuals must escape a concept of
content as an individually realizable characteristic.

Members of mass

media audiences perceive only the front of a stage made up of authors,
actors, simple interpersonal relations, social situations or features
purposefully cultivated about them.

Judges chosen from such audiences

are more likely to achieve reliability along habituated lines.
The incapability of an approach to content analysis that is limited
to the individual realizability of content refers specifically to the impact of more complex, super-individual, socio-technological structures
of which the nature of the mass produced messages seems to be the
outcome.

The personification of modern governmental machineries

or of international relations is a symptom of this incapability.

Or, to

stick to our example of mass media products, that under these conditions individual authors are still associated with them is but an
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unconscious remainder of pre-industrialized culture and a useful sales
argument skillfully manipulated by the cultural industry at large.
Adorno put it vividly:

As

"To study television shows in terms of the

psychology of the authors would almost be tantamount to studying Ford
cars in terms of the psychoanalys.is of the late Mr. Ford" (3:482).
Even Adorno, who in opposition to the inter subjective verifiability of content suggested consideration of "various levels of hidden
messages" for analysis, is still limited to its individual realizability,
although he regards content within a social psychological framework.
This concept of content as individually realizable message characteristic allows for individual differences in interpretation but can treat
neither communicator nor audience as an organization but as an
agglomeration of individuals.

The difference appears, for instance,

in the multiplicity of aspects under which the successful communication industry tends to view its own products and the singleness with
which such a product appears to an individual.

This multiplicity of

functionally interlinked I contents! which reflect the complexity of a
social communication network may, in fact, be purposefully reduced
to a simple single interpretation on the part of an individual consumer.
Whenever sufficient evidence exists that participants in a communication situation are independent individuals or that its participants
can be viewed as an agglomeration of people without too much loss as it may be justifiable for the typical atidieu€·e of modern mass
media - the concept of an individually realizable content seems
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perfectly adequate.

But whenever messages mediate between. social

structures of some complexity.,i. e. are the outcome of a non-random
interaction process of which individuals are constituent participants,
the analytical use of this concept of content must lead to faulty results.
The fact that virtually no objections to content analysis have been raised
along this line can be considered indicative of the content analyst's
position in this situation.

While practically and theoretically incapable

of analyzing the content of a given message as it pertains to an interpretation on the part of the complex social organization of the mass
media, he is severely bound by the nature of the popularizations, the
images and points of view that ,the communication industry tries to
create and maintain and can do rfothing but conform in seeking validating support for his analysis in the happily individualized mass media
audience.

A psychologically formulated content analysis that is based on
the individual realizability of content could almost be paraphrased as
an attempt to replicate or represent aspects of subjectively meaningful cognitive processes that are evoked by some stimuli whereby these
aspects are regarded as symbolic manifestations of the psycho- social
environment of the subject.

The ease with which such individual

realizations are customarily projected onto social structures, or
its reverse, i. e., sOcial events are studied through the cognitive
processes of their participants, has had no suitably formulated theoretical basis but a long history and continual support by western
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philosophies who have defined signs, symbols, language etc. in such a
way that they uniquely segregate man from animals on the one hand and
individual from society on the other.

A concept of content that is super-

individually realizable is virtually nonexistent.
When communications between social organizations are intended
to be the subject of something like a content analysis the relevant
messages must be expected to exhibit an extremely complicated "grammar" and "semantics" and tend to contain much more information than
a single human being maybe able to process.

Thus the analysis of the

products of such social organizations as the mas s media industry,
political parties Or whole cultures as messages, and in terms of the
dynamics of the underlying communication networks, must be assumed
to be veiyinvolved.

Analyses of this magnitude necessitate adequate

theoretical frameworks within which scientific teams can cooperate
effectively and elaborate investigative tools can develop.
Very little has been done to enlarge the scope of content
analysis beyond the boundary that the individual realizability of content imposes.

Perhaps Hall's insightful interpretation of culture as

a gigantic commu;nication process· should be noted as an example.
Unfortunately, his attempt to develop a "vocabulary of culture" of
which messages transcending the lifetime of individual human beings
are thought to be composed (81) has not found empirical applications.
We have focused on three theoretical-conceptual issues that
seemed most critical in implicitly delineating the scope of content
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analysis.

As far as one can speak of a concept of "content" in psycho-

logical tests involving symbolic responses it is most certainly conceived
of as an individually realizable quality of the material presented.

When

one attempts to suppress the effects of personality variables on such
symbolic interpretations and then proceeds to extrapolate from these
interpretations to the possible signification responses of communicators
and/ or audience members of a communication situation, "content" then
becomes moreover an J.ntersubjectively verifiable characteristic.

In-

direct validation makes necessary, and the volume of material typically
analyzed favors the view of "content" as a permeating characteristic of
communications.

Although these critical theoretical issues are com-

pletely. independent of the methodological dilemma in content analysis
they are closely related to the way trained judges and their nonformalized content concept are explicitly and exclusively used as
crucial constituents of the analytic process.

After elaborating on the

practical consequences of these theoretical issues it is now appropriate
to focus briefly on some of the potential breakthroughs.
One of the legacies of propaganda analysis in World War II are
some sound objections to content analysis and the rudimentary form
of a theoretical framework for a new approach.

Although the permea-

tion of moods, tensions and anxieties in domestic propaganda were
also of interest to the policy makers of that time, they placed more
value upon predictions of military actions and inferences._ concerning
expectations of the governing elite.

While the analysis was used in
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this context rather pragmatically and explicit descriptions of the theoretical assumptions and propositions were not attempted until after the
war, (71) it became quite obvious that an analysis that was based on a
concept of content as elaborated above was not very likely-to bring about
the desired results.

Account had to betaken of the social structure of

the governing elite, their deciSion-making situation, and in particul<u
the position of the propagandist within that elite and in relation to the
population to be mobilized.

The conventional content became merely

a vehicle through which specific insights could be gained, and not the
object of description.

This inductive element which is quite alien to

content analysis as an investigative technique is already manifest in
the interest of the propaganda analyst ":S stated by George:
In propaganda analysis, typically, the investigator is
interested in inferring one or more of the following
antecedent conditions of the propagandist's communication: his propaganda goals and techniques; the estimates, expectations, and policy intentions of the leadership group for whom the propagandist is speaking
which have influenced the adoption of a particular
propaganda strategy; the situational factors or changes
which have influenced the leadership's estimates,
expectations, and policy intentions and/or the propagandist's choice of communication goals and techniques
(70:18).

According to George the propaganda analyst proceeds through
a series of inferential steps from the most obvious linguistic features
of a message to those of interest to the analyst.

While the traditional

content analyst takes into consideration, only what the communication
manifestly "says, " the propaganda analyst assumes such surface
appearances to be subsumed under a propaganda strategy which is to
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be inferred as a first step inorder to get at elite intentions, expectations
etc.

George argues that this "indirect method requires logic-of-the-

situation reasoning and the use of generalizations other than the one-toone type of correlation between a content indication and an aspect of the
elite I s political behavior Or situational milieu" (71 :43).
Making inferences from texts as to their antecedent conditions
or possible effects became also the concern which seemed to unite the
efforts of many participants at the working conference on content
analysis mentioned above.

Here Osgood remarked that there seemS to

be a "general natural law" relating the nature of a message with the
nature of its producer and it appeared that the analysis of messages is
very much concerned with some such law.

Elaborations on some such

law, Mahl's IIExploring Emotional States by Content Analysis" showed,
for example, how speech disturbances such as superfluous repetitions,
hesitations, stuttering, and sentence corrections may be used clinically
as indicators of an individual's state of anxiety (124).

Note that such

speech disturbances are traditionally not considered subject to semantic
analysis and have certainly little to do with signification habits or
meaning in the common sense of the word.

Saporta and Sebeok made

a similar point in their paper on "Linguistics and Content Analysis:"
"presumably, deviations from the structural norms in the formal
characteristics of messages would then be correlated with differences
in the intentions, behavioral states, in short, with some non-linguistic
conditions in the producer of those messages" (169:131).

92
While Mahl based the validation of hi$ analysis on some kind of
intersubjective verifiability, namely, on a high correlation between the
judgements of experienced psycho-diagnosticians with the measures
obtained, Osgood sought validating evidence for his inferences in psychological experiments.

He could show "that contingencies among

events in messages are indicative of the association structure in the
source and predictive of the association structure that may result in
the receiver" (147:73).

The "association structure" that can be in-

ferred from contingencies in messages can be regarded as a theoretical
construct that has its roots in classical associationism in psychology
and has been used to explain a variety of behavioral phenomena.

While

Osgood's contingency analysis provides a tool for the description of
a particular message characteristic that is quite different from
simple frequency characterizations, the meaningfulness of its results
is rendered only under the assumption of a particularly psychological
theory of human cognition.

Thus, contingency analysis as an ap.alytical

tool remains entirely descriptive.

As a technique for counting some

identifiable CO-Occurrences in messages it does not offer a method for
making inferences from messages.
When analyzing a written text a psychological point of view
suggests itself immediately, for the text having been produced by an
individual author can most obviously be expected to reflect nonlinguistic features of that author.

Even the analysis of Nazi propa-

ganda had to consider the personality and propaganda habits of Goebbels
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as a first step.

Less specifically psychological in orientation is a state-

ment by Gerbner, who took up the main argument advanced in propaganda
analysis and at the conference.

He wanted to "see in content the basis

for inference about specific functional relations between the communicating agent or agency and other events or systems, and about actual or
potential consequences" (74:87), and not as a kind of objective summary
of what the message says to someone.

For him, "a 'communication'

is ... a specialized, formally coded or representative social event which
makes possible inferences about states, relationships, processes not
directly observed.

The 'process' of communication is the transmission

of such events and sharing of certain inferences.

The 'content' of com-

munication is the sum total of warranted inferences that can be made
about relationships involved in the communication event" (74:86).

The

above statement was part of an attempt to introduce a conceptual framework for content analysis in mass communications research.

But the

paper containing this statement did not go so far as to outline how such
a view can be implemented on a practical basis.

According to Gerbner 2

this formulation has not found any reflection in empirical research,
which is rather unfortunate.
A recent review of "Trends in content analysis" by Stephenson
led to the conclusion that in the focus on methodological problems of
computing data, "Osgood's contingency analysis, for example, merely

2George Gerbner, personal communication to the author,
February 1966.
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sidetracks genuine communication problems, providing complications of
facts which have no relevancy to such problems.

A return to earlier

formulations, and to real problems would provide the necessary theoretical basis for sound theoretical use of content analysis" (186:155).
But Stephenson also neither offers any convincing argument for a reorientation of the goals of content analysis, nor specifies the critical
issues of such computational techniques from a theoretical point of view.
Since the conference on trends in content analysis no significant
theoretical contributions to content analysis have been published.
Numerous applications in sociology, psychology, communications research and linguistics rarely indicate a departure from those traditional
research ideas which have already been suggested by Berelson and
Lazarsfeld (30) Berelson(27) (28) and recently been reviewed by
Pool (162).
ing.

Perhaps a handbook by North and others is worth mention-

It discusses some of the .more sophisticated procedures for

analyzing historical documents in reference to situations of international conflict (142).

But, this work as well as HolsH's yet unpub-

lished review of content analysis (83) and Stone's report on his work
with the General Inquirer cornputerprograms (188) (189) (190) do not
provide new theoretical insights either, and Stephenson's unexplained
dis s a tisfa ction a pplie s a swell.
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Summary
This is essentially the current state of content analysis .. Its
critical issues show more unsolved problems than resolutions. Already
the definitions that have been advanced in the cause of its development
and that ought to have distinguish this mode of inquiry from others are
by and large insufficient;

Neither do they unambiguously delineate the

empirical domain to which the method is presumably applicable, nor
do they clearly as sert toward what use such analyses may be put.

The

few attempts to specify analytical procedures that are typical of this
mode of inquiry are either too narrow or have been shown to easily
lead to methodological inadequacies that may render content analysis
a method full of fallacies and hence, inacceptable on intellectual
grounds.
The more carefully the habitual use of this investigative technique is examined, the weaker does its theoretical foundations appear.
It seems that the intentions of the content analysts and their claims

often run far ahead of their understanding of the constraints that
a re built into particular methodologies.

Part of the difficulties, it

seems, stern from unnecessary commitments regarding explicit
procedures of enumeration and computation that have been useful
in other domains of empirical inquiry but are apparently alien to the
study of the content of messages.

If data are subjected to an

analysis because of their known Or assumed "semanticity" or
"referentiality," their "symbolic nature" or by virtue of the fact
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that they are "about!! something else~ or have

lI

c o n tent

j

It

then it ITlust be

argued that specific ll1ethodological requirell1Emts have to be ll1et which
ll1ay be irrelevant where such assull1ptions are inconsequential.
Rather than systell1atically working to elill1inate ll1ethodological
defects and to enhance the power of theoretical frall1eworks, whether
consciously or not, content analysis seell1S to have frequently ll1ade
use of its techniques for reason other than that of gaining verifiable
. information froll1 available data.

The peculiar historical origins of

this undertaking may account for this use.
The current state of content analysis seell1S all the 1l10re unsatisfactory considering the fact that the ll1ethod today constitutes
probably the 1l10st fundall1ental tool in comll1unications research and
in the social sciences as far as they are concerned with the exchange.
of messages of any kind.
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CHAPTER THREE

TEN WORKING EXAMPLES

As has been shown in the previous chapter, the current conception of content analysis as an investigative method is unsatisfactory in
numerous respects.

This makes it difficult to conceive that a redefini-

tion of this widely used term will bring about the desired adequacy.
The strong associations between these previously elaborated insufficiencies and the term "content analysis" alone justify the introduction
of another, broader, and intuitively more satisfactory' name for our
subject matter:

message analysis.

What is meant by "message" will be clarified later.

Forthe

rnOITlent it suffices to assume the intuitive notion of a l1m.essage 1! as

"a communication about something not identical with the materiality
of that which is transmitted." A letter could, for example, be considered a message on the ground that it tells a reader something about
something other than the paper and ink of which it consists.

But the

notion of message becomes more interesting if it is extended beyond
its conventional interpretation to include, for example, the products
of popular mass media if they indicate to an analyst some antecedent
condition of their industrial production or omission, or allow him to
predict the pos sible socio- cultural consequence s of their existence.
On the other extreme this notion should be broad enough to encompass
non-verbal behavior of which the individual may not be aware.
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Graphology would be an example of this extreme (214).
In the light of the previous criticism it does not seem feasible to

start-out by defining what message analysis IS or how it OUGHT to be
understood, but rather to ask what problems are solved with it and what
methods are employed when data are considered as messages in the
above-mentioned sense.

Therefore we begin to describe various inci-

dents in which directly observable phenomena were treated as a message
about something else.

In order to emphasize the generality of our con-

cern the ten examples which are chosen below refer to a wide range of
areas, some of which appear to deal with problems of message analysis
only on second inspection.
Working example I, for instance, describes the decipherment
of a language, a classical problem of archaeology.

A historically in-

teresting case of what is called "quantitative semantics" is reported
as working example II. Cryttography provides the working example
IlL

From literary research working example IV could be taken.

Working example V is an example of war propaganda analysis.

The

use of propaganda analysis for intelligence purposes is exemplified
in VI.

The authors of working examples V, VII and VIn are com-

mitted to communications research, each from a different point of·
view, but all dealing with mass media products of one kind or another.
Working examples IX and X are included to show the role computers
may play in message analysis with X as a specific application to
psychodiagnosis.

99
The working examples are assumed to provide a sufficiently
broad support for the generalizations concerning the goals of such an
inquiry, the analysis of the underlying methodological pattern and a
statement of the specific empirical problems associated with message
analysis which are attempted in succeeding chapters.

Working example I
One of the traditional subjects of archaeology is the inquiry
into hitherto unreadable records pertaining to ancient cultures.

liThe

greatest single task of decipherment ever performed ll is, according to
Pratt (164:19), the decipherment of the old Persian script.

Although

this accomplishment belongs to the history of science, it may provide
a good illustration for a certain type of message analysis although a
replication of such an incident is improbable.
During the 17th century, when many European travelers discovered origins of civilizations in the Near East, several inscriptions
were copied from the rocks of old Persian ruins and published as
mysteries along with the travel adventures.

Neither the purpose of

these inscriptions, nor the language in which they were written was
known.
According to Doblhofer (52:81-113), our main source for this
example, the first contribution to an understanding of these cuneiform
characters was evidence provided in support of the hypothesis that
the inscriptions were written horizontally and not vertically as was
assumed at that time.

Years later Carsten Niebuhr, mathematician,
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engineer and archaeologist, discovered that the inscriptions belonged
to three different writing systems.

He concentrated on the first,

distinguished 42 different characters but could not make sense out of
the extensive frequency tables he compiled.
After he died the orientalist and librarian Oluf Gerhard
Tychsen continued.

He correctly assumed that the role of one of the

characters which appeared with a frequency unusual for natural
languages is that of a word-distinction-marker.

His knowledge of

philology led him to conclude that the three writing systems discovered
earlier belonged to three different languages, the first based on an
alphabetical, the second on a syllabic and the third on a word script
none of which was known.
a ,blind alley.

But two important mistakes led him into

The one was that he tried to assign phonetic values to

the characters in the hope of finding a language close enough to give
meaning to the words.

He obtained only gibberish.

The second was

a misdating of the Persian inscriptions.
Friedrich Christian Karl Heinrich Munter paralleled the discoveries of Tychsen but, being in addition familiar with the medieval
Persian usage of titles, he reasoned that if the seven characters which
had already been noted to be repetitious in the inscriptions, refer to
"King" and "King of Kings, " then the preceding word should be a personal name.

This was all he could achieve during his lifetime.

Then carne George Friedrich Grotefend, no orientalist, but a
thorough philologist and historian with broad interests and a
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predilection for mathematical puzzles.

He knew enough of medieval

mythology and was sufficiently equipped to place the many hypotheses
which had been accumulating in a proper historical context.

Herodot,

with whom he was thoroughly familiar provided him with lists of
names from which he had to select.

The fact that these three writing

systems had also been found together On clay plates indicated a period
in which three languages had to have been used simultaneously.

This

period had to coincide with the names of three successive kings if
Munter's hypotheses were correct.

The Greek names of kings satis-

fying such a condition could then be identified but old Persian was an
unknown language.

Happily, their translation into medieval Persian

corresponded to the number of characters at the appropriate places.
So Grotefend gained the total of 13 letters and several other word interpretations consistent with the mythology handed down through
history, and with what became independently known about those places
where the inscriptions were found.
The comparative philologist Ramus Christian Rask could
correctly determine the genitive plural of "king" after other inscriptions became available.

Then Engene Burnouf published a new

cuneiform alphabet and suggested that several of Grotefend's
interpretations were wrong.

The indiologist,

sanscritist and

historian Christian Larsson, being equipped with thorough knowledge of the documents pertaining to the historical period and area
. in which the script presumably originated, could suggest certain

I
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very probable interpretations of the situation in which the texts were
written.

His work resulted in a new alphabet which already contained

23 phonetically correct determined letters.

Later several missing

signs were independently interpreted by E. E. F. Beer, E. V. St.
Jacquet and others.

The final and probably most inclusive contribution

to the decipherment of the old Persian script is due to Henry Creswicke
Rawlinson, who as British representative in this area discovered numerous monuments with similar inscriptions and could- -in cooperation
with the ongoing research in Europe--complete the task in the middle
of the 19th century.

The script could then be transc ribed and the

documents translated into modern languages capable of denoting what
the inscriptions presumably referred to.
The working example represents

of message analysis.

J

of course

J

an extrellle case

The obstacles which had to be removed to

achieve a correct reading of the records were so great that it occupied
the lifetime of four generations of distinguished scientists.

There-

fore the case illustrates most clearly some of the steps required for
such an analysis and the kind of knowledge brought to bear on such a
problem.

Working example II
18th century Sweden provides an example where a religious
controversy was decided by applying certain rudimentary quantitative
techniques to written text.

The incident is documented by Dovring

(55) (56) and involved a collection of 90 hymns, entitled "Songs of Zion."
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The songs of unknown authorship passed the state censor and were
published several times during a period when the powerful state church
felt undermined by various religious movements.

Disobedient behavior

was observed, and suspiciously enough those people using the songs dared
to choose their preachers according to their preferences, leaving empty
the churches to which they were assigned.

The popular ministers soon

became associated with a religious sect, the Moravian Brethren, and
the orthodox clergy accused the songs of being "contagious, " carrying
"dangerous ideas" which "may have disastrous consequences for the
whole Swedish state. "
The controversy soon crystallized around the question of whether
the apparently quite popular songs were in fact the carriers of those
disintegrating thoughts or not.
quite pointless.

The accusation seemed, however,

The frequency distribution of significant symbols

i~

the songs showed close resemblance to the one in the official hymnal
of the established church and no obvious difference between these two
song books seemed to justify the prediction of "disastrous effects. "
However, the clergy and intellectuals

invo~ved

in this contro··

versy were not only well read but also had continual acc'ess to foreign
newspapers.

A study of the German literature written in opposition

to the Moravian movement revealed that the sect used a "special
language" in the dissemination of their "dangerously diffuse doctrine."
Their ideas were dressed in the ordinary language of each country's
native tongue but new meanings were given to well known words,
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themes and symbols.

Because of the familiarity of the words and phrases

used by the Moravians, the public was not aware of being exposed to a
new way of thinking.

According to Dovring, the learned clergyman

"Kumblaeus felt that this use of language made it possible for the Moravians to conce"l dangerous, false doctrines, and to create 'a state within
the state'" (55;392).
Kumblaeus then devised a kind of key-syrnbol-in-context method
in order to recover the apparently concealed information.

This method

not only significantly distinguished the songs from the official hymns,
but, moreover, clearly brought to light some of those features of the
"special language" which had been described in the literature to be indicative of the Moravian Brethren's propaganda technique.

Supplemented

by other "tests" and further "interrogations" the analysis led to the
irrefutable conclusion that the songs indeed represented a link between
the religious dissenters' behavior and the activities of the Moravian
movement.

The example refers probably to the first well documented incident in the history of message analysis in which non-conventional
indicators of written text (i. e. not based on conventional or dictionary
meanings of words) were used to draw inferences as to possible communication links.

Although the analytical tools employed were not

highly developed, Dovring claims that a reconsideration of the investigation with modern scientific methods of quantitative semantics
confirms the "correctness of many of the accusations
orthodox clergy" (55:394).

mad·~·

by the
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Working example III
The history of the concealment of information goes back to the
Greeks who supposedly first made this art purposefully subservient to
the needs of diplomacy and the army.

But cryptography, as the science

of secret communication is called today, reached its highest significance when the organization of big armies started to rely on wireless
telegraphy, a medium of corrununication which could easily be overheard
by an opponent.

But simultaneously with the advance of secret codes

arose the skill to break them.

Many war situations therefore depended

on whether the cryptographer of one side could outwit the one on the
other, by analyzing those messages the content of which were intentionally concealed from him.
Pratt (164:183-187) vividly describes how Union cryptographers
during the American Civil War scored their most spectacular success.
In fall of 1864 the Union operations in the southwest were not prosper-

ing.

General Canby commanded there for the Federals andihis problem

was what Kirby Smith's Rebels meant to do.

The rebels were lighter

and moved faster than Canby could; unless he figured out their intentions in advance he would have to guard every point 'at once, an

under-

taking for which sufficient troops were not available .

.

Just at this time three documents were transmitted to Union
headquarters in New Orleans.

One was a telegram partly cipher,

partly clear, that had been taken from a tapped Confederate wire:
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September 30
To Genl. Eo Ko Smith:
What are you doing to execute the instructions
sent you to HCDLLVW XMWqIG KiM GOEl DMWI IN
VAS DGUGUHDMlTDo If success will be more certainyou can substitute EJTFKMPG OPGEEVT
KQFARLF TAG HEEPZZU BBWYPHDN OMOMNQQGo
By which you may effect 0 TPQGEXYK abo"., that
part HJ OPG KWMCT patrolled by the ZMGRlK GGlUL
CW EWBNDLXLo
Jeffno Davis
The second was a telegram which had been intercepted two years
before, looking somewhat similar to the first.

Vicksburg, Deco 26, 1862
Geno Jo Eo Johnston, Jackson:
I prefer OAAVVR, it has reference to XHVKJ
QCHFF IBPZE LREQP ZWNYK to prevent PNUZE
YXSWS TPJW at this point. ROEEL PSGHV ELVTZ
FIUTL rLASL TLHlF NOIGT SMMLF GCCAJ Do
J Co Pemberton
0

With the third document carne a note saying that it probably is
the original clear of the secondo

It had been found among the captured

Confederate papers at the fall of Vicksburg and corresponded in date,
phraseology, and number of letters:

I prefer Cantono It has reference to fortifications at Yazoo City to prevent passage of river at
that point. Force landed about three thousand,
above mouth of rivero

The cryptographic department at New Orleans was sufficiently
familiar with the Vigen'ere

tableau,'

a device by means of which the

clear of a message could be transformed into a cipher according to a
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variable key. It was discovered that the Pemberton message of 1862 was
written by means of that device.

With the ciphered message and its

clear, the key "MANCHESTER BLUFF" could be worked out, for the
process of extracting the key is in the Vigenere tableau just the reverse
of enciphering the message.

But this was not the key for the message

to Smith.
Like the Pemberton message, the telegram included passages
in clear; the irregular grouping of the letters seemed, moreover, to
indicate word divisions.

In particular the last sentence of the message

had a peculiar suggestive structure to the cryptographer:
BY WHICH YOU MAY EFFECT * ':0:'****1.,* ABOVE
THAT PART *,~ *** *",*** PATROLLED BY THE

****** *****

*:::~ *:;.~***~?:**

0

The only patrols in that part of the world and of the war were the naval
gunboat patrols on the river.

He tried "of the river" between "part"

and "patrolled" to extract the key and got "TE VICTORY C," a perfectly sensible fraction which could not possibly have been the result
of a fortuitous process.
However, the key was still incomplete, especially its beginning
was missing.

The longer word at the end of the message seemed to

offer several possibilities, but the one-letter word followed by another
eight letters could only be an "a" and for the eight-letter word the
cryptographer could think only of "crossing." Again he tried to extract the key and obtained "ORY COMPLE."

The two fractions

appeared successive in the message, hence, giving "COMPLETE
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VICTOR Y" as the key to the decipherment.
Beyond any doubt the message could now be read.
Kirby Smith".
Mississippi..

It ordered

to forward troops to the east side of the
"and contained precisely that information which

Canby needed to plan his campaign.
In comparison with I and II this working example is probably
most restricted.

Perhaps just because of it, it provides an illustra-

tion for a message analysis in which the structure of the message is
fairly simple and well understood in advance but the sheer quantity of
combinatorial possibilities goes and is typically intended to go far
beyond the possibility of achieving an interpretation by trial.

Working example IV
Literary historians find themselves frequently engaged in the
identification of authors of unsigned documents.

Controversies as to

whom Shakespeare's plays can be attributed, whether or not St. Paul
wrote the epistle to the Ephesians, and in which sequence Plato wrote
his works, are still partly unresolved.
Probably the first sophisticated quantitative approach to such
problems was presented by Yule in his book The Statistical Study
Literature (217).

~

The unidentified document which provided the

challenge for this investigation was a small but well-known volume
entitled De Imitatione Christi et Contemptu Omnium Vanitatum
Mundi henceforth called Imitatio.

The authorship was and still

109
seems to .be vigorously disputed.

Among the candidates to which the

book was ascribed are St. Bernard, St. Bonaventure, Pope Innocent III,
Gerard Groote, and most prominantly Thomas

'a

Kempis (1379-1471) of

the diocese of Cologne, and Jean Charlier De Gerson (1363-1429) of
Paris University.
Yule argued that "words are to the writer what paints are to
the painter, the materials at his disposal for the purpose of creation"
. and in order to answer any question concerning the authorship of
a piece of literature "every element of that highly complex quality of
the author's style may and should be taken into account, but amongst
those elements his vocabulary -- the aggregate of words he uses
takes an important position.
(217: 1).

It is a definite characteristic,

"

Consequently vocabulary samples were taken from the theo-

logical work of Gerson, from miscellaneous works of a Kempis and
from the unidentified Irnitatio itself.
While working on these texts, Yule perceived an analogy between his data showing numbers of words used once, twice, thrice,
etc., and data showing number of persons of a finite population being
involved in 0, 1, 2, 3 . . . accidents during a given period of exposure.
The theory of accident distribution had received a great deal of attention during that time and led him to develop several statistical indices
by means of which various features of the vocabulary distribution
within written texts could be comparatively stated.
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Supplemented by numerous data concerning variations of these
indices within the different works of one author, concerning variations
among different authors writing in the same subject area and data
about sampling affects, the three documents in question could be compared.

The vocabulary indices of the Imitatio exhibited a considerably

higher degree of resemblance with the ones of the admitted works of
~ Kempis than with those of the theolDgical works of Gerson.

From

this indirect evidence Yule concluded with a high degree of confidence

,

that Thomas a Kempis was the author of the Imitatio and not the alleged
Charlier De Gerson.
This example is of interest in several ways.

While the previous

working examples dealt in some sense with conventional meanings
either directly (I), indirectly (II), or as a check for the plausibility of
the inference (III), Yule did not rely on such meanings in predicting
the deceased originator of a document.

His work can also be considered

as the first attempt to use statistical methods not just in support of an
otherwise independent inferential argument, but as an inferential
method.

We will refer to this method later.

Working example V
In late 1939 U. S. legislation required the registration of foreign agents with the State Department.

The measure was intended to

disclose the identity of persons employed for the dissemination of
"antidemocratic propaganda."

In conjunction with the enforcement
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of such legislation, Federal courts accepted the results of quantitative
methods of content analysis as evidence.
Among the most prominent cases one "involved a corporation
engaged chiefly in the dissemination of books, periodicals and other
publications.

Although a subsidiary of a foreign government (the

USSR), 'Bookniga' had failed to register.

. . • Transocean G. m. b. H.,

a news agency, was likewise indicted I for failure to register, since
it was a 'corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of
the laws of Germany'" (111:177).

The government asked Lasswell

to provide judicial evidence for answering the question of whether
the information disseminated is linked to a foreign government and
can hence be considered to be propaganda.
Lasswell and associates (111:173-232) developed a set of eight
tests with implicit standards for accepting hypotheses concerning
links between foreign governments and information disseminated in
the United State s:
The avowal test:

a simple but not very :",eliable test making

use of explicit declarations with one side of a controversy.

For

instance Lasswell et al. compared the relative frequencies with
which publications described themselves as authorities in what they
had to say about the USSR in order to ascertain a possible link to
this country.
The parallel test:

a test designed to compare statements

and themes which appeared in the publications in question with
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those of a known foreign propaganda channel.

In the Transocean case

Lasswell found for each incongruent statement, 23 statements congruent with Nazi themes.
The consistency test:

a test to compare the consistency or in-

consistency of attitudes expressed with the declared propaganda aims
of a party to a controversy.

The analysis of public pronouncements by

Nazi party and governmental officials led to a set of propaganda aims
on the basis of which the affinity of various publications to Nazi objectives could be exhibited.
The presentation test, a test determining the balance of favorable
and unfavorable treatment given to a controversial issue.

For example,

in Moscow News, distributed by Bookniga, the number of fa;;:orable
references to the USSR outnumbered the unfavorable ones by more than
600 to I while the favorable references to other countries were outnumbered by unfavorable ones in the proportion 5 to 1.
The source test:

a test designed to establish the balance of

sources relied on regarding a controversial issue.

Lasswell found

that Moscow News relied exclusively on acknowledged governmental
and party sources in Russia.
The concealed source test: a test involving detailed text comparisons in order to discover the origins of the information disseminated.
The distinctiveness test making use of vocabularies peculiar to
the propaganda sourCe.

Distinctive vocabularies such as party

slogans, Fachsprachen can be indicative of dominant ideological
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orientations.

Las swell compiled a list of key political terms from

Russian newspapers:

bourgeois, class, class struggle, collectivism,

collective and state farrns 1 cOITIITIissariat, comrade, soviets (coun-

cils), diversionism, exploitation, . . . such terms appear quite
alien when translated into fluent English text and can be utilized to
indicate the origin of the text in question.
The distortion test:

"Objective reporting" does not necessarily

present all details of a controversy but only those an agency considers
essential.

The nature of the omissions and additions, obtained by

comparison, are therefore of considerable interest.

For example

Transocean and the, New York Times were, compared on some sample
days.

A contingency table revealed that 58% of the additions by

Transocean favored foreign propaganda aims while only 30/0 contradicted them.

Of the themes omitted by the suspected agency, 48%

were contradictory to foreign propaganda aims and 16% in favor of
,them.

In reference to other newspapers in this country the suspected

agency carried a comparatively larger portion of pro foreign distortions (as implicitly defined in the method employed).
The objective of this example of quantitative content analysis
is closely related to the one of the Swedish state church (II).

It

represents however, one of the first attempts to systematically
extract information from the mass media and makes use of more
advanced methodology.
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Working example VI
During World War II all major powers monitored the mass communications media of other nations, opponents, allies or neutrals.
Mass communication in general and broadcasting in particular were
largely responsible for organizing socio-political .actions on a grand
scale, and offered useful intelligence as to the internal states of a
nation at war

j

her ITlorale

1

intentions, expectations, capabilities

j

etc.
One type of intelligence of particular interest to the policy
makers is the prediction of a governing elite's planned major
initiative s and actions.

Such intere sts bestow relevance to "ques-

tions concerning the timing of the action, its precise nature and
magnitude, its exact location, the objectives assigned to the action,
the elite I s expectations concerning its success, and the extent and
nature of any opposition to that particular initiative within the elite
group."

(71:133)

"In one of the outstanding case s of propaganda
analysis on record, British content analysts were
able to infer that Nazi propaganda talk about forthcoming use of a secret, unconventional air- bombardment weapon was no bluff. This inference was made
in November, 1943, eight months before the
inception of the V-I 'buzz-bomb' attacks.
"Promises that Germany would have a reprisal
weapon, which began to appear in German propaganda
as early as June, 1943,. were obviously intended to
bolster domestic morale, which had been badly shaken
by increasingly heavy Allied raids to which Germany
seemed to have no answer. If the propaganda objective
of such promises was obvious enough, the questions
remained whether such talk was mere propaganda or
whether a new reprisal weapon was actually being
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prepared for use on a lllilitarily important scale in the
near future. The British analyst answered these questions affirmatively with considerable confidence. His
inference rested upon the fundalllentaf assulllption, confirmed on lllany past occasions, that 'Gerlllan propaganda
never deliberately lllisled the German people in lllatters
involving an increase of Gerrnan power. '
"The British propaganda analyst also inferred that
the prolonged delay in the appearance of the new reprisal
weapon - - after it had been repeatedly and authoritatively
prolllised to the Gerlllan people -- lllUSt have been due
to delays in its tillletablenot anticipated when the propaganda COllllllitlllent was lllade. This inference was
supported by the observation that it was Goebbels'
practice not to lllake an illlportant propaganda COllllllitlllent of this character too far ahead of the date when he
expected it to be realized. Thereby, he avoided aggravating dOlllestic lllorale, which would be quickly affected by
resentlllent over false propaganda prolllises. The propaganda analyst even estilllated the maxilllulll period of
time - - about three lllonths - - that Goe bbels would allow
hilllself for propaganda anticipation of the event. Hence,
when the prolllised reprisal weapon was delayed appreciably beyond the tillle period, the analyst concluded -correctly - - that the scheduled elllploYITIent of the new
weapon lllUSt have been unexpectedly delayed. He even
identified the approxilllate dates on which sOlllething had
happened to cause the delays.
"The British analyst noted that references to air
reprisal by llleans of new weapons suddenly dropped out
of Gerlllan propaganda for ten days beginning August 19,
and later for seven days beginning Septelllber 11.
He found that the 'gaps' did not coincide with 'other
events' and, significantly, that the propaganda COllllllitments on reprisal and new weapons was watered down
when such propaganda was resumed after each 'gap.'
The necessary explanation, then, was that sOlllething
had happened just before each of the 'gaps' that was
connected with the preparation and scheduling of the
new reprisal weapons. (An implicit assulllption was
that shifts toward increased alllbiguity in propaganda
time COllllllitlllents regarding date of.;reprisal - - a shift
that had in fact occurred after each' gap' - - reflected
an official Nazi estilllate of a further delay in D-day for
the new weapon. )
o

••
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" . . He then was told of the British air raid of
August 17 on the secret weapon station at Peenemunde
and the Allied air-raids of September 7-8 on installations in the Boulogne- Calais area which were suspected
of being launching platforms for a new type of German
weapon. . . . (thus), his inferences provided additional confirmation of the significance of the targets
(not fully certain at the time) and of the effectiveness
of the raids in disrupting Nazi reprisal preparations"
(69:341-342).
After the war, George (71) attempted to rationally reconstruct
some of the procedures the propaganda analysts had followed.

These

attempts were-facilitated by the fact that many propaganda analytic
reports listed the evidence, reasoning, and more or less explicit
models of the situation on the basis of which the inferences were
drawn.

Moreover, historical documents, now available, permitted

verifications of the inferences made and, hence, an indirect evaluation of the methods employed.
We will refer to some such methods later in detail but at
present another illustration of propaganda analysis will make some
additional points.

Working example VII
Speculations regarding the power structure and policy differentiation within the ruling elite of a foreign nation have always been
of interest to students of politics.

For various political reasons

information regarding the structure of such an elite is likely to be
withheld, a fact that makes the confirmation of political hypotheses
extremely difficult.
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Stalin's seventieth birthday, December 21, 1949, provided a
rare opportunity for an analysis of policy orientation and degrees of
influence of various members of the Politburo.

On this occasion the

speeches by members of the Politburo and other officials were published in Pravda and Bolshevik.

Such speeches, it was hoped, would

shed some light on the then frequently debated problem of succession.
Leites, Bernaut, and Garthoff who undertook the task of analyzing these speeches wrote "while the statements mentioned appear at
first glance to express the same adulation of Stalin, they do contain
nuances in style and emphasis" (118:317).

Being well aware that these

statements were.made publicly, i. e. not only or at least not exclusively
addressed to Stalin, but prominently directed to the masses of readers,
the style and emphasis was assumed to be a reflection of the speaker's
political pos ition.
The characteristics relevant for an indication of such positions,
Leites et al. argued,

lie in the modes of expressing nearness.

For

this, the Soviet use of language provides two distinct approaches.
One set of "symbols of nearness and intimacy (father, solicitude, etc.)
appear most frequently in the popular image of Stalin and (is) stressed
for that audience which is far removed from him."

The other set of

symbols derives from the prevailing "deprecation of such nearness in
political relationships.

The ideal party member does not stre s s any

gratification he may derive from intimacy for political ends . . . . Those
closer to Stalin politically are permitted to speak of him in terms of
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lesser personal intimacy ('leader of the party,' etc.)," are privileged
to refrain from the crudest form of adulation.

The relative emphasis

on the Bolshevik image or on the popular image of Stalin therefore "not
only reflects the Bolshevik evaluation of the party as distinguished from,
and superior to, the masses at large, but also indicates the relative
distance of the speakers from Stalin" (118:338-339).
Leites et al. counted the number of references made by each
speaker to the Bolshevik image and to the popular image of Stalin as
well as to images that are ambiguous with respect to the former and
presented their results tabularly.

The table suggested the existence

of three major fractions within the Politburo.

The f;"action consisting

of Molotov, Malenkov, and Beria (in this order) having the highest
number of references to Stalin's Bolshevik image and hence being
probably closest to Stalin.
For convenience of presentation we used the tabulated results
by Leites et al. and computed the relative political distance D
between Stalin and each member of the Politburo on the basis of their
assumptions as follows:

D =

whereby N

N(popular) + 1/2N(ambiguous)
N(popular) + N(ambiguous) + N(Bolshevik)

o~

D $,1

represents the frequency of respective references to

Stalins images.

Accordingly the following rank order was obtained

(the fractions result from contrasts in the relative political distance
within the Politburo).
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Molotov
Beria
Malenkov

D =

0.095
.143
.175

Shvel;"nik

.533

Mikoyan
Voroshilov
Andreyev

,714
.750
.809

Kanganovich
Kosygin
Bulganin
Khrushchev

.909
,917
.950
.958

The power struggle immediately succeeding:Stalin's death clearly
confirmed the inferen'ces made.

What had not been known at that time

but becomes clear now is that the group closest to Stalin obtained i.its: .
power from the party organization while the group distant to Stalin derived :'its' , power from the more popular organs of the USSR government.

Working example VIII
As was suggested in Chapter One, much of "content analysis"
is most directly associated with mass media research and in particular
with quantitative inquiries into the popular content of those media.

One

of the classical studies is Berelson and Salter's "majority and minority
Arne ricans" (31).
The analysts randomly selected short stories published in
popular magazines between 1937 and 1943.

The attributes of persons

appearing in such stories were mapped into several category sets of
which the three most important ones were: a) explicit or impli,cit
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membership in ethnic groups (white Americans, Anglo-Saxons and
Europeans, Negroes, Jews, or others);
the story;

b) social roles occupied in

c) their manner of presentatiol;l (favorable or unfavorable).

A compositional comparison of the short- story population
with the population in the U. S. showed a striking discrepancy.

90.8%

of the persons in short stories were lIArnericans" as compared to

60.2% in the U. S. population.
from this group.

In addition, most heroes were drawn

The minorities tended to provide the villains.

The

IIArnericans '1 occupied positions with higher socio-econolTIic status)

were more law-abiding, and acted less on the basis of materialistic
motives than members of the minorities.
s~embled

The more a person re-

the stereotype of the white American, the better, the more

decent, honest, superior, and the wealthier he was presented as
being.
The interpretation of this frequency characterization goes in
two directions, the condition affecting the publication of such stories
and the effects they have on the reading public.
The antecedent conditions inferred are those of the institutional set up: the compactness and shortness of the stories favor the
use of established cliches.

Familiar stereotypes immediately provide

symbols of identification for a majority of the reading public, hence,
optimiz e s a Ie s .

Changing a once established successful formula may

decrease expected returns and is, thus, not economically feasible.
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Although the stories are offered and accepted as entertainment,
the "constant deprivation" of the various minorities "over a long period
of time serves to activate predispositions of a hostile or an indifferent
audience.

Readers with latent tendencies to assign the usual stereo-

typic descriptions to groups whom they do not know, or toward whom
they are unsympathetic, or with whom they do not corne in personal
contact, can find support for their convenient tags, labels and aggressions in such magazine fiction.

As this is all the more striking a s a

result of the implicit comparison with 'the Americans' the condition
and behavior of fictional characters can readily be used to "prove"
that the Negroes are lazy or ignorant, the Jews sly, the Irish superstitious, the Italians criminal, and so on" (31:190).
The reported research project is generally considered one of
the corner stones for the use of content analysis in the study of popular
culture.

Together with working examples V and VI it shows how vast

amounts of mass circulated material can be analyzed quite suggestively,
but it is moreover an example in which the interesting part of the
interpretation follows more or less as addenda -- inferences as to
the antecedent conditions and effects do not follow from the method of
content analysis.

They are intelligent speculations for which the data

could not provide conclusive evidence.

Working example IX
As some of the previous examples suggest, message analysis
can easily lead to and require quite time consuming operations.

When
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the volume of data to be analyzed become$ in addition very large, the
task often becomes hopelessly unmanageable,

And yet many of the in-

teresting probleITls in the behavioral sciences require the processing
of large quantities of written text.

A public opinion interviewer, for

example, recording the free answers to his questions, is faced with
the difficult probleITl of evaluation.

Or, studies in sITlall group re-

search typically tape the verbal interactions that occur in a hUITlan
group, transcribe theITl and try to make sense out of them according
to some theoretical framework.

Historians and political scientists

have recently become interested in collecting exchanged diplomatic
documents to study the acceleration and deceleration of hostility in
situations of international crises (84) (142).

Similarly anthropologists,

when attempting to analyze the structure of proverbs or folktales (100)
have to consider large collections of written records and messages.
The common difficulties associated with such problems of analyz,.
ing written texts have led to several attempts to use electronic computers
that are capable of handling large quantities of data.

Among the outstand-

ing solutions are two programs, the "General Inquirer" developed by
Stone (188), and Stone, Bales, Namenwirth, and Ogilvie (189), and
the "Concept Learner" (86) developed by Hunt, which have jointly been
used for automatic theme analysis (190).

The range of practical

applications of these programs is rapidly growing.

We take only one

illustrative example to show the procedure and potentialities of the
method.
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A well-known study by Osgood (148) atte:mpting to test hypotheses
regarding the writer's state of anxiety and the style of his product co:mpared genuine suicide notes which had been collected in California with
notes obtained fro:m private letters received fro:m friends and relatives
of :me:mbers of a panel.

Each suicide note was then paired with a

"pseudocide" note the writer of which corresponded in sex.

Graduate

students with no prior experiences with suicide notes were instructed to
independently assign the:m to these two categories.

They did no better

than chance.
Stone and Hunt (190) atte:mpting to test the perfor:mance of their
co:mputer syste:m for content analysis, obtained si:mulated suicide notes
by instructing subjects to write such notes as realistically as possible.
Genuine and si:mulated suicide notes were then paired according to sex,
age, and socioecono:mic level and given to sopho:mores for the sa:me
task of distinguishing the:m on an intuitive basis.

As a whole the

students did better than chance with the :mean being 66% correct, posing the question:

could the Generallnquirer do better?

The General Inquirer is a co:mputer progra:m for answering
certain questions concerning stored texts.

It accepts IBM cards on

which the original sentences only slightly edited together with :marks
for the syntactic position of the words are punched.

In accordance

with a specialized dictionary each word is then associated with a set
of tags presu:med to be of theoretical significance for the proble:m
under investigation.

Tags and syntactic positions are then stored on
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a magnetic tape and provide the data base for retrieval questions.
The task of predicting whether the writer of the note intended to
commit suicide or not became in this context one of effectively discriminating between real and simulated notes.

To this end the actual source

of each of the first fifteen pairs of notes was known to the researchers.
These notes were compared by means of the General Inquirer.

After

asking sets of questions and obtaining the proportion each of them could
correctly distinguish, three factors were found to discriminate:
1.

References to concrete things, persons, and places
(higher for real notes)

2.

Use of the actual word "love" in the text (higher for
real notes)

3.

Total number of references to processes of thought
and decision (higher for simulated notes)

The discriminate function derived on the basis of the scores on these
factors was then applied to the remaining eighteen pairs of notes with
the members of the research team not knowing their identity.

After

the prediction was made the actual sourCe of the notes was revealed
to the team.

It turned out that seventeen of eighteen pairs of notes

had been identified correctly.

This result is quite remarkable when

compared with the near chance identification by human judges.
The major difficulty discovered in working with the General
Inquirer was that the human user of the program tended to be too constrained to find enough questions which distinguish a large enough
percentage of the text.

At this point Hunt's "Concept Learner"
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developed to discover discriminate functions automatically was suggested.
In conjunction with the General Inquirer it could discover distinguishing

"themes" in both sets of documents.

The Concept Learner looks at all

the sentences in each document to see if there are one or more tags
common to all sentences in one document that are not found in any
sentences of the other document.' If such a single all or none question
does not discriminate all sentences in one document from all the
sentences in another, a heuristic procedure is employed which develops
a discriminating tree of tags and syntactic markers until the two sets
of documents are completely distinguished.

The thoee structure so

developed is equivalent to a sequence of decision rules determining the
class membership of a document.
So far both pro.grams have been applied to several problems of
automatic theme analysis.

The Concept Learner is then used to

develop distinguishing rules for texts differentiated according to
some criteria outside the documents, e. g. the psychological state
of the writer, and acquires information about that criteria.

The

General Inquirer can then apply these rules to make predictions

re·~

ferring to such criteria.
The practical utility of such analyses by computer is obvious.
The example is included, however, for its theoretical significance.
Not that these two programs are meant to be satisfactory at this
stage of development, but, in describing message analysis to a computer nothing can be left implicit for a process of intuition to which
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most of human symbolic behavior rightly refers.

In some sense the

ultimate task of understanding such analytic processes is an executable
computer program working toward the specified goal of message
analysis.

Working example X
One of the processes which have only recently been described
as communication processes is psychotherapy (168).

The psychodiag-

nostic interviews preceding intended therapeutic treatments can profitably be viewed as dialogues between a patient and a diagnostician in
which an attempt is made to assess the nature of the patient's psychic
disturbances from his linguistic and non-linguistic behavior.
This task has rightly been claimed to be extremely difficult.
When a patient attempts to express himself during psychodiagnostic
interviews, he tends to communicate several things simultaneously.
For instance, what it is that he is talking about, what he thinks in
general about it, what he is feeling at the moment, what he intends
the diagnostician to think, what he wants to avoid revealing to the
diagnostician about himself, etc.

The task is rendered even more

difficult by the experience that the dictionary meanings of the patient's
assertions are frequently misleading.

The denial of a symptom may,

for example, alert an astute analyst to the possible presence of that
very symptom.

Or uncontrolled assertions rendered during such

interviews would, on the other hand, yield entirely inadequate interpretations if treated as instrumental.
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The fact that the expressions a patient gives during psychodiagnostic interviews is very rich and must be interpreted with enormous
subtlety, has often led to a wholesale rejection of more explicitly stated
methods of diagnosis.

Yet the protocols of such interviews can become

quite voluminous and unmanageable and require a simplified representation of its relevant characteristics.
Among the numerous indices which have been proposed (17), and
normatively defined over the body of recorded data is Dollard and
Mowrer I s

discomfort- relief quotient (54).

This quotient purports to

be a measure of tension by taking into account the number of words revealing some form of discomfort and those indicative of relief or
reward.

Although such measures have indicated quite suggestive

differences of recorded texts, little is known about what they actually
rneaBure.

Recently Mahl argued that predictors of a patient's emotional
state should make use of speech characteristics which are not under
the control of the speaker.

He systematically explored the correlation

between such emotional variables as the level of anxiety and various
types of speech disturbances (124).

His results supported the belief

that a certain. speech disturbance measure will be a useful nonlexical
indicator of current anxiety in the speaker (125).

But more work has

to be done in this direction.
Another way of facilitating psychodiagnostic processes has
been suggested by Cassotta, Feldstein, and Jaffe.

These researchers
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describe a device for automatic extraction and quantification of vocal
behavior in interviews (40) which is already in existence, and propose
a new, more complex device of which the former will be a component
part (61).

This device is intended to be programmed to evaluate a

patient's speech pattern and print out some diagnostic statements.
The device is conceptualized as performing several patternmatching operations.

The researchers suggest that "normative

patterns of speech from other persons comparable in intelligence,
education and socioeconomic background might be put into the machine
memory.

The computer might then be asked to compare the speech

patterns of our patient with this criterion.

Extrapolation from current

theory suggests that schizophrenics use abstract words more frequently
than non- schizophrenics.

Another conjecture is that schizophrenics

more frequently use words connoting social distance, such as third
person pronouns, in preference to first and second person pronouns,
which imply greater closeness . . . . It might be hypothesized that
schizophrenics show greater variation in their range of associative
patterns than do non-schozophrenics.

1£ shown to exist, such greater

variation may account for the perception of schizophrenic speech as
difficult to understand',"

(61:246).

Work with the already existing device for automatic extraction
and quantification of vocal behavior led to the discovery of even simpler
kinds of indicative speech patterns.

"In all cases in which pairs of a

group of nonlexical attributes were significantly intercorrelated for
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norlllal persons" they were not intercorrelated for diagnosed schizophrenics.

Assullling the findings were confirllled with sufficient power

for use with individuals, we could, with suitable prograllls, ask the
cOlllputer to store frequencies of the extralinguistic llleasures as
they were extracted frOlll speech and intercorrelate successive pairs
of the llleasures across the interview.

To autolllate the cOlllplete pro-

cess the cOlllputer could then be asked to decide . . . which of the
correlations were significant.

Concolllitant use of both the lexical

and the nonlexical analyses should enable us to say sOlllething about
at least one kind of psychopathology" (61:249).
This working exalllple is overtly silllilar to IX, but geared to
another end.

Although the researchers noted that llluch work has to

be done before the envisaged computer programs can reliably he
employed for diagnostic purposes, the work on the computer has
already clarified several issues concerning the procedures that an
effective psychodiagnosis will require.

Making explicit what the

solution of psychodiagnostic problellls involves and testing such
procedures by employing cOlllputers for executing them systematically not only helps psychotherapists in their work but also provides
much information about the possible modes of reasoning, Or analytic
procedures a mes sage analyst may have to follow in pursuing diagnostic ends whether he is concerned with single individuals or complex
societies.
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CHAPTER FOUR

THE GOAL OF MESSAGE ANALYSIS

This chapter aims at an adequate formulation of the purpose of
message analysis.

The emphasis is not placed on the process of mes-

sage analysis as such but on the nature of the ends toward which the
method can be considered a means.
adequacy is meant to refer

In this context the notion of

a) to the decidability as to the structure

of the situation in which message analysis is appropriate,

b) to the

conditions under which a message analysis can be considered as
approaching or having reached a suitable goal, and perhaps
simplicity or elegance of such a formulation.

c) to the

The ten working examples

will be used to support our formulation and it is suggested that the resulting formulation, which will be formalized in Chapter Five, holds
far beyond these examples, showing message analysis to be a very
general mode of inquiry.

The Message Analytic Situation
Let us begin by describing the message analytic situation as
a system.

This

requi1~es

the identification of a set of variables and

the formulation of some constraints accounting for the nature of
interaction between these variables.

As a first approximation let

us make an obvious distinction between two sets of variables of the
message analytic situation, the one being labeled "message analyst,"
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the other, the environment under the analysts 1 cpnsideration, will be
called the "object system. "
Although some working examples appear to place individual
persons in the role of analysts, to restrict the notion of message
analysis to the ability of single human beings would severely limit
its scope.

As a matter of fact, the role of message analyst is more

frequently assumed by scientific cooperatives of persons and facilities
than by individuals.

In 18th century Sweden, working example II, it

was the intellectual elite whose members challenged each other until
acceptable responses were found.

Propaganda analysis during the

Second World War (VI) was accomplished by organizations specifically
designed to cope with the large volume of foreign broadcasts in a
meaningful way.

The decipherment of the old Persian language (I)

took several generations of members of a scientific community.

And

the attempts to ascertain psychopathologies from speech reported in
X

is even conceptualized as involving no specifically human ability,

if the work succeeds.

As far as this chapter is concerned the message analyst will
be treated as a whole, as a black box, so to speak, the.internal
structure of which must be considered to be extremely important
in determining the outcome of analysis but which can be left undifferentiated when external criteria of adequacy are discussed.
The object system in message analystic situations can take
the form of an individual as in working examples IX and X, specific
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his psychology; the form of social behavior of the politburo members
under Stalin (VII); the form of a national system of socio-political
mobilization and coordination of war efforts (VI) or the form of the
social use of language (I).

The materiality of any actual system may

suffice as an object system in message analysis.
The 'message analyst and the object systems are coupled in a
,typical way.

The most distinctive characteristic of the message

analytic situation is that the object system is only partly observable
by the message analyst.

This becomes abundantly clear from the

working examples.
For example, the object system of the propaganda analyst in
(VI) was an enemy nation deliberately concealing strategically significant information.

Traditionally, war situations favor the use of

security measures to hinder the spread of such information beyond
the national boundaries.

The broadcasts which propaganda analysts

monitored represent only a very small section of the spectrum of
pos sible observations .
The incomplete observability is even more vividly demonstrated
by the psychodiagnostic situations described in (X) in which the diagnostician finds himself incapable of observing the emotional states of
his patient directly.

Even the concept of "emotional state" seems to

be a hypothetical construct effectively characterizing some fundamentally, inaccessible states of the patient's brain.

The speech of a

human being represents only a very small subset of those variables
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along which the behayior of a human being may adequately be describable.
The object system which interested the Swedish orthodox clergy
in working example (II) was the complicated international network of
religious influence.

Indicative of the existence of such a network was

the increasing religious dis sent in Sweden and the "Songs of Zion" both
of which were subjected to extensive analysis.
The incomplete observability of a message analyst's object
system becomes the real condition under which the old Persian
language in example (I) had to be deCiphered.

The empire in which

the three languages were written and in terms of which some culturally
important messages were carved in stone, had disappeared long ago.
Its main body of cultural things, its social communication structure
was not observable.

Only a few records indicated its probable exist-

ence in history.
Not a defining characteristic of message analysis, but of
considerable consequence is the fact that the interaction between
the observable and unobservable parts of the object system is
typically very rich.

This fact is, no doubt, the reason why the

attempts to develop analytical methods for such situations has
origina,ted in communications research and not in other disciplin",s
which characteristically start with complete observability.

Com-

munications research is by subject matter orientation concerned
with some such interaction between messages and their producer or
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between messages and their possible effects.
Consider working examples II, V, VI, and VIII as more obvious
cases in point.

They. are all concerned with object systems the com-

ponent parts of which are not only richly interacting but also conventionally conceived of as containing communication.

The message

analysts of these four examples considered their object system as
social communication networks that link partially observable components.
Less obvious is the kind of interaction that underlies the Object
systems described in working examples IV, IX, andX.

They deal with

the communication that exists between some person's personality or
internal states and his verbal behavior.

Working example VII not only

deals with the interaction between such internal states and a person's
verbal expressions but, moreover, with the socio-political communication network that links a mass audience with an aspect of the
structure of a ruling elite of which the internal states of participating
persons are component parts.
A second distinctive feature of the message analytic situation
is that communication between the object system and the message
analyst is a one-way process.
The communication with object systems which have existed
at some point in the past, for example, is absolutely bound to be
one-way.

The analysis of messages from extinct cultures such as

the Persian empire of working example I, or from historical figures
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such as the possible writers of the Imitatio in working example IV does
not have any effect on the sender of such messages.

Communication is

directed from the object system to the analyst and not vice versa.
Analysis of enemy propaganda for intelligence purposes (VI) or
of the power structure within a foreign elite (VII) would be greatly
facilitated if an opportunity existed to request additional information,
or to askfor information confirmatory to the inferences made.
the analyst is restricted to the role of a receiver.

But

Although the product

of a message analysis may indeed be assumed to have significant pOlicy
implications, the message analytic procedures are a priorito possibly
intended acts upon the object system and do not account for such a
feedback.

The propaganda analysis in working example VI and the

cryptographic analysis in working example III readily exemplify such
situations.
Even the psychodiagnostic use of message analysis, described
in X, exhibits the typical one-way flow of information.

Although the

protocol which serves as an input to the message analytic process is
indeed one of an interview, i. e. of a two-way interaction between
diagnostician and patient, the message analysis in no way affects the
course of the psychodiagnostic interview until it is completed.

The

communication clearly originates at the object system and is transmitted via a transcription of the exchanged sounds ina computer
understandable language.
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In this sense the message analytic situation is distinguished from

the classical experimental situation in which the experimenter manipulates at least some variables assumed to affect his observation in a
significant way.
Corollary to the typical unidirectionality of communication between object system and message analyst is the essentially non-cooperative relation between both.
The use of ciphers as a means of deliberately concealinginformati on for unauthorized receivers is only one case in point.

Another

indication of such a relation is an attempt to provide message analysts
with misleading information about the nature or states of the object
system.

This is often the goal of war propaganda, overtly directed

toward home consumption but calculated to have a desirable effect on
the opposing country.

George analyzed several such incidents (71: 138)

and Lasswell's "distortion test" reported in (V) was designed to uncover publications employing such techniques.
The non-cooperative character of the message analyst/object
system relation does not necessarily stem from conflict or competitive
situations.

The psychodiagnosticianknows of situations in which the

patient is simply unable to freely expres s what 'the analyst is interested
in.

Similarly, in communicating short stories as entertainment to

large audiences (VIII), the mass media made it very difficult indeed
for Berelson to analyze the biases underlying such stories.

Whether

this is a deliberate attempt to hide information of interest to the
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communication _researcher, or an unawareness of the service the mass

tnedia could provide to the analyst of popular culture retnains to be
decided; it is certainly non- cooperative.
Non- cooperation tnay sitnply stetn frotn the fact that the object
systetn just doesn't know of, or has no conception of, the existence
and/or intentions of the tnessage analyst.

Although sotne of the tnes-

sages written in stone were clearly addressed to future generations,
no conceivable characteristics of thetnessage analyst could have been
anticipated by their writer.

The satneis of course true in the author-

ship probletn of exatnple IV and aU other analyses of tnessages frotn
history.
The essentially non-cooperative relation between object-systetn
and tnessage analyst also distinguishes tnessage analysis frotn such
techniques of inquiry as psychological tests, surveys and controlled
or free interviews.

In all these cases data obtained frotn such tech-

niques tnust be considered as being potentially biased by the fact that
their gathering is stitnulated, if not by specific que stions, then at
least by the presence of an interviewer who engages in afortn of cooperative relationship with the object systetn.

When data so obtained

are interpreted, the effect of such a cooperative relation has to be
accounted for quite carefully.

In tnessage analysis the object systetn

is typically unaware of the fact that it is a subject of analysis, un"
aware as to which of its parts is under observation and unaware of
the consequences of the analysis.

Hence, tnessage analysis is an
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unobstrusive technique, quite in the sense of Webb et al. (202).
At this point let the weak notion of "observation" be replaced by
a notion referring more precisely to what is transmitted between object
system and message analyst: a "signal."

To quote Zinkin:

"By !signal'

we understand a certain sequence distinguishable by its elements, Or a
simultaneous totality of various physical states,

A signal may be

changed in the course of time and be differentiated in space.
preserved (by photography,

ma~netic

quickly from one state to another.

It may be

recording, etc.) or it may pass

A signal may be measured according
[,'

to definite parameters with the aid of physical instruments!! (218:144).
Whether signals are produced by means of a stylus on clay or by brush
and ink on rice paper, whether they are printed from movable type
slugs on modern paper or recorded by hand on data sheets, the movement of an electronic picture tube and the punched holes on an IBM
card, they are not conceived of as having meaning in any conventional
sense.

A signal is accepted by a message analyst solely on the basis
of the distinguishability of its inherent properties, the physical nature
of its elements and the structure dis coverable between them.

In this

technical sense signals constitute the domain to which Shannon and
v'

Weaver!s information function (175) applies.

Shannon and Weaver

both explicitly avoid any semantic notion when defining the amount of
information quantitatively.
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A preliminary diagramatic presentation of the message analytic

,
situation is attemptedi'll Figure 3.

Herein arrows denote "communica-

t;ion;in the indicated direction1!; boxes represent "processes!!;

and the

oval, "that which is transmitted. "

Message Analytic Situation (preliminary)

Object System

Message Analyst

essage
)____-I'''na 1yti c
rocedure

(unobserved)

Primary Components of Message Analytic Situations
Figure 3

In order to avoid confusion, the role of the external observer,

in which the reader will find himself, might be clarified as well.

To

begin, the external observer is faced with an observational task quite
similar to that of the message analyst.

The message analyst obtains

signals from a typically small portion of some object system.
rest of that system is inaccessible to him.

The

The message analytic
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situation in which suchunidirectional communication -occurs is the object
system of the external observer.

Hence, the external observer is the

component part of a system that is superordinate to the message analytic
situation: a meta system.
Although message analyst and external observer are in fact subject to similar kinds of observational constraints, if the external observer wants to make assertions about the observational constraints
which a message analytic situation imposes on the message analyst,
then he is forced to assume a less constrained vision; he is forced to
;make the assumption that he has more complete or even perfect information about the message analytic situation in general and the object
system of that situation in particCllar; he must assume that he has that
information which the analyst

l~cks.

As unrealistic as the assumption

of nearly constraintless observation may appear in some cases, it is
useful .for the presentation of the argument and avoids certain contradictions provided that the two systems, the message analytic situation
and the meta system, are kept separate in the discussion.

Since many

concepts concerning message analysis derive from the typical observational constraints which the message analyst has to face, we will
continue to assume to have access to parts of the object system that

. are concealed

from the message analyst such that the message analyttc

situations can be made an interesting subject of study.
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The Predictive Nature of Content
Having characterized the message analytic situation as a one-way
communication process between a partly accessible object system and a
message analyst to whom some signal is transmitted, nothing has been
said so far about the purposive outcome of the analysis.

Characteriza-

tions of purpose require consideration of some behavioral delineations
and for the discovery of the primary focus of message analysis, in particular, two approaches suggest themselves immediately.
The first approach would require finding some teleological commitments agreed upon by writers in the field. This approach refers to
the most popular anticipatory conception of a goal.

Chapters One and
,

Two, in which this road was taken, pointed out the relative fruitlessness
of such an attempt.

A commitment to being quantitative and systematic

may uniquely distinguish content analysis from entirely intuitive interpretations of symbolic materials but is too broad to be considered the
goal of this specific investigative technique.

Almost all scientific in-

quiries would be included under such a formulation.
, Considering the fact that the whole complexity of social existence is transmitted by means of interpersonally exchanged informal
messages, a confinement to materials to which social conventions
attribute meanings or symbol characteristics in one sense or another
without stating the requirements imposed upon the outcome of the
analysis is inadequate on similar grounds.
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The a1rrlOst complete lack of explicitly expressed purpose in the
content analysis literature may reflect the well-known fact that techniques, employed originally as a tool in full awareness of the goal for
the attainment of which they may have been designed, can become a
value in themselves.

The goal then simply drops out of the awareness

or the concern of writers in the field.

Be it as it may, the search for

anticipatory-type formulations in the literature of content analysis has
failed to provide clues for the formulation of what me s sage analysis is
supposed to accomplish.
The second approach to the assessment of the goal of a system
requires observation of its behavior whether a goal is explicitly stated
in advance and consciously pursued or is implicit in the technique
adopted by a component part of that system.

The concept of goal sug-

gested here corresponds to that of an equilibrium toward which a system moves over time, a state which it tends to maintain or toward
which it returns if disturbed.

Subjectively such a state may be ex-

pressed in terms of the satisfaction with the result obtained by amessage analytic technique, in terms of the plausibility of the interpretation
advanced, or in terms of the expressed practical usefulness of the outcome.

Objectively such a goal-attaining process may manifest itself

by the observation that the output of a message analytic process becomes less and less altered, causing fewer and fewer objections on the
part of the analyst or some user, and finally reaches a definite state
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at which the analysis, having solved the problem of investigation in its
own terms, comes to a stop.

Such a state will be called a goal.

Several working examples may be considered from this point of
view.

For instance, working example I described how four generations

of scientists worked on the problem of deciphering a language.

The

emergence of such mysterious patterns on rocks, assumed to be manmade, posed nothing but the problem.

The discovery of the word-

distinction-sign, considered as a milestone in the analysis, was far
removed from a solution.

Nevertheless, more scientists became

stimulated by this discovery and contributed to the search.

Numerous

speculations andhypotheses were proposed and successively eliminated, among them being all premature attempts to assign phonetic
values to the distinguishable elements, i. e., the signals composing
the text.

The extensive frequency tables which were compiled for

letters, words and simple relations between them contributed very
little to the deCipherment until a few short repetitive sequences of
figures were found to represent some property outside the texture of
the script, something that could have been a cultural standard of the
old Persian empire and independently transmitted to medieval
Persia: the habits of using official titles.

Then one piece after

another from the known history of the region became associated
with textual elements.

The message analysis clearly stopped, reached

its goal so to speak when all signals could be related or explained in
terms of some events consistent with the history of the old Persian
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empire as far as it was known; when this interpretation could even be
extended to other excavated documents of a similar kind; and when the
proposed' reading of the text caused no serious objections from the
learned community.
This goal of deciphering a language, it seems, can be described
as a state in which the analyst is capable of making assertions about
that part of the object system which he can I).ot observe, the part which
is considered to encompass the antecedent conditions of the signals
transmitted.

Conversely, the inability to draw such inferences seems

tobe accompanied by a subjective state of dissatisfaction indicative of
the lack of goal attainment.

The dissatisfaction which has until recently

been asserted concerning the knowledge of the Etruscan

script and

Minoan Linear B, a dissatisfaction which is still heard when some
of the 25, 000 year old north-west Indian scripts such as those of
Harappa and Mahenjodaro (52:286) are discussed, are cases in point.
Grammars of such writing systems can be relatively easily formulated
,'on the basis of the material found, and this was almost all that was
known about the Etruscean language until very recently some names
could be identified in the written texts.
While the inferences toward which the deCipherment of a
language tend are more those of a traditional

sem~ntic

interpretation,

the inferences that are of interest to the psychoanalysts in working
example X, are clearly not of the conventional linguistic ty.pe.
Mahl suggested, inferences as to internal emotional states of a

As
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patient are most profitably based on speech patterns not under conscious
control by the speaker.

Similarly the analyst of propaganda de scribed

in working exalTIple V suggested ,a set of tests which do not produce anything silTIilar to what is customarily referred to as i'meaning."
!l

tnanifest

nle~nings'r

The

,in Berelson1s conception of content analysis are

even completely ignored in Yule's inference about the authorship of a
document on the basis of its style.

Rightly claiming that thecolTIplex

expressions of industrialized culture in the modern lTIass lTIedia are
not sufficiently understood, or, that we have not learned how to look
c"

at television, many c]lltural critics such as McLuhan (134) (135) point
in the salTIe direction, demanding inferences frolTI the surface appearance of complex social systems to their internal operations, from
signals :t6'.their source.
Whether the analysts whose work was described in the working
examples call their task the deCipherment of a language (I), or their
method quantitative selTIantics (II), cryptography (III), literary research (IV), propaganda analysis (VI), content analysis (V, VII, VIII,
IX), text analysis (IX), psychodiagnosis (X), in all cases the goal
seelTIs to be related to the =king of inferences frolTI signals to
sOlTIe unobserved components of an object system frolTI which those
signals were obtained.

It is therefore telTIpting to equate "content"

with what a message analyst inductively infers frolTI a given signal.
Although we indeed wish to associate this terlTI with the output of a
lTIessageanalytic procedure, such a simple equation needs further
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elaboration for two reasons.
First, the term "inference, " which according to Webster refers
to any outcome of a normal thought process, to a process of arriving at
a conclusion or of accepting .an opinion on the basis of available evidence,
etc. (204: 1158) is much too weak to serve as a defining characteristic of
message analysis.

Persons may infer all sorts of things from received

signals which mayor may not have been intended by its sender, which
mayor may not be appropriate in the existing situation.

Especially a

methodological analysis of signals as messages cannot rely on some
thought process qua thought process.

Extensional criteria for the ade-

quacy of an inference have to be applied from outside the inferential
procedures; this specifically requires us. to consider the outcome of
the inference, not whether some inferences have been made.

Hence,

the process of inference must be considered a means and not an end of
message analysis.
Second, the incomplete observability makes a direct link between observed and unobserved components of an object system
impossible.

The message analyst cannot point to what is not obser-

aQle to him.

Although this argument is straightforward, the working

examples can provide additional illustrations: the'psychodiagnostician
in (X) attempting, as we used to say, to infer some internal state
from a person's speech behavior is not ever likely to observe such
a state.

Psychopathologie s such as "schizophrenia" or emotional

states such as "anxiety" are hypothetical constructs operationally
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defined in some technical discourse and in conjunction with practical
behavioral problems.

Similarly the goal of deciphering the old Per-

sian language (I) was not one of denoting the cultural objects and
object constructs to which it may once have referred but that of a
translation into a modern language in terms of which the historical
context of this script's origin was adequately representable.
The point which needs to be made is that because the object
system is only partly observable and the message analyst is absolutely bound by this limited access not under his control, his products
need to be mapped into a notational system capable of representing
all of the possible states of the object system as a whole or at least
as much of it as the analyst is intere sted in.
One example of a representational system is the state space
of a system within which each point represents one of the object
system's possible states.

In effect Mahl adopted such a representa-

tional system when conceptually manipulating states of anxiety.
Similarly a behaviol;al space, each point of which represents one of
the pos sible behaviors of a dynamic system, can be considered a
representational system.

Another possible realization would be a

formal language limited to and capable of representing just the
features of the object system under consideration.

In the weakest

case, a natural language such as English may be supplemented by
a set of well-defined scientific terms and some general theoretical
assumptions concerning the object system constituting what is
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commonly. called a special discourse.

The representational system in

working examples I and VIII demonstrates this case.

In the domain of

social and psychological systems the current presystematic message
analysis most frequently uses the latter.

Whether a message analyst

makes assertions about anticipated military actions by an enemy
country, predicts the possible social consequences of mass media products, detects interpersonal relationships within a ruling elite or
diagnoses the pathology of a patient, he finds himself confined to a
representational system as sumed to be adequate for representing the
object system of his concern.
According to our terminological distinction between observed
and unobserved components of an object system, the" signal" must -in accordance with its definition advanced above - - be understood as
a direct representation of the observed parts of an object system in
the representational system, while the term "content" can designate
only a notational element in the representational system as far as it
refers to the unobserved part of the same object system.
With the establishment or recognition of the necessity for a
representational system as a third constituent part of the message
analytic situation, a system that is intermediary between object system and message analyst but perfectly accessible to the latter, the
opportunity is gained to locate more concisely the domain and range
of the message analytic procedure: they are contained in the representational system.

The operations that account for the intuitive

149
notion of inference have to be conceived as defined in terrns of the notaHons of a representational system that is capable of representing not
only observed states of an object system (signals) but also its unobserved
states (contents) that are of particular concern to message analysts.
The pre-evidential character of the outcome of a message analysis, the message content representing not facts as a signal doe·s, but
conceivable facts, makes our notion of content predictive by definition.
These predictions need not refer to future steps in time.

They appear

simply as results of operations within the representational system and
outside the signals obtained.

Specific choices among the notations re-

ferring to yet unobserved parts of a system, operations that lead from
a set of actual observations to a set of possible observations or the
ascertaining of the implications of given evidence for the solution of
a problem must be considered as the making of predictions although
not necessarily in the specific sense referred to here.
Figure 4 informally depicts the message analytic procedure
as an operation defined over the notations of a representational
system.

Note that domain and range of this procedure, the message-

signal and the message content must by definition of mes sage be
disjoined in the representational system.

Note further that the

Figure presents the situation only from the point of view of the message analyst.
It should again be emphasized that such a notion of content
makes the material nature of the object system, i. e. whether it is
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a social, biological, or artificial system, appear entirely irrelevant
as well as the question of whether meanings are conventionally associated with the signals so analysed.

A reiteration of our ten working

examples in the terms advanced so far may make this point clear.

Representational System

Message Analytic

Procedure

Representational System (representing an object system) containing Domain and Ran·ge of a Message Analytic Procedure
Figure 4

Working example I
Object system
Signal
Content
Working example II
Object system
Signal
Content

The social use of language in the old Persian
empire
Figures carved in stone
(Historical) events in old Persia

International network of religious influence
Text in a song book
Communication between a foreign religious
sect and religious dissenters in Sweden
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Working examEle III
Object system
Signal
Content
Working examEle IV
Object system

Secrecy systems in military communication
A cipher
A clear referring to military actions

Signal
Content

Covariation of literary styles and identities of
writers
The text from an unsigned book
The author

Working example V
Object system
Signal
Content

International news network
The output of suspected organizations
Links to foreign countries

Working example VI
Object system
Signal
Content

National system of social-political mobilization
Radio broadcasts
Preparations of major actions

Working example VII
Object system
Public behavior of a governing elite
Signal
Text of speeches
Content
Social distances between members of an elite
Working example VIII
Object system
Public media (organization and mass audience)
Signal
Fictional short stories
Content
Socio-economic conditions of production, social
psychological effects
Working examEle IX
Object system
Signal
Content

Relations between style and emotional state of the
writer
Written notes
The writer's readiness to commit suicide

Working example X
Object system
Signal
Content

Human psychological behavior including speech
Recorded speech
A psychopathology or emotional state
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Concerned with the TIleaning of assertions of natural language,
Rapoport caTIle to reTIlarkab1y siTIlilar interpretations of "content. "
The atteTIlpt to sharpen the concept of TIleaning irOTIl the point of view
of operational philosophy led hiTIl to the straight forward postulate that
an assertion becoTIles eTIlpirically TIleaningfu1 only if it iTIlplies SOTIle
predictions.

He therefore defined "predictive content" as "the totality

of predictions iTIlplied by an assertion" (167:37).

Thus, the assertion

TIlade by the British propaganda analyst in VI:
It is beyond reasonable doubt that GerTIlany possesses
an offensive weapon which her leaders believe: a) is
of a type unknown to the Allies, b) cannot be countered
within a short period. . . . (will) COTIle into use not
before the TIlidd1e of January 1944, and not later than
the TIlidd1e of April.
"
can be viewed as iTIlplying a rather specific set of predictions of the
forTIl:

"If SOTIleone were to conduct a search in GerTIlany he would

find a new weapon.

If he were to ask her leaders, he would find theTIl

believing such and such about it.

If nothing were to interfere before

the tiTIle specified, direct experiences would prove TIle correct."
SiTIlilarly, the inferences described in working exaTIlple VIII could be
viewed as iTIlplying such predictions as:

"If a study of the attitudes

toward ATIlerican TIlinorities as a consequence of exposure to TIlagazine fiction were conducted, such and such would be the result. "
Even TIlore striking is the interpretation of the outcoTIle of cOTIlputer
speech analysis in (X) as predictive content.

"Schizophrenia" indeed

does not refer to any single observable phenoTIlenon and TIlay not even
refer to a patient's internal state in as cOTIlplicated a TIlanner as it
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may be defined.

If it is a therapeutic term then it is very likely to

imply that a certain set of treatments, applied to the patient so
labeled, will yield a certain result.

Many psychopathologies are

explicitly defined in terms of anticipated consequences of a treatment.
With this interpretation by Rapoport, our concept of content is
quite in agreement.

It also requires an unobserved environment

toward which the predictions apply and in the context of which they
are potentially dis confirmable .

It would not be in agreement, how-

ever, with the notion of "meaning" expressed in a question like:
"What is the meaning (or content:) of the set X of movies?"

Our mes-

sage analyst to which such a question may be posed would have to
simply refuse an answer on the ground that no object system is
specified and hence no message analytic situation exists, implying
that any prediction would be fortuitous.

Consider only the fact that

the number of possible content analyses in Berelson's (27) and
Miller's (136:95-96) sense that can be applied with the highest
degree of reliability is an exponential function of the number of
distinctions that can be made in the signal and consider the number
of elements that can be distinguished within a single movie!

If

such a question were to be asked, however, in reference to some
specified audience, the film-maker, the industry that produces and
distributes them, the culture in which they survive, etc., i. e. if
an object system were to be delineated of which the set of movies
in question could be considered an observed part, then the question
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becomes one of message analysis in our sense.

In this case the intuitive

notion of "meaning" may become equivalent with our predictive notion of
content and is, so far as the conditions of a message analytic situation
are satisfied, disconfirmable in principle .

. External Criteria of Adequacy
The notion of the predictive nature of content is not purely
nominal.

It has an important conotative implication:

idea of an objective truth inherent in a message.

it opposes the

It requires (a) that

the content inferred must at least be potentially disconfirmable and
suggests (b) that the truth may be assessed in degrees rather than as

an "either orO proposition.
In either case some external evidence must be available

after a message analysis has been attempted such that the adequacy
of the content selected on the basis of the signals received can be
evaluated.

This external evidence that represents the unbound part

of the object system in the representational system may be called the
vaHdating signal.

By comparing the inferred content with the validat-

ing signal the validity of a message analysis procedure may be
established, and the appropriateness of the choices regarding the
content assessed.
It could therefore be argued that the goal of message analysis
is a maximization of valid content, that as many inferences as
possible should be drawn from given signals, and that the knowledge
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about the unobserved part of an object system should be pushed to its
upper limit.
Such a goal however, seems to be an altogether unreasonable
one.

Reconsider only the fact that the systems a message analyst

tends to deal with range from single human individuals (IV, X) to
whole nations in the situation of a war (VI), systems that contain a
vast quantity of unobserved components and an extremely complex
internal organization.

To demand from a message analyst a perfect

determination of the states of such complex systems on the basis of
extremely.lhnited observations would be unrealistic for two reasons.
First, Ashby has shown that adaptive behavior is variety limiting (13:58-70) i. e. that any adaptive system, any system that behaves
toward some goal or possesses some intelligence, tends to suppress
the variety. in the signals it produce s.

Many. - - :r1hough not all --

object systems of message analytic concern must intuitively be considered "intelligent," "adaptive" or "goal- oriented." As a corollary

,
to Shannon's eleventh.theorem (175:39), the complexity of a source
that can be inferred on the basis of the signal it produces is absolutely
bound by the variety the signal exhibits.

These propositions lead to

the conclusion that to the extent an object system posses ses adaptive
characteristics the message content inferred can only predict a
limited segment of the unobserved part of the object system.
The second reason is a more practical one and refers to the
message analyst's capacity to process information.

His capacity to
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process signal information is limited by the nature of his normal mental
and computational facilities.

That message a,;,alysis tends to require a

relatively high attention to such information processes is indicated not
only by.the frequently heard complaint that (even the relatively simple)
content analysis is too time-consuming, but also by the recent attempt
to computerize certain routine procedures of such processes.

Consider

the threatening complexity the message analyst has to face who attempts
to analyze the messages circulating within a social system; the analyst
must rigorously limit his task to a manageable size.

The information

processing facilities he has at his disposal bind him to accept only
those investigative problems which can be solved within a reasonable
period of time.
In practice the message analyst accepts such a restriction by

adopting specific interests, a narrow point of view, or by devoting
himself to certain limited practical or theoretical problems.

As the

history of content analysis vividly. indicates such interests are
typically derived from the prevailing cultural climate.

Around 1900,

for example, mass media content analysis was very much concerned
with ideas associated with the "decline of culture"; in the twenties,.
with the "effects of propaganda, ideological warfare and commercialism on the individual"; now peace research and political science
draws novel inferences from the same type of material.
The working examples show mOre specifically that message
analysts tend - - consciously or unconsciously - - to focus only on a
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fairly limited part of an object system.

The psychodiagnostician in work-

ing example X, for example, directed his attention only on certain psychopathologies or therapeutically relevant emotional states.

Among the

numerous contents that could have been inferred from recorded speech
but were excluded by the analyst's point of view are those refe rring to
ethnolinguistic characteristics, those of socio-economic characteristics,
intelligence, education, etc.

The analyst in working example V ex-

plicitly directed his research toward the detection of sources of foreign
propaganda in the United States.

He thus excluded all those contents

that provided neither positive nor negative evidence about an agency's
transmission of foreign propaganda.

For example, those contents that

refer to antecedent conditions or possible effects of the messages, as
--~----

they are of concern in VIII, were declared irrelevant to the problem.
Similar and most obvious is the restriction imposed upon the analyst of
war propaganda described,in VI.

The analyst was only rewarded for

and consequently only interested in those inferences that were assumed
to have some significance for the wartime policy-makers.

Other ir-

relevant inferences were just not made or simply not communicated.
The point that needs to be made is that the message analyst
facing relatively complex and possibly adaptive systems typically can
not obtain perfect knowledge about the whole system from the observation of a very. limited part of it.

Rather, he is forced to select

contents referring to a limited "problem domain" within the representational system, a domain which derives from a specific interest, value,.
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or problem adopted by or imposed upon a message analyst.
The goal of message analysis could now be limited to maximizing
the valid content within a problem domain that is delineated in advance.
But this goal is still to simplistic for it does not consider the fact that a
message analyst may make several kinds of errors when attempting to
appropriately select among the possible contents on the basis of signals
received.

Some notion of the "degree of accuracy" of a prediction or

some notion of the "degree of completeness" of a prediction has to be
considered in formulating the goal.
When making specific content inferences the message analyst
always seems to be susceptible to two basic errors which have different
effects on the appropriateness of the content selected.

The most con-

spicuous error appears when the content inadequately represents an unobserved part of an object system, i. e. when the content "says things
that are not so."

This "error of commission" which corresponds to the

degree of accuracy of a prediction referred to earlier is largelyindependent from another error, the "error of omission" which appears
when the content ranges only over a section, not over the whole problem
domain", i. e. when the content fails to represent what it is expected to
represent.

This error corresponds to what has previously been men-

tioned as the degree of completeness of a prediction.
'While it is fairly obvious that a goal-oriented message analyst
has to suppress both errors as far as possible and it is, hence, easy
to agree on the desirability and undesirability of the extreme values
of the assumed continuum, it seems difficult to evaluate the desirability and undesirability of the intermediate values of that continuum
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on which both errors have differential effects.
The difficulty is increased by the fact that the message analytic
situation does not permit a message analyst to directly recognize or
assess an errOr of cOrpnlission he commits in selecting a content while
he may control his error of omission provided that his problem domain
is adequately specified.

An arbitrary extellsion of the inferred content

that ranges only over a section of the problem domain may indeed eliminate the error of omission but only at the expense of increasing the
error of commission, that error to which he has no immediate access.
The message analyst is therefore burdened with a difficult task of
optimization.
The differential weights which the two errors carry depend
entirely on the situation in which the message analyst finds himself,
and depends on how the conduct of the message analyst is. tied to the
quality of his product, regardless of whether the rewards are imposed
on the message analytic situation by an external observer or by some
other source.
Working example VI depicted, for instance, a situation in
which the inferences of a war-propaganda analyst were utilized for
strategic decisions of possibly crucial political importance.

In such

a case one should expect that the accuracy of the content is of greatest
significance; hence, the error of omission may have to carry less
weight than the error of commission.

160
Similarly the extreme caution with which psychodiagnosticians
approach the problem of predicting psychopathologies from the speech
of a patient indicates the great weight which the accepted responsibility
. for the mental health of a human .being bestows upon errors of commission.

Although the reported results were quite convincing indeed, the

researchers warned against immature generalizations and concluded
that more work is required before an adequate computer diagnosis
could supplement the work of a psychotherapist.

A" wrong diagnosis

would not only. affect the life of a patient, but its publicity would
seriously harm the analyst's future conduct as a professional.
On the other hand, if the determination of the authorship of the
unsigned Imitatio, described in working example IV, turned out to be
false, the consequences for the literary researcher or for those who
use his results could be estimated as less serious.

That is not to say

that such a task is merely an irrelevant intellectual exercise, but that
the error of commission, the direct assessment of which is apparently
very difficult anyway, carries less weight than the error of omission.
The imaginative inferences in the addenda to the content analysis of mass media fiction, reported in (VIII), similarly seem to deemphasize the error of commission in favor of a speculative extension
toward the problem domain, circumscribed by the topic "racial prejudice." Validation would indeed be very difficult, and so far as is
known nobody has attempted, to gather validating evidence regarding
the inferences Berelson and Salter made.

The study is, however,
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wen known, frequently cited and reprinted for its stimulating interpretation indicating an emphasis on reducing the error of omission rather
than that of commission.
The last two examples represent in a sense extremes in which
either the complete lack of independent evidence hinders an assessment
of the inferred content's error of commission (VI), or the way the inferences are stated makes an assessment of that error extremely difficult if not impossible (VIII).

Even if this error is not known in most

of the caSes which the working examples represent, the claim that the
inferences made: doihdeed represent some unobserved part of the
respective object system, is maintained with different degrees of
certainty.

In other words, even in situations of extreme lack of

direct evidence in support of the representativeness of the content,
the goal of message analysis again seems to focus on a valid representation of some unobserved component of a partly observable
system.
In full awareness of the empirical difficulties of evaluating
the errors of omission and commission, let us assume that the content selected by a message analyst is evaluated by the external observer by means of comparison with what may be called a "validating signal."

Such a signal is assumed to constitute precisely that

observation which the message analyst is lacking, represents, for
instance, the unobserved part of the object system within the problem
domain, and is of course accessible only to the external observer or
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after message analysis has been completed.

The extent to which content

and validating signal correspond, the extent to which the selected content
adequately represents what it claims to represent, i. e. the extent to
which the content is valid could then easily be assessed.

Assuming a

quantitative measure function for content, the amount of valid content
contained in the output of a message analysis could then be measured.
Errors of commission and omission then appear respectively in the
quantitative differences between validating signal, content and valid
content, and constitute quantities that need to be eliminated as a message analysis progresses toward the goal.
Given the risks involved in making wrong and/ or incomplete
predictions, i. e. given the differential weights acrued to the content
errors of commission and omission, or more specifically the monetary rewards and punishments associated with each of them, the
message analyst's goal becomes finally that of selecting contents in
a problem domain in such a way that the rewards are'maximised.
If these differential rewards are set up favorably, the quantity of

valid content may become an optimum.
As we have shown, optimization of valid content is not always
a goal, at least not in content analysis.

Often speculative inferences

are rewarded highly without controlling for errors of commission.
On the other hand, in the more rigorous sciences, errors of commissions are punished highly in comparison with errors of omission,
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in the case of which the results of message analysis so evaluated exhibit
a different picture.
Message analysis, as an attempt to appropriately select contents
in the predictive sense as a consequence of signals received, as an
attempt to make valid content inferences from signals, as the scientific
treatment of data as messages with specific contents; is then involved
in a complicated optimization process.

This process attempts to induce as

much as possible from given observations to determine unobserved
states of an object system's affairs within the dimensions of a specified
problem domain and attempts to avoid errors that are related to the
validity of the content inferred and to the rewards imposed on this
activity.

'Summary of Definitions
In concluding this chapter the definitions of the technical terms
may be listed below.

The informal diagram of the message analytic

situation in Figure 5 gives an overview regarding most of the terms.
The message analytical situation is composed of essentially
three subsystems: the object system, the message analyst, and the
representational system.
The object system consists typically of many interacting component parts and is only partially observable by the analyst.
The representational system is a specialized (formalized or
disciplined) language or· notational scheme, perfectly acces sible to
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the message analyst and capable of representing all conceivable states
of the object system or at least those within the problem domain.
A problem domain delineates within the representational system
those component parts or dimensions of an object system that are of
special interest to the analyst.
A signal is transmitted from the object system and accepted by
the analyst just on the basis of its distinguishability from other signals
Or the distinguishability of its elements.

The signal represents states

of the observed part of an object system in the representational system.
A content refers to states of the unobserved component parts of
an object system and is a member of the set of possible representations
that the representational system offers for selection before a signal is
received.

Specific choices make content always predictive.

A message is a signal that has some consequences regarding
the selection of contents in a given message analytic situation.
The message analyst is a material interpretation of some

~

sage analytic procedure, the domain and range of which are disjointly
defined in the terrns of the representational system.

More operationally,

the message analyst makes appropriate choices among contents as a
consequence of signal received, accepting a specific problem domain
and certain rewards (i. e., the different weights the content errors
may carry) as his parameters.

Within these parameters, the goal of

a message analytic procedure is to minimize errors and to maximize
the rewards such that valid content may become an optimum.
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A validating signal is a signal that represents states of the unobserved part of an object system.

Revealed a posteriori to a message

analysis, it may be used to determine the appropriateness of the selections made, to validate the message analytic procedure or to determine
the quantity of valid content.
Message analysis, then becomes (a) any method for appropriately
selecting (inferring) contents (in the predictive sense) as a consequence
of (from) signals received.

The term may also be defined as (b) a

systematic attempt to make specific and potentially valid content
inferences, or as (c) a scientific manipulation of given data as messages
about unobserved components of a system.
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Object System

Representational System

Message Analyst

Signal

Message
Analytic
Procedure

(unobserved)

(Prediction)
Content
VaUdatin'g Signal

Problem Domaij
Rewards

Diagram of the Message Analytic Situation (informal)
Figure 5

167
CHAPTER FIVE

FOUNDATIONS OF AN INFORMATION CALCULUS
FOR MESSAGE ANALYSIS

The following chapter is an attempt to treat previously discussed subjects more rigorously.

To this end a calculus has to be

developed in terms of which informational aspects of message analysis can be treated more adequately,

As far as the information cal-

culus will be formulated in this chapter, it will be primarily geared
to state the goal of message analysis abstractly.

For this purpose

the explication of only one type of information, the quantity of information carriedby a signal, seems to be necessary.

Other kinds of

information will be taken up in Chapter Seven after some of the
distinct empirical problems of message analysis have been discussed.
It will be seen.that other quantities of information to be defined later,

are based on and expressed in terms of the fundamental ideas presented in this chapter.

Furthermore, it is assumed that the calculus

will be useful n.ot only in message analysis but that it will also provide
the basis. for a non- statistical information theory for a range of situations in which observations are utilized for purposes of prediction,
situations more complex than the one of our immediate interest.

Preliminarie s
The notations which will be used in the following are mainly
set theoretical ones based on Ashby's "Set Theory of Mechanism and
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Homeostasis'" (IS), an approach to formalization which draws heavily on
Bourbakiis '''Theorie des Ensembles; Fascicule de R~sultats" (33).

In

cases where we deviate from this approach suitable definitions are given.
To' start with the nature of the representational system, let us
assume a relatively simple object system which,however, has very
many interacting components.
the set of states it can take.

Let each component be represented by
The set of states could be stages of inter-

national conflict, levels of deterrence, measures of tension, positions
of the moon, authors of documents, indices of stylistic features, letters
of an alphabet, the presence or absence of a symptom, scores of an
aptitu:letest, measures of symbol entropy, expressed political ideas,
historical events, steps in time, '" anything that might interest a
message analyst at some time .and for some purpose.

The "set of

states a component may take" is meant to include such things as "values
on a variable,

It

11positions along, ·a-·.·~.in1ension,

II

"indices on a scale,

"measures" of some attribute, implying no metric, however.

11

Each

component of the object system needs neither to be represented by
the same set of states, nor need their states be differentiated along
one dimension only.
Let the set
system.

Zls

Z

represent the component parts of the object

elements

.,4,

B, C::,

J),

ponent by the set of states it can take .

... ,7.

represent each com-

The representational system

into which such an. object system can be mapped then becomes the
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product of the elements in Z.

This product set or state space of the

object system as it is often referred to, may be written:

... "

=

g2

/1/

=

Z

/2/

where:

... ,
Note:

1J

Our notation for the product set gZ should not be confused with

a similar notation that Bourbaki use s to denote the set of all mappings.
The typical element of ov-r many-dimensional space is a many-tuple
which in accordance with

/1/

may be written in two equivalent ways:

... , :z >

/3/

=

where:

O1EJr j

freE

,

-tsC ...

/4/

and (s)Z EO gZ

If the object system is such that it can take only one state at a

time, then its behavior becomes a trajectory within the state space.
We could consider another representational system, capable

o~

repre-

senting all possible behaviors of the object system, in the case.of which
a. behavioral space would have to be taken to represent all possible
trajectories an object system may occupy in the same way as it occupies a state.

We could consider representational systems which

are quite different from our many-product set, but we want to focus

170

only on the simplest object system that is complex enough to serve as a
. basis for explicating the terms of our concern and leave representational
systems capable of representing more complex object systems for a
later extension.

Such a restriction does not however, in any way affect

the generality of the argument.

It serves only for the clarity of the

presentation.
The previous chapter led to the conclusion that the message
analytic situation must be characterized by the incomplete observability
of an object system and by the message analyst's attempt to infer or
predict some unobserved event on the basis of those observed.

In the

framework of the representational system defined above, incomplete
observability can be identified with having aCCesS not to all members
of the set

Z but .only to a proper subset, say,

E

thereof.

Thus, an

incompletely observed state of the object system; the typical signal of
which is to be subjected to message atfalysis becomes equivalent to a
fraction of a many-tuple ranging only over some of the state space's
dimensions.

Such a signal can be regarded as an element of a sub-

space of the object system's state space.
In the notations of our representational system such a signal,
i. e., incomplete observation can be written as follows:

E c

whereby

Z

/5/

Specific signals within a space may be individualized by subscripts,
J.
fo rex am p
le, to ep
X ress that {S) E. r

1.

. •...
{S)E.
J

If the set of components,
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variables Or dimensions, or more adequately, the sets of states those
components may occupy in conjunction need not be referred to explicitly, then the superscripts denoting such sets maybe omitted.
example, some signal may be denoted by the symbol (s)

or

For

(s)i and

some space simply: by. g
Given the signal (s)E the message analyst knows the actual
state of the object system to be in the subset (s)E

><:

gZ-E of gZ

Given in addition his problem domain denoted by the subset D

of Z

the message analyst is informed that the content to be .inferred from
that signal will have to be found among the members of the subspace
gD-E.

Such conclusions are fairly obvious and indeed implicit in the

structure of Our representational system conceptualized as a product
set.

The operation accounting for these implications is essential for

the information calculus to be developed.

It is related to the "opera-

tion of projection" which, applied on a state space or any subset of it,
simply picks out a subspace.

Customarily defined as a mapping (15:14),

the operation of projection is:

gZ

When operating on a

sing~e

_ _ _....._ QG

/6/

element, it produces an element having

fewer components:

prG

(s)

Z

The idea of reducing the dimensionality of a state space is of

/7/
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course, inversely related to the idea of considering a set of an object
system's components which is larger than the set of those actually observed.

In fact the subset containing the actual state of the object system

which is impliCitly known when a signal is received can be obtained by
applying the inverse of prG on the signal.

According to the definition

of the operation of projection its inverse produces the following set:

=

(s)

G

x

f

(S)Z-G}

=

(s)G x

gZ-G

/8/

For the intended development of our information calculus for
message analytic situations, a more general notion of projection is ,
needed which will be termed "cojection" for it involves two jOint operations based on projections.

The term has been suggested by RObinson.'3:c

We start with a definition of two projections wherein E
arbitrary subsets of

Z and the

*

and F

are two

distinguishes them from those having

the total state space gZ as domain:

':'prE

gEU F

..

gE

/9/

gF

/10/

and

::'r:prF

gEUF

;0-

3 T . Thatcher Robinson, personal communication.
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With /9/ and /10/ the operation of "cojection onto F" can now be defined
as follows:

gE

=

gF

/11/

Whereby the domain of the projection is always to be understood as indicated by the dimensions of the operand.
nal (s)E onto F

co F (s) E

The cojection of a specific sig-

is:
'"
-1
E
= ~
~prF "'prE (s)

=

/12/
Note that the operation of cojection is a mapping only under the condition
that its range is either identical with or fully contained in its domain.
Otherwise it is not single valued.
One of the peculiarities of cojection which will be of importance
later on is the cojection of a null-tuple, i. e., a signal none of the values
of which are known or specified.

Such a cojection produces the whole

space within the set of dimensions specified by the superscript:

(s)(tInF x

=

gF-(tI

/13/

The effect of cojections may, be more vividly demonstrated by an
example with actual values.

gZ

=

IT
e

E

Z

ge

Let the state space be:

and

=

{ a, b

1
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Let: five signals be given as:

(s)t = <. a ... "?,

(s)~ = -< ba ... >, (s)~ = <bb ... >,

G
(s) 5

(s)~

= -<bab .. >,

=

<. b ... :>,

whereby E,

F,

and G are all subsets of Z and the dots represent components of a
quintuple along dimensions in

Z not specified by the respective signal.

Some of the cojections are depicted diagramatically in Figure 6.
In order to discuss the operation of cojection more fruitfully
another operation has to be introduced which maps set theoretical
notions into the natural number system.

The operation referred to

provides a basis for translating expressions of the algebra of sets into
those of cardinal arithmetic.

Cardinal arithmetic is required for ex-

pressing quantities within the representational system numerically.
Let A

be any set and a

be a cardinal number representing the number

of elements in A, the operation denoted by, the symbol # may be
interpreted as an enumerator of the elements contained in its operand
and be written:

a

=

/14/

#A

With the operation #,

some of the fundamental operations of

the algebra of sets such as union and product can be equated with such
ordinary operations as addition and multiplication.
A

and

B

Let, for example,

bedisj oint sets, then:

# AU B

=

#A

+

#B

/15/
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(aaaaa)
(aaaap)
(aaaba)
(aaabb)
(aabaa)
(aabab)
(aabba)
(aabbb)
(baaaa)
(baaab)
(baaba)
(baabb)

co Z

_..--::~================:;::(. a.· .. )
coZ

(aa ...

)}--,,--'I
co

rt'-t-:::==========:;;::.(ba ... )

(baba'a)}
(babab) r
(babba)
(babbb) .
(abaaa)
(abaab)
(ababa)

(baa .. )}

1....J---=== (bab .. )

(ababb)
(abbaa)
(abbab)
(abbba)
(abbbb)
(bbaaa)
(bbaab)
(bbaba)
(bbabb)
(bbbaa)
(bbbab)
(bbbba)
(bbbbb)

coZ

( aaa .. )
(aab ..
(aba ..
(abb ..
(bba ..
(bbb ..

)
)
)
)
)

F
-----'-------co

)}_coE~_---t.._.(. b ... )
(bb ... )

(ab ...
..

(s)~ " (. a ... )
E
(s)2" (. b ... )
(s)

F

3 " (ba ... )

F

.

(s) 4 " (b b .. ; )

' ..

(s)~ " (bab .. )
Operands and Transforms of some Cojections
Figure 6
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For any set A

and B:

#A x B

=

#A

#B

/16/

=

/17/

Consequently:

# gAVB
Moreover,

=

# leads to various inequalities and equivalences, for example:

If each component

AcB

implies

#A

<

#B

/18/

implies

#A

=

#B

/19/

g

has the same number of elements:

<

i11lplies

/20/

The possible signals that can be obtained from an object system
and that can be distinguished in the respective state space is not just the
set of elements in gZ,

but the set of all many-tuples (s), ranging over

all possible subspaces of the state space.

With

IPz

denoting the set of all subsets of

Z

The nU11lber of signals distinguishable in 'gZ is:

#

f

(s)EG

IPz

J

=

(1

+ #JI-)

(1

+ #Bl

(1

+

#"(j

(1

+

#XJ

because any (s)E can be construed as taking anyone value within the
set E

of sets of states or as being not accessible.

That this number

is 11luch larger than, the nU11lber #gZ of ele11lents in the total state
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space is easily Seen by converting the above expression into the following
form:

=

1

+ M+ #.B+ ... + #J+ #JtxB +

#Ji"L

+ ... + #Q

Z

i. e., it is the sum of all nul-tuples, all simples, all couples, all triples,

.... , all elements in the state space.
The previous chapter showed message analysis to be a problem
of making appropriate selections within some domain delineated by terms
of the representational system and referring to unobserved components
of the object system.

The goal of "optimizing valid content within a

. proble·m domain" presupposes a quantification of the appropriateness of
a selection.

Since the number of decisions that are to be made by an

analyst can most reasonably be assumed to be strictly finite and enumerable, it is suggestive to apply some of the well known infOrmation measures on the effective number of alternatives presented to him.

As

appealing as such a suggestion may seem; the task is rendered difficult
however, if confined to the concept of information as advanced by
Shannon (175) and Wiener (209).

The four main reasons are as follows:

Firstly, it seems to be impossible to assign

priori relative

frequencies to the alternatives within the behavioral space of an object
system.

A representational system represents not only actual but also

possible signals that maybe preconceived by a receiver or message
analyst on purely logical grounds.

It contains not only the observed

but also, and most importantly for the message analytic situation,
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preconceived and yet unobserved states of the object system's components
that may be subject to prediction.
by an analyst on the object system.

The representational system is imposed
Hence a statistical treatment of both

observed and unobserved states would indeed be vacuous.
Secondly, a simple counting of the number of characters in a
signal or an assessment of the frequency with which such a signal or its
characters has been obtained in the past does little to account for' the
referentiality of such a s.ignal to an object system's components represented in the representational system.

Such notions as "the amount of

knowledge about the object system conveyed l>y a message "cannot be'expressed by merely measuring some characteristics of the signal itself
which carries that knowledge.

In traditional stochastic information

theory notions such as "the validity of the inferred content", have' ,no place
because the former cannot handle semantical aspects of signals.

These

notions typically require the viewing of a signal in the larger context of
,an

priori representational system.
Thirdly, a treatment of the alternatives available to the mes-

sage analyst for selection' as "equiprobable" , the assumption' of which
has proven helpful in other situations of complete uncertainty, "would
seriously violate the systemic character of the state space.

Or" stated

differently, the "logic" implicit in a rep'resentational system accou.nting
for some other than statistical dependenCies would be neglected if all
possible signals within such a system were treated as equally likely.
This is not to say that probabilistic notions are completely irrelevant
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for our interests but that some other form of dependency needs to be
considered which a statistical notion of information does not incorporate
at this pOint of its development.
Fourthly, Shannon's mathematical theory of communication
assumes processes of information transmission to be 'ergodic, i. e.,
the transition probabilites are fixed and frequency distributions are
equiprobable.

On the other hand, one of the most significant character-

istics of message analytic situations and perhaps of all interaction,
through messages is that the reception and manipulation of signals
successively and irreversibly reduces the ,uncertainty, about an object
system.

The information process'

in which the message analyst is

engaged is essentially a non-ergodic process that terminates when as
much uncertainty as pos sible is removed from the problem domain.
Thus, several assumptions of stochastic type information theories as
proposed by Shannon ,and Wiener are fundamentally different from those
that have to be considered regarding message analytic situations.
Consider an abstract example of a message analytic situation.
Suppose we were given some signal and asked to make some predictions
as to the actual state of the object system, i. e., we are asked to
appropriately select some content out of the alternatives retnaining
in the state space after a signal has been received.

For purposes of

illustration let us refer to the signals the various cojections of which
have already been diagrammed in Figure 6.

For the sake of simplicity

let the problem domain be the respective subspace whose values remain
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undetermined after one of the signals are given.
Comparing signals

(sh

and

(s) 5 ' for instance, it is quite ob-

vious that given (s)5 much more is known about the object system than
if only (sh

were to be received.

The "more knowledge" that seems to

be associated with (s)5 appears also to be connected with some notion
of "higher confidence" in adequately selecting among the possible contents of that message.

Moving from

(s11

via

(s)3 to

(s)5 we would

even say,that the "probability" of correctly guessing the possible con_
tents of the message increases with the increasing knowledge about the
object system directly conveyed by the respective signal.

Without

violating our intuition we could furthermore assert that (s) 5 is
some sense "richer" than

(s)l ' makes prediction "easier" than

or carries "more information" than (s) l'
(s)2

in

In the same sense

(sh '

(s) 1 and

could be said to carry the same amount of information although

they are different signals.

The same can be said for

(s)3 and (s)4'

Note that such notions have little to do with those explicated in Shannon
and Wiener's statistical information theory.

The notion of probability,

for example, is not based on any frequency of selections.

It is a

probabiJity,priori to any frequency and uniquely dependent on the
nature of the representational system chosen.

Needless to say, no

statistical extrapolation of the signals can account for such intuitive
notions of probability and consequently it cannot account for the notion
of information of our immediate interest either.

181
Conversely, given (s)5 the knowledge conveyed by it includes
what (s)3

and (s)l

could convey and this is true regardless of how

frequently either of the signals have been observed.
(s)3 is a projection of (s)5'

and

(s)l

The fact is that

can similarly be obtained from

both (s)3

and (s)5 by simply omitting some of the signal's components.

Both (s)3

and (s)l

can be inferred from (s)5 with absolute certainty

and can be said to be redundant with respect to
ditions our intuition leads uS to assert that
relative to
to

(s) 5'

(s)3 and (s)5 just as

(s)3

(sll

(s) 5'

Under these con-

contains no information

contains no information relative

It should again be noted that the concept of information which

is used here informally refers neither .to Shannon's entropy (175). nor to
McGill'.s· uncertainty (132) nor to a measure of rarity or surprise value
as. the statistical information measures have often been interpreted.
The crux of the matter is that the example and its interpretation
just mentioned, does not deal with a frequency interpretation of proba bility but with a logical interpretation of probability, a distinction
which has been made clear in Carnap's work (37).

Similarly, the

notion of "information" as used here derives from the logical interpretation of probability and is probably the one Cherry envisaged when
saying" ... when we solve a set of simultaneous equations we do not
really obtain neW information; the various steps and the final solution
represent transformations (or 'codings ') of the information which was
contained implicitly in the original equation" (42: 389).

The idea that

there may be many concepts of information, a statistical one, a
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semantica1one, etc., all of which can be said to be specific interpretations of a general information calculus has been presented by BarHillel (22).
The diagram seems in a sense to "explain" some of the intuitions
we asserted regarding the amount of information carried by an incomplete
observation.

We suggested that signal {s)3' being in some sense

"richer" than the signal '{s)l' carries more information.

Now the

diagram depicts the immediately striking fact that the number of elements
remaining in gZ after
than after only {sh

(s)3 has become known is indeed much smaller

has been obtained --not to speak of the further re-

duction of the variety of elements among which the state of the object
system will have to be found after

{s)5 has been cojected onto

the other hand, going from (s)5 to {s)3 or to

Z.

On

(s)l ; and from {s)3 to

(s) 1 ' the variety remains unaffected neither increasing nor decreasing.
This fact may account for the intuition that a signal which is only a
fraction of a another carries no information and is perfectly redundant
with respect to the latter.
, The diagram is such that all cojections which do not increase
the variety found in their operands are depicted by left-to-right arrows.
It happens that these cojections are projections as defined in /8/.

On

the other hand, cojections depicted in the diagram by right-to-left
arrows are not mappings.

They are the inverses of projections and

may be called extensions which never decrease the variety found in
their operands.

Compare by means of the diagram the number
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#C(lE(S}~

= 1

obtained by a projection with the number

#coG(s}~

= 4

ob-

tained by an extension.
How these cojections are termed appears to be secondary.

But,

that the intuitive noti(ln of information in the sense of the specificity of a
signal is intrinsically related to the varieties obtained after cojections
have been applied on subspace of a state space and elements thereof,
seems at least suggestive of the following:

A Derivation of the Signal Information Function
The introduction of this chapter developed the basic tools for
our information calculus.

It,enables us to formulate the requirements

which a measure function for "amount of information carried by a
signal, " or briefly, "amount of signal information," should satisfy.
These requirements will, at first, be discussed informally.
The most general requirements on this measure function is that
it should be a continuous function of the signal's specificity or the degree
to which a signal represents the object system within a representational
system.
The measure function should yield quantitative statements
representing some signal characteristic in reference to a representational system which are amenable t(l some algebraic operations.

More

specifically, measures of signals that specify different parts of an
object system and that are in this respect independent of each other,
should be additive.
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Suppose a set of signals are received in the form of punched
cards.

It seems close to our intuitive conception as to a proper meas-

ure of information that two punched cards have, as Shannon suggests,
twice the capacity to store information as a single such card.

Anal-

ogously, if an object system is composed of many identical components,
a signal representing the state of two such components should contain
twice as much information as a signal representing the state of only
one.

If the set of received signals, for example, punched cards,
written text, numerical record etc., are only replicas of each other,
then the information function should not be affected by the number of
identical signals received.

On intuitive grounds the first of these

signals contains all information that is obtainable from the set, the
remainder can be considered redundant and therefore should not contribute to the measure.

Note that this notion of redundancy is quite

different from the concept of redundancy in Shannon's statistical information theory where it is a me·asure of a constraint.
If a receiver or message analyst defines his focus of attention,

area of interest or problem domain to be a particular set of an object
system's components, some signal should be measured as carrying
information only to the extent that it has specificity within the set of
dimensions that denote the

priorily defined focus of attention.

And

yet, the function should still remain a measure of the amount of information the signal carries and not vary with the amount of ignorance
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prior

to the reception of that signal.

This requirement becomes im-

portant for differentiating relevant from irrelevant information and
should permit us to consider arbitrarily chosen parts of an objelOt system
without affecting the quantities measured with one exception: the size
of the a'rbitrarily chosen part of an object system should determine the
upper limit of the amount of information a signal may carry within the
delineated focus of attention.

This requirement is also quite natural.

1£ a signal provides all information of interest, there is nothing to be

,

'

added to the quantity of information possessed by receiving more signals
of whatever kind.

This requirement particularly makes the difference

between our measure of information and a statistical measure of information quite an obvious one.'
Under the assumption that the particular sequence in which a
variety of signals of an object system's components are received is
merely a p:"oblem'of observation and hence does not provide information about that system, the measure function should not be affected by
the order in which these signals appear.
Two or more received signals may 'represent components ,of
the object system as being in mutually exclusive states.

In such cases

the measure function should take an indefinitely large value.

On

intuitive grounds contradictions of this kind in no way reduce the uncertainty regarding an object system., When such contradictions appear,
they indicate that the representational system chosen is not powerful
enough or that it is incapable of adequately representing the object
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system from which the signals were obtained.

In some sense such

signals can be conceived as carrying mOre information than the representational system can handle.

Hence, the measure function is then

expected to assume the value of infinity.

For example, the same

place cannot have two different colors at the same time.

At least

within the common representational systern"colors are mutually exclusive.

An observation of incompatible states would lead to the

collapse of the representational system.

In a more powerful repre-

sentational system which includes, for example, observer differences,
such incompatibilities may become resolved and observations to this
effect may then become manageable and contain finite quantities of
information.
After this informal discus sion of the properties that we expect
a measure function of amount of signal information to possess, we
will state these requirements more formally.

Just for the derivation

of the function (i. e., just in this section of the chapter), the particular
subspace which is of interest to the analyst or receiver will be denoted
by the set G of dimensions that constitute a subspace of the state
space gZ representing an object system and the two sample signals
(s)E and
in

Z,

(s)F will be considered with sets· E

and F

both contained

delineating the components represented by each signal.
Axiom 1: the value of the measure function f is not to exceed

a certain maximum that is determined by the size of the subspace
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denoted by the set G of dimensions of interest to the receiver or message analyst, i. e. ,
G

being fixed or known,

where by equality is obtained when G

Axiom 2:

£

E .

The value of the function is to remain invariant for all

arbitrarily chosen dimensions of subspaces that are merely extensions
of the subspace of which the received signaL is an element, i. e. ,
(s)E being fixed or known,
f{G, (s)E)

=

invariant for any G,

ESG.

Axiom 3: If fractions of a signal are taken independently, then
the. value of the measure function is to remain invariant to any order or
arrangement in which these signals are considered, i. e. ,
for any E, F and G,
f{G, (s)EUF)

=. f{G, {s)Eand (s)F)

=

f{G, (s)F and (s)E)

the non-committal "and" denoting an operation to be defined according to
the axiom.

Axiom 4:

If the members of a set of signals represent no

common components within the dimensions of interest to the analyst,
the!). the value of the measure over all signals is to be the algebraic
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sum of the measures obtained from each individual signal, i. e. ,
whenever

(GnE) n (GnF)

f(G, (s)E and (s)F)

Axiom 5:

=

= f(G, (s)E)

(/J,

+

f(G, (s)F) .

The measure is to be a continuous function over the

number of elements that its arguments delineate within a representational
system, i. e. ,

f(G, (s)EUF)

Theorem:
ments

is continuous

The only function satisfying the five axiomatic require-

IS:

=

where

c

clog

maybe any constant.

Proof:

From

/12/ and /16/

follows:

and

=

=

Suppose now G=E, then according to both axioms 1 and 2:

£(G, (s)E)

=

f(G)

=

F(E).
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By axiom 1 the value of the measure is not to be affected by any signal's
specificity outside the space denoted by G.

In the cardinal arithmetic

expressions above, it is easily seen that under the condition G=E the
number of elements in the signal's cojection onto G is always one and
remains unaltered for any (s)
G

E

,

G~E

The operation cojection onto

ensures that #gE-G is eliminated.
By axiom 2 the value of the measure is to be invariant for any

G,

E£G in which case the measure is solely to be a function of the

specificity of the signal.
having, say,

m

elements, were added to G.

by G' then has m
of (s)

E

Suppose a few dimensions, constituting a space

onto G'

The new space denoted

times as many elements and so has the cojection

m

.
times as many elements.

Axiom 3 requires now

that the number of elements in gG~E in the expression above to have
no effect on the measure function.

These quantities vary exponentially

with the number of dimensions in the arbitrarily chosen space denoted
by G.

The only way of effectively compensating these joint variations

is by dividing the quantities in question.

Hence, the only function that

satisfies axioms 1 and 2 jointly is,

=

where

g

#co

G

g

G E
#co (s)

g is a function that needs to be determined by other axioms.

Thus when G s;;;: E,

f{G, (s)

E

)

=

g

#coGg

G E
#co (s)

=

=
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thereby satisfying the requir·ement ofaxiorrl 1.

=

=

g

When E s=.G,

#gE. #gG-E
#(s)E. #gG-E

=

whereby the requirement of axiom 2 is rrlet.
By axiorrl 3, which can be taken up quite independently of .the other
axioms,

.,

=

=

Since signals in this expression rrlay pertain to several different spaces,
"and" rrlust include a standardizing operation for which cojection has
been defined and an operation that is associative and cOrrlrrlutative.
ing co E U F

Apply-

on the signals in the above expression Yi.elds:

=
(s)F x gE-F

=

whereby

Therefore, the only operation that satisfies the requirerrlent set forth
in axiorrl 3 is the intersection of these cojections.
only be defined:

(s)

E and (s) F

=

=

Thus

"and"

can
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which, inserted in the function obtained from axioms 1 and 2, yields:

"

g

"

g

#GG-(EUF)
#(s)Gn(EUF)

=

g #GGn(EUF)

#GG-(EUF)

Axiom 4 requires the measure for a set of individual signals to be
additive whenever these signals represent no common component within G.
In conjunction with axioms 1, 2, and 3, axiom 4 requires the function to
have the following property:

=

+

Simplified as it has been done above, axiom 1 through 4 requires

g

#GGn (EU F)

+

=

Under the stated assumption that

(Gn E)n (Gn F)

=

(/J, it is always so

that

GGn (EU F)

=

x

The requirement axiom 4 imposes on the function then.becomes more
clearly expressed as:

g

+
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It is well known that the onlyfunction that has this property and confirms

to axiom 5 by being continuous is:

g

(x)

=

c log x .

Hence, the measure function for amount of signal information that satisfies the requirements put forth by the five axioms can only be:

clog

=

#co

G

(s)

E

G

nco (s)

F
~"

..

Q.E.D.

There is no reason to assume the constant c
other than +1.

to have any value

The basis of the logarithm is arbitrary.

But, for accord-

ance with other information theories we can assume it to be 2 whenever
practical computations are made.

Hence, the values of the function are

expressed in "bits." Moreover, we wish to express the function for any
set {. .. , (s);, . ..

J

of signals and therefore define the amount of infor-

mation carried by a set of signals as:

G
SI ( ... ,(s)i"")

=

/21/

log

It is easily shown that the informally stated requirement concerning contradictory signals is implied by the five axioms.
signals

E

F that are mutually exclusive within G,

(s) i and (s) j
(s)~n
1

Consider two

Fn

G

(s)~n Fn G

J

i. e. ,
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implying

x QG-F

=

which is in fact equivalent to

=
in which case

=

=

log

+00

Q.E.D.

Our measure function for amount of signal information exhibits
a superficial resemblance to "-logZPi'" the amount of statistical information that is associated with a single signal out of a set of signals that
are characterized by their occurrence with certain frequencies.

The

expression derives from Shannon's work (175) although it has been
formally introduced only by others, for example, Fano (59).
quently,

Conse-

Pi is the frequency interpretation of probability and ought not

to be confused with our expression right of the logarithm.

Our measure

function is more similar to Carnap and Bar-Hillel's amount of semantical
information conveyed by a statement:
whereby m

"inf(i)

= -logZ

m(i)"

(Zl) (38),

is a measure function defined over the range of statements

that do not imply the statement i.

194
Although formally similar to the measure of statistical information and to the measure of semantical information in that they involve the
logarithm of some proportion, our measure is concerned with the specificity of a signal within <in arbitrarily chosen domain of interest' to the
receiver and with respect to an object system from which the signal presumably originated.

Insofar as signals are being measured in their

capacity to represent components of an object system, One might conceive of our measure as being a measure of the amount a given signal
represents.

It should be noted that the specificity of a signal still has

little to do with the content we are ultimately interested in.
In our definition, the expression to the right of the log<irithm is
a proportion of the number of alternatives within a space denoted by G
and the number of alternatives that remain in that space after a signal
has become known.

In other words, the information measure is based

on the proportion of the varieties ina deSignated space a priori and a
posteriori to cojections of a set of signals onto the dimension of that
space.

This fact leads us to a rather convenient interpretation of our

quantity of information as the difference between a priori and a
posteriori knowledge within a given boundary.

=

log

# coG

More formally, let

/22/

g

and

U

G

( ... ,(s)i"")

=

log

#

0

coG (s)i

/23/

195
then our function for arrlOunt of signal information becomes:
G
Sl ( ... ,(s)i"")

=

U

G

( ... ,(s)i":')

/24/

With this intuitively meaningful equation of information with the
difference between two different states of knowledge, the function becomes a recognizable explication of the kind of information concept
which is made use of when asserting that an experiment yields information about some object tested; that a photograph contains information
about something depicted; when claiming that television presents more
information in subject area X than in subject area
a person as being informed or not informed.

Y, or when judging

It is the kind of information

that is necessary for the making of decisions concerning a delineated
aspect of someone's environment and is therefore sought and paid for
by purposive organizations.

It can be conceptualized as successively

and irreversibly eliminating the uncertainty within a given domain of
interest to the receiver of the signals.

By permitting an arbitrary

delineation of a particular focus of attention to which the assessed
quantities refer, the measure function accounts fo1' differential evaluations that a receiver may impose on the specificity of a signal thus
differentiating between relevant and irrelevant information according
to a receiver-specified interest or purpose:

Some distinctive values of the signal information measure
SlG( .•. , (s)i"")

=0

implies that U

G

=

U G ( ... , (s)i"")

and

indicates that the signals carry no information with respect to that part
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of the object system represented in the set G
amount of signal information in

Z

If the

of dimensions.

(Z encompassing the whole state

space) is zero, the signals must be considered empty Or not received.
According to /13/,

UZ((s) <)I) then as sumes its maximum value.

SIG (. .. , (s )i' ... ) = U G implies

U

G

( ... , (s)i' ... ) = 0 and indi-

cates that the set of signals perfectly specify the state of the object
system represented by gG.

The set of signals can then be said to

have carried precisely the amount of information required to remove
all uncertainty in gG
Sr G ( ... , (s)i' ... ) =

00

indicates an indeterminacy in the sub-

space denoted by G due to contradictions that the representational
system cannot resolve.

For example consider the diagram in Figure 6.

The cojections of (s)2 and anyone of (s)1'
any common element as long as
space G.

E

(s)3'

or

(s)5 never have

is included in the respective sub-

Hence, their intersection is always the empty set.

The

measure then indicates the presence of two or more signals that are
mutually exclusive within the assumed representational system.

Dependencies Between Signals Mfecting the Measure
When two signals contain the same information, one of them
may be said to be redundant with respect to the other.

A set of signals

mayor may not contain redundancy depending on whether and the extent to which the specificity of one signal is already implied by some
other signal.

The quantity of redundancy of a set of signals can be
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defined as follows:

G

R1 (ooo,{s)o,ooo)
1

G

=

.

Sl (ooo,{s)i'ooo)

/25/

or expressed in relative terms, taking values between zero and one:
SIG (o

0

0

,

(s) i'

0

0

0

)

/26/

:EsP{(S)o)
1
1

If two signals are identical,

G produces identical setso
G

SI {(s)i' (s)j)

=

G

{s)i ;:: {s)j'

their cojection onto

Therefore:

SI {(s)i)

=

whereby the relative redundance becomes

riG{(s)i' (s)j)

If two signals are independent in G, Leo

=

005 0

(Gn E) n (G(l F) = Q; ,

then according to axiom 4:

=

+

and relative as well as absolute redundancy assume the value zero.

.

If two slgnals are such that (5)

E is a fraction of, derivable

from, Or already specified by the signal (s)F in G, io eo,

=
=
from which it follows that

# gG- F

198
whereby

Consequently only (s)E contributes to the redundancy of the set of
signals:

=

With the exception of the case where two signals are mutually

= p,

the amounts of

joint and individual signal information are related in the following way:

+
Measures of the amount of signal information conditional on
some given s1g'hal can be defined in analogy to Shannon's conditional
entropy.

Suppose the amount of information conveyed by the signal

(s)i is to be assessed, the signal (s)j being given or known, we define:
.

G

SI ((sli/(s)j)

=

G

SI ((s)i' (s)j)

= UG((s)i)

=

/27/

log

The relation between the amounts of conditional information and of
redundancy follows from /25/ and /27/:

=

G

SI ((s)i)

/28/
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If two signals are free of contradictions in G

or the contradictions

are intentionally to be ignored, then the amount of conditional information
can be expressed in a more convenient way.

Starting again with the defini-

tion /27/:

srG((s)E/(S)F)

=

G
F
#co (s)

log

#coG(s)En coG(s)F

=

log

=

log

=

log

#(s)G() F x gG-F
#(s)Gn Ex gG-En (s)Gn F x gG-F

#gG-F
#(s)(G-F)n E x g(G-F)-E

#coG-Fg
#coG-F(s)E

=

UG - F

- UG-F((s)E)

=

sr G - F ((s)E)

Among the many specialized information measures that can be
defined in terms of our calculus is a measure of the amount of valid
information.

This measure is needed to state the goal of message

analysis formally.
state of a set G

Suppose a message analyst takes a guess as to the

of an object system's components and this guess is

only partly correct.
guess was valid.

We wish to have a measure of how much of this

This entails the comparison of the guess with some

validating evidence and requires the definition of a special operation
"(}"" that picks out those dimensions E'

of the guess

(g)E that are

/29/
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in agreement with the validation signal (v)F ..

Let the operation <r

induce a mapping:

E---E'

=

{ e leE E

and coe(g)E =

/30/

and be written:

=

co(g) E' .

The names of information functions that include the operation
prefixed by a capital V.

iY

will be

Consequently the amount of valid signal info.r-

mation is then defined as:

=

Since by definition /30/ of the operation (t,

/31/

/31/

log

E'£; E, it follows from

that:

VS1G ( ... , (g)i' . .. / / (v) F )

S1G ( ... , (g)i' ... ) .

/32/

The Goal of Message Analysis
After having developed the foundation of an information calculus
assumed to be adequate for message analysis and after an attempt has
been made to show some typical properties of the suggested measure
function, we are now equipped to formulate the goal of mes sage analysis
mOre concisely and in more elegant terms.

For the sake of simplicity,
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the symbols referring to the state space of an object system will be used
throughout, keeping in mind that the formulations are meant to be generalizable to other representational systems as well.
As it was developed in the last chapter, the diagram in Figure 7
depicts now formally the message analytic situation as a system having
an ()bject system, a representational system and a message analyst as
its, components.

Although the message analyst has only limited,access

to the object system of his attention, it should always be understood that
the external. observer, from whose point of view the me s sage analytic
situation is depicted, assumes that access of which the message analyst
is lacking.

This assumption, it will soon be recognized, is a prerequisite

to formulating the goal of message analysis unambiguously.
Let the object system be represented within the set
sions constituting the state space
some subset of variables in Z,

gZ;

Z

of dimen-

and the signal (s), specifying

be received.

The first condition

which the message analytic situation must satisfy can be formulated as
follows:
The object system

o

~

__

incompletely observable if

UZ

"'"

suggesting that a problem of message analysis may exist.

The concept

of a message always requires some inferences beyond the factual observations which are

meaningless in isolation.

Message analysis there-

fore becomes empirically relevant only if the amount of information
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Object System

Representational System

Message Analyst

gZ
~

z-

_ _ _ _--I-_ _ (s)S_ _ _-f-_ _ _ _ _....

S

(c) __- - - - - - \ - - - - - - - "

' -_____~--~_(v)Z-S

£01, (3,

DJ

Diagram of the Message Analytic Situation (Formal)
Figure 7
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conveyed by the signal is markedly larger than zero.

This amount of

information should not, however, be too large for two reasons.

Firstly,

if it equals the maximum uncertainty concerning the object system's
state as a whole, the system is perfectly specified and no need for inferences arises.

Secondly, if it exceeds the maximum uncertainty, the,

signal contains contradictions and cannot be utilized for inferential purposes within the representational system chosen.
Our conception of a message requires some predictive efforts,
some inferences on the part of the message receiver and, hence, the
appropriate selection of some content, denoted by
ables in

Z

(c), over the vari-

but not included in those of the signal which is presumed to

carry that content.

In other words, signal (s)

message are not to be redundant.

and content (c)

of a

Therefore the second' condition which

the m"",sage analytic situation is required to satisfy is:
Some signal is treated as

o -<

~

message if:

SIZ((c)/(s))

If and only if condition

/**/

is satisfied the content inferred from a

given signal can be considered predictive.

If only condition

/*/

is

satisfied and the amount of information carried by the content conditional to the signal is zero, then

t~e

content is merely descriptive of

what has been observed directly or is already specified by receiving
the signal.

In such a case no references are made to unobserved parts

of the object system, and in fact the signal being known, the content is
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perfectly redundant.

Under condition / **/, the arrlOunt of 'conditional

information may indeed approach the maximum arnount of uncertainty
regarding the unobserved part of the object system, claiming perfect
knowledge in spite of incomplete observability.
Unfortunately, both conditions,
vability of an object system and

/,:d.'/

/c*/

for the incomplete obser-

for something being treated as a

message, can only serve as a prerequisite, not as a basis for formulating the goal of message analysis.
by the following two reasons.

This becomes immediately evident

Firstly, as it has been argued in the

previous chapter, a simple maximization of content cannot be a reasonable goal of message analysis.

The reduction of most of the remaining

uncertainty concerning the object system after a signal has been sent
and received may not only be an impossible task, but also irrelevant
to the interest and specific problems which motiva,te an analyst to
employ such a mode of inquiry.
limited task.

We therefore settled on a more

A problematic area of interest to the analyst may define

a specific problem domain D

of Z within which appropriate selec-

tions of predictive content are significant to the conduct of the analyst.
The diagram in Figure 7 depicts

D to be externally imposed on the

message analyst, but it could as well be viewed as the correlate of an
intrinsic goal of the message receiving system.
condition

/*"/

could be modified by replacing

Z

Under this objection
by the set D

of the

problem domain I s dimension within which information is declared
relevant.
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Secondly, any arbitrary selection arpong the contents not specified
by the signal in D would already satisfy the modified condition
gardless of whether the prediction is valid or not.

/"~,/

re-

Therefore the amount

of information conveyed by the inferred content conditional on the signal
would in no way measure the effort on the part of a message analyst to
"correctly" infer the content of a message or to "adequately" predict
some inaccessible state of the object system's components unless the
information is valid.

Consequently, a statement of the goal of message

analysis cannot solely be based on simple quantities of information that
the analysis is to yield; but to a significant degree, on the quantity of
valid information that is associated with the inferred product of treating
some signal as a message,

If appropriate selections are required to

satisfy a certain goal, then a criterion of appropriatenes s must be
given.

Note that the first objection to accepting condition /~,*/ argues

for an intensionally defined value of information gained from messages,
while the second argues for an extensionally defined value of information
provided by a message.

A statement of the goal of message a analysis

will have to include both.
These two arguments suggest looking for a reasonable goal
within the following inequality in which the validating signal (v) Z-S
serves as external evidence against which the inferred content is
validated.

The inequality derives from /27/ and /32/ and reads:
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o .:;;.

<

VSID((c)!!(v)!(s))
SID((c)!(s)) ~ UD((s))
l~_ _ _~v.-_---''---.J)l,-_ _~v'-_ _~)
Error of
Commission

/33/

Error of
Omission

A message analyst must not, of course, be considered "ideal. "
He is susceptable to various kinds of errors two of which appear in the
inequality above.

Firstly, the predictive content may refer only to a

portion of the problem domain not specified by the signal.
may be called "error of omission."

This error

By analogy to the conventions of

statistical inference Simon (178) called such an error Type I error.
It 4ppears here as the difference between the amount of information the
content conveyed and the uncertainty in D, both conditional on the signal
received.

Secondly, given the signal, there is the "error of commis-

sion" which can be defined as the difference between the amount of in. formation the inferred content conveys and the amount of validated
information of that content in D.

This error would, by analogy to the

above suggestion, be called Type II errOr.
The message analyst has to minimize or to avoid both of these
errors according to the extent each affects his future conduct.

In

some situations it maybe more important to infer as much relevant
information as pos sible even though it includes invalid information,
in some other situation emphasis may be placed on the validity of the
inference.

Let

0(

therefore be a non-negative constant of merit

associated with the worth of each unit of valid information, and (3 a
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non-negative constant of penalty representing the punishment for errors
of commission.

0(

and

(3

may be conceived of as monetary values.

Let

the total value of the product of a message analysis be defined as the
quantity:

O(VSID«c)II(v)/(s))

-

(3(Sr D «c)/(s))

-

VSrD«c)II(v)/(sl))

1341

Then the goal of message analysis can be characterizeq. as an optimization process applied on the product's value whereby the amount of predictive information in D tends toward its maximum and invalid prediCtions toward their minimum depending on the value associated with each
of them.

Hence, according to the conclusion of the previous chapter and

the above considerations-:
A message analyst must be considered goal-oriented, i. e. behaving toward the goal of message analysis if, considering his initial state
of having received a signal satisfying 1"1, the inferred content satisfying I*~'/:

(read the arrow as "becomes") whereby it is implied that:

o

< VSrD«c)I/(v)/(s))-_-;"~UD«s))

reaching an ultimate state at which neither error is present:

VSP{(c)II(v)/(s))

=

SID «c) 1(s))

=
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Condition I"~'*I may be considered to be a statement of motivation which directs the process of inquiries into message content in the
way stated in I':'''''~*I toward some end stated in I***'~"'I.

/***>:'1

This process

is manifest in the successive attempts at deciphering the old Per-

sian language which indeed reached the ultimate state

1*>:0:'**1

at which

the hitherto unreadable script was perfectly understood and subsequent
content inferences yielded valid results.

The motivation stated in

/"'"';"1

is most clearly recognizable in the situation of the war-propaganda
analyst in VI of which George (71) could report an increase in accuracy
of content inferences over time, demonstrating the process described
by

1***>:'1.

One could argue that the constants

0(

and

(3 determining the

nature of rewards were relatively high in the propaganda analyst's
situation as compared with their values in the situation of the mass
media critic in VIII.

The strong emphasis on pragmatic validation in

the caSe of the former and in the case of the latter, on intuitively
determined face validity only exemplifies two different consequences
of the two variable s of the reward as defined in 134 I.
process of increasing certainty

1****/

At any rate the

is also observable in the

illustrated attempts of psychologists to analyse human speech (X)
and written texts

(IX) with the purpose of making inferences as to

the psychological states of the speakers.

And it is finally the hope

of reaching a state /'~**':'*/, Or at least of corning closer to it

(/':":"'*/), that motivates many content analysts in their search for
an understanding of the intricacies of modern industrialized culture
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by analyzing and making inferences from the products of popular mass
media

(V)

(VII)

(VIII).

The ultimate state

/*****/

of message analysis seldom seems

to be reached and can only be considered an ideal.
fied when the conditions of reward
the process

/,~,~,~*/

/~,~,,:,/

One must rest satis-

are defined in such a way that

of inquiries into message content tends toward this

An Application to Working Example III
One of the fundamental postulates in cybernetics which has been
formulated by Ashby is that:
any system that achieves appropriate selection to a degree
better than chance does so as a consequence of information
received (14).
The postulate· is abstractly analogous, though not identical with Shannon 1 s
(175:37) theorem ten which concerns the quantity of statistical information that must be supplied to restore a noisy signal.

The postulate has

been shown to hold for all systems known so far, and states that under
very general conditions the amount of appropriate selection is bounded
by the quantity of information utilized.
By defining the quantity of information as a measure of the
amount of uncertainty reduced as a consequence of signals received
(messages interpreted, content selected; etc.), our measure function
for information is an explication of the information concept referred
to in the postulate.

In the light of this interpretation, condition /

;p:d,~, /
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requires a message analyst to bring some quantity of information to bear
ona delineated problem domain, while condition

/**,:,,:,*/

in accordance

with axiom 1 states the upper limit of the amount of information required
to obtain certainty, in that domain.

The fact that information has to be

supplied by any analyst attempting to treat some received signal as a
message is one of the most fundamental and consequential features of
message analysis and will pose many empirical problems of processing
available information, discussed later.
In order to demonstrate the information processes a message

analysis may require and to exemplify the quantities of information
which pieces of knowledge carry in reference to a message analytic
problem, let us consider working example Ill.

Working example III

describes a message analysis which exhibits a structure that is most
obviously susceptible to quantitative operations.
Figure 8 depicts the message analytic situat.ion described ln
III.

General Canby's object system is the Confederate Army; his

specific problem domain, Kirby Smith's intended operations.' The
English writing system is one of the representational systems in
terms of which the object system can be represented adequately as
far as the needs of Canby are concerned.

The telegram, presumably

referring ,to the problem domain in question is, however,. to a significant degree formulated in terms of another representational system
presumably representing English terms.

Hence, the cryptographer

is faced with the problem of supplying that information which permits
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Cipher System

--~--~--------------~~(s)--~------_

Mess,!ge
Union
Cryptographer

(z)' = (c)

_+-__---"..
Information

Part of Confederate Army

(s)

=~\

(c)

=

English Writing System

Cryptoanalyst

Ciphered part of the message
(z)'
= Deciphered part of the message (=content in cryptographer's terms)

(s)' =

Clear part of the message

(c)' =

Clear of the message (=content for the native English speaker)
=

(s)', (z)' _ _

Decipherment
(c)'

=

Intuitive semantic interpretation

Diagram of the Situation in Working Example III
Figure 8
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hi:m to appropriately select a:mong the possible letter sequences which
a) could be represented by the signals, the ciphered version of the
English text, and b) are consistent with the se:mantic and syntactic rules
of the English language.
The initial state of the :message analysis is characterizable by an
extre:mely un:manageable a:mount of uncertainty resulting fro:m the fact
that each of the 127 letters of the ciphered parts of the telegra:m can take
anyone of the 26 letters of the English alphabet.

The initial and :maxi-

:mu:m uncertainty is the uncertainty within a state space of 127 di:mensions each of which can take 26 values.

~f

an una:mbiguous reading of

the message is tobe achieved, it is precisely this maximum uncertainty
which has to be effectively eli:minated by supplying a certain amount of
knowledge to the interpretation.

The amount of information required

is:

Note that the cryptographer's problem do:main denoted by M

is differ-

ent from Canby's problem domain which represents Kirby Sm.ith' s
possible operations.

The set M

of dimensions constitute a state

space of possible letters that can be considered as replacements of
those in the ciphered part of the telegram.

Since this required amount

of information referred to by far exceeds the capacity of. any terrestrial
organism or technical device to systematically try and test all combinatorial possibilities, the cryptographer's emphasis has indeed to
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be placed on an "effective" elimination of the uncertainty.
The first relevant piece of information obtained by the cryptographer carne from analyzing the two accompanying documents.

The

Confederate Army, it was figured out, made use of the Vig~nere
tableau.

This device involves the application of a transformation from

a clear and a key to the cipher of a message.

The key has only a few,

between 10 and 20 letters which are used repetitively to encode and decode messages of an arbitrary length.

The Pemberton message was

enciphered by means of a 15-letterkey.

Knowing the nature of the

transformation it was not necessary to look for all combinations of
127 letters in the state space denoted by M, but only for those of the
key with which the message could possibly be deciphered.

Hence, the

knowledge "ciphered by means of a Vig,§nere tableau" introduces a constraint of the number of combinations within the state space relative
to the clear and thus reduces the dimensionality of the initial state
space by a known transformation which we will call
state space be:
veyed by

F

gV =

p- gM,

the

esti~ated

p-.

Let the new

amount of information con-

is:

70

526

+

+

23

=

23 bits

Although this is an enormous amount of information, the remaining
uncertainty between 47 and 93 bits is, however, still much too large
for any trial and error process.

Consider only the number of possible

Z14

10 to ZO-letter words or phrases which the English language could provide
'-C

as a key!
The second piece of information the cryptographer could bring to
bear on the message stemmed from both his familiarity with the English
language and the knowledge of that part of the object system to which the
message presumably referred.

Knowing that "the only patrols in this

area are the gunboats on the Mississippi" and discovering "a sequence of
letters that can easily be replaced by 'of the river, '" which will be denoted
here by "{k)Z'"

produced with the help of the Vigenere transformation

the fraction of the key:

"TE VICTORY C."

Note that the message analyst did not have any other validity
check than his sense of plausibility in judging the key fraction so extracted.

His argument that this fraction could not have occured by

chance suggests a view of his sense of plausibility in terms of the
statistical redundancy (in Shannon's sense) of the English language,
but we are not concerned with this sort of judgement at this point.

f

and

{k)Z. are quite different in effect.

The former affects

the dimensionality of the state space without specifying some value on
its dimensions, the latter specifies 10 letters in that reduced space
denoted by V.
therefore:

The amount of information carried just by {k)Z is
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and the amount of information so far obtained by utilizing

uM

_

u V + SrV ((k)2)

= 573

+

p

and

(k)2 is:

23 bits.

After having utilized (k)2' the analyst discovered the third piece
of information in the nine letters "a crossing" fitting a certain suggestive
letter sequence in the ciphered part of the message.

This suggestion was

again due to.his familiarity with the English language and his fragmentary
knowledge of the nature of the object system.

Applying the transforma-

tions for extracting the key this time on "a crossing" yielded "ORY COMPLETE which was cojectable onto the space of the remaining unspecified
letters of the key.
(k)2 and

Let us call this third piece of information "(k)3' "

(k) 3 exhibit a certain amount of redundancy (in the sense of

our information calculus) which confirmed the cryptographer's judgement concerning whether the extracted key was complete.

The amount

of redundancy of (k)2 and (k) 3 is:

=

47

+ 10g 2 26 9 - log 2 26 15

= 19 bits

and the amount of signal information conveyed by (k) 3 conditional on
(k)2 is;

=

10g2 26 9 - 19

=

23 bits.
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The complete decipherment of the message could now be accomplished by repeatedly applying the transformation prescribed by the
Vig.§nere tableau on both the chipher and the key.

No additional infor-

mation was needed to execute these transfonnations.

The requisite in-

formation for this decipherment was provided by what we called jJ.,
(k)2'

and (k)3'

The resulting clear was unambiguous, made sense in

terms of the English language and was accepted beyond any doubt,
this point the condition

/,:,,,,*,~*/

At

was satisfied although no validating

evidence other than the cryptographer's intuition could be provided.
The quantities of information conveyed by the three successively
utilized pieces of knowledge add up to the total amount of uncertainty
of the initial state as it is to be expected:

V

=

526

sr

((k)2)

=

47

sr V

((k)3/(k)2)

=

23

=

596

UM

(+ 23)

bits

where by the estimate for the amount of information provided by knowing that the message was enciphered by the Vigenere tableau (the
latitude of

.±

23 bits) became certainty.

The behavior of Kirby Smith's Rebels could now be anticipated
as far as Canby's planning was concerned.

However, the assessment
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of the degree to which this prediction was accurate and the mode of
validating the inferences made, is beyond the scope of this discussion.
While this example demonstrates the way the information calculus
can be applied to assess quantities of effective signal information that
are conveyed by certain pieces of knowledge, Chapter Seven will attempt
to define several expressions for quantities of different types of information that have so far been cast in terms of signal information only.
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CHAPTER SIX

EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS OF MESSAGE ANALYSIS

When discussing the message analytic situation, the message
analyst has to be treated as a "black box" because a specification of
the goal of message analysis has to avoid references to the analyst's
internal structure, his procedures and subroutines, if objective external criteria for evaluating the total performance of a message analysis are to be established.

The task of this chapter is to break this

black box into its essential components, to show the requisite information processes and to outline a macro structure of an analytic procedure
that would satisfy the goal of message analysis as stated in previous
chapters.
We want to reserve the term "message analysis" for a methodologically conclusive inquiry into incompletely observable systems

i. e. a methodologically verifiable treatment of data as message.
The possible confusion between message analysis and other overtly
similar activities which this additional requirement is supposed to
eliminate necessitates some introductory remarks before the procedural details of message analysis and their specific empirical
problems are discussed.

The Methodological Commitment
Message analytic situations as defined in previous chapters
are indeed very common in everydaylife.

Signals such as lines on
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a television screen, black ink figures on paper, punched tapes, radio
waves, and even car shapes, cloud formations, odors, etc. provide
intklligent beings a basis for speculating about aspects of their environment to which they have no direct access.
People, so.cial organizations, nations or content analysts may
satisfythe goal requirements of message analysis without in any formal
way allowing their behavior to become a subject of methodological examination.

The domain of such behavior is generally termed and invest-

igated as "symbolic behavior" and is a behavior that is abundantly
exhibited by many higher organisms and social systems of varying size.
There is no reason to assume that symbolic behavior presupposes a
formal analysis of sensory data as messages.

The great efficiency

with which symbolic interaction takes place between social organisms
of any kind even suggests that awareness of the inferential processes
involved cannot serve as a prerequisite for handling symbols effectively.
For this reason, most of the analytical conceptions of symbolic behavior
can afford to avoid references to the fundamental fact that information
must be supplied in order to treat signals or data as messages.
An intelligent mass media critic, (for example Berelson in his
study reported in VIII), when attempting to infer some social conditions
from the frequency counts he obtains from content analyzing popular
fictions, is most certainly quite aware of his reasoning.

His interpreta-

tions may have evolved in actively participating as a member of
at large, in the course of his career as a scientist, etc.

so~iety

But making use
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of a method is quite diffe rent from explicitly stating the method employed
such that it can be subjected to methodological evaluation.

It is this dis-

tinction that differentiates symbolic responses from message analysis.
In a rudimentary way working example II can serve as an illustra-

tion of the evolution of a methodologically more satisfactory inquiry into
messages from a hitherto entirely intuitive judgment: the process originated when the Swedish scholars refused to accept the public accusations
made by the orthodox clergy.

Although the link between the religious

dissenters, the Moravian sect and the "Songs of Zion" seemed to be
appealing, the evidence for such inferences were judged insufficient.
It will be recalled that the first explicit method which emerged was a

comparison of the counts of key- symbols found in both documents,
the suspected songs and the authorized book of hymns.
first produced results supporting the intuition.

The method

It had to be discard'ed,

however, when other disputants proved the difference to be due to what
is today called an error of sampling.

In response to such challenges

another method emerged that took into consideration the contexts in
which certain key symbols appeared.

The analytical technique yielded

differences between the two documents more reliably but could not
provide the full evidence necessary to support or reject the accusations made.

So the scholarly dispute went on until explicit methods .of

analysis emerged which under the given circumstances appeared to be
irrefutably conclusive and withstood all tests of intellectual adequacy.
In this example it was not the results of the analyses that were
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challenged but the methods by means' of which those results were obtained.

Since direct evidence for the possible link between the sect,

the song book, and the undesired effects was virtually unobtainable,
the only concrete object of the dispute was the inferential method itself.
The prerequisite of such disputes which are in essence methodological,
is that the analytical technique employed is explicitly described and
hence potentially replicable.
Herein lies the fundamental distinction between a systematic
message analysis and other forms of symbolic behavior.

The former

requires an explicit and complete map of the inferential procedure
followed, the decision criteria employed and assumptions made during
.the analysis while the latter requires nothing of this sort.

In the

absence of direct observational evidence the credibility of the products
of message analysis depends solely on a methodological examination
of the conclusiveness of the antecedent analytic process while the
credibility of symbolic behavior has intuitive and social roots.
An analytical procedure that is satisfactory on methodological
grounds is of course one that has been examined before being applied
on a particular set of signals, i. e. it is at least to some extent planned
in advance.

Such a requirement has often been attacked on the basis

that science ought to give primacy to observations and therefore collect
as much data as possible before designing computational procedures
for representing them.
One

objection to the above argument is that the universe

simply contains too much (irrelevant) information to be considered
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by an analyst with limited capacity to process it.

As we shall see later,

one of the problems of message analysis is to suppress irrelevant signal
information.

If a message analyst is concerned with any problem at all,

then this problem bestows differential relevance upon the possible data
he can consider.

Especially since message analysis typically deals with

latently structured and relatively voluminous material, a recognition in
advance of what is relevant is usually a significant part of solving the
whole problem.

To plan message analytic procedures in advance is

therefore not only a matter of economy but possibly a matter of arriving
at a solution at all.
Another objection sterns directly from the content analytic
dilemma elaborated in Chapter Two.

If the analyst is completely free

in choosing the analytical procedure after data have been collected, it
is quite likely that he will be trapped in a methodologically fallacious
situation which will produce only pseudo evidence.
In scientific inquiries, it has often been suggestive to proceed

from an uncontrolled scanning of the "symbolic environrnent, " perhaps
guided at first by a scientist's disciplined intuition, to what is called a
"fishing expedition" and from there via exploratory studies and tests
of investigative techniques to analytical methods of some definiteness.
While the state of the art of message analysis may not always be such
that explicitly stated procedures permeate the whole analysis, the·
iteration converging toward the methodological ideal of examining and
planning investigative techniques prior to their actual use should be
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recognized as a typically scientific one.
To approach such an ideal becomes an absolute necessity when
information processing devices ,for the analysis of messages are intended
to be used.

Here nothing can'be left to intuition.

Working examples IX

and X show what is required when computers are to be utilized for message analytic purposes,

Some of the technic",l problems involved are

discussed in Borko (32), Hunt (86) (87), Garvin (68), Feigenbaum (60),
North (142), Janda (90), and Stone (188) (189) (190).

The researchers

attempting to solve such 'empirical problems agree that the task is often
meticulous and yet, as a result of this self-imposed methodological
rigor, they are able to report quite unexpected results obtained with a
minimum of clerical labor,

Many scientists share Wrigleyls belief that:

the electronic computer will prove to be the most versatile
and influential scientific instrument so far invented and that
it will playa larger role in the scientific histories of the
future than even s;'ch obvious challenges as the microscope
and the telescope (216:163),
but of equal importance is the extreme explicitness that computers require in scientific research.

As Holsti remarks

II. , •

rigor and discipline on the formulation of research.

computers impose
The investigator

using computers for content analysis is forced to make every step of
his research explicit . . , it is not wholly facetious to suggest that'all
content analysis research should be designed as if it were to be done
by computerll (83: 124).

The use of electronic computers lends itself

to the kind 'of explicitness that was missing in much pre_behavioral
theorizing and is a pre'requisite for systematic methodological evaluation.
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Of course the procedural details of message analysis cannot be
specified without reference to a particular message analytic situation.
Some such situations may require the obtaining of permeation measures
as one of the analytical steps; some other situation may suggest that the
presence Or absence of a particular characteristic is more relevant to
the problem at hand; and in a third situation, the appropriate inferences
maybe triggered by the appearance of certain abstract properties that
emitted signal sequences exhibit.

There is ample reason to assume

that no universal algorithm can be formulated that will yield the desired
inferences in any situation, for any object system and with respect to
any problem domain given.
Given the general goal of handling available information in such
a way that uncertainty in an unobserved problem domain is to be effectively minimized, we can hope to show some of the subgoals that have
to be reached when inqUiries into messages are to be successful in the
above SenSe.

This is another way of saying that it is assumed that any

message analytic procedure can be broken down into a few essential
components or subroutines, each geared to a different end and posing
different empirical problems to the analyst, and that their essential
components can be abstracted from the specific nature of the message
analytic situation.
It is furthermore assumed that if enough information about the

regularities of the object system is available and the formal properties
of suc.h essential components are sufficiently understood, these
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sub-procedures may then be suitably assembled such that the message
analytic goal can be accomplished.

The, es sential components sugge sted

in the following can befor);llulated only in general terms and differentiated
heuristically.

This means that other approaches to message analysis

Illay prefer to make other distinctions and use different labels.

But it

is believed that some such procedures are the prerequisite for any message analysis that is satisfactory on methodological grounds.
The following components of message analysis in the wider sense
will be distinguished in this chapter:
1) Recording denotes a process of transcribing .raw data into
primarynotations that are amenable to subsequent explicit analysis.
2)

Filtering signifies a systematic reduction of data byeliminat-

ing irrelevant information or noise from available data, past or present,
by applying appropriate operations on their structure.

The output of

this component is a transformed version of the data or a representation
suitable for further processing.
3)

Constraint analysis attempts to discover relevant constraints

existing in an object system and to formulate regularities that can be
considered to account for them. This component accepts data representations as input and produces regularities that can be utilized for inferential
purposes.
4) Design of message analysis in the narrower sense involves
an evaluation of the paths provided by known regularities according to
whether and how the uncertainty in a delineated problem domain can be
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reduced effectively.

The output of this component contains specific in-

structions to be used in recording, filtering and content inference.
5)

Content inference may be regarded as the heart of message

analysis and refers to a process by which problem-relevant constraints
are applied on filtered data or texts.

The output of content inference is

a representation of the message content by definition.
6)

Projection refers to a transformation of the abstractly repre-

sented content onto the dimensions of the problem domain whenever
content inferences do not already yield results in those dimensions.
Projections may take the form of applications of analytic results according to other objectives.
7)

Content validation evaluates the output of content inferences

against independently received validating evidence representing some
aspects of the object system.
In a simplified form Figure 9 gives an informal outline of the
empirical concern with messages which we will term message analysis
in the wider sense.

One of the research tasks that can be discerned

among others in empirical inquiries into messages, is the analysis of
relevant constraints an object system may exhibit or the establishment
of regularities concerning the messages it produces.

Such a task must

be considered preparatory to the systematic treatment of data
sages.

~)'

mes-

Message analysis in the narrower sense is in accordance with

the goal as defined in Chapters Four and Five.
filtering, and content inference.

It involves recording,

The specific arrangement and nature
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of these components are determined on the basis of available information
from a constraint analysis.

Projection and validation are, on the other

hand, a posteriori to message analysis in the narrower sense and maybe
regarded optional as far as the goal of the message analyst is concerned.
The diagram is a simplified one in so far as actual mes sage
analyses tend to be much more complex than depicted.

There may be

interactions and iterative loops between the components and not just a
one way flow of information.

There may be chains of filters and infer-

ence procedures and not just one .of each.

Lack of validity may have to

induce procedural modifications and not just be indicative of some defect
as the diagram seems to suggest.

In short, reaching the goal of a

particular message analysis may presuppose more complex networks
of numerous such sub-procedures.

The simplified presentation merely

depicts the minimal differentiations among essential components and is
primarily meant as an outline for the following discussion of the empirical problems of mes sage analysis.
The remaining sections of this chapter are devoted to constraint
analYSis, filtering, recording, content inference and validation.
order in which they are discussed is not chronological.
cedures are not discussed here.

The

The other pro-

After this attempt at clarification the

following chapter will take up the same subject in the light of the infor-.
mation calculus introduced in the previous chapter.
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Constraint Analysis
This section concerns the empirical problem of analyzing message- relevant constraints in the following steps:

consideration will first

be given to the relation between requisite information and the existence
of constraints.

Then indices of constraints are discussed showing the

idea of constraints to bea quite general one.

This leads to the problem

of formulating the regularities that can be assumed to account for the
discovered constraint, a problem that is quite different from just indicating the presence of it.

The section will subsequently be concluded

by presenting two examples of constraint analyses as an illustration of
the kind of empirical prerequisites of message analysis in the narrower
sense.

Requisite Information and Constraint

'"
The working examples make it abundantly clear that the goal of
message analysis can only be achieved if a certain quantity of informationis available that can be brought to bear on given data.

At the end

of Chapter Five an attempt was made to illustrate the information
calculus by expressing the amount of requisite information quantitatively,
completely neglecting, however, the nature of such information.
is perfectly legitimate but insufficient.

This

Shannon and Weaver (175) do

not either offer an explication for "information" when defining a measure function for the average amount of statistical information.

But·

message analysis deals with several kinds of information; the information that the data provide, the information that is required to make
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specific inferences, the information that is finally obtained as message
content, and the information that is necessary to validate content inferences.

Here we have to consider the nature of the information that be-

comes operationalized in filtering and in content inference which in turn
permits us to make appropriate selection of contents within a problem
domain.
To show exactly what must be known when specific content inferences from given data are attempted let us again examine some of
the working examples.

A simple case is the identification of the author

of an unsigned document described in working example IV.

Although a

long list of persons were originally considered as potential authors of
the Imitatio, evidence other than thol>e described .in The Statistical Study
of Literature reduced this list to two persons.

Hence one bit of infor-

mation was required to decide the authorship in this case.
Yule discovered and verified for many documents with known
authors that certain statistical indices defined over the vocabulary of
a document varied only slightly within the works of one author but considerably between the works of different authors.

He found, for example,

nouns to be most distinctive and was therefore able to characterize each
author by the set of nouns he employed in his writing.

This one-to-one

relation between writer and his statistically represented vocabulary
was precisely the knowledge needed to decide on the authorship of the
Imitatio.

Note that this relation could be established only after the

document's characteristics were suitably recorded, filtered and
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represented and that this relation was a prerequisite for making the .intended content inference.
Working example IX showed how the General Inquirer was used to
infer the suicide intentions of a person from his personal letters.

The

example again demonstrates that the inference could not proceed invacuo.
It was preceded by what we may call a "learning period" during which 15
known pairs of letters (one real and one simulated) were subjected to an
analysis that was in effect a constraint analysis.

It will be recalled that

three vocabulary variables were found to discriminate the relative frequencyof 1) references to concrete things, persons, and places, 2) the
use of the actual word "love" and 3) the number of references to pro·cesses of thought and decision identifiable in the text.

By subtracting

the score on the third measure from the sum of the scores on the first
two measures a discriminate function was developed which when applied
on 15 other pairs of unknown origin correctly distinguished 13 of them.
The kind of information that was acquired during the learning period
and subsequently made available for making inferences was the discriminate function mentioned above.
Evaluating the propaganda analysis efforts during World War II,
George (71) studied numerous incidents of which only one could be reported as working example VI.

Inquiries into the propaganda analyst'S

reasoning on record revealed relatively detailed "models of the situation" on the basis of which inferences were made from the ITlOnitored
message.

He found in particular that the analyst discovered and made
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use of nUITlerous recurrent regularities in the opponent's propaganda
behavior.

These regularities sOITletiITles took the forITl of typical in-

dicators of which lists were cOITlpiled;. and sOITletiITles, the forITl of
generalizations about the ITlajor propagandist within the political setting
of the governing elite.

Knowledge of these recurrent regularities were

in fact a prerequisite for ITlaking the inferences intended.

Thesuc-

ces sively increasing accuracy of the inferences ITlade are indicative of
the accuITlulationof relevant inforITlation.
While inferences in content analysis ITlainly rest on a speculative
base, Yule's relation between the identity of an author and a statistical
representation of his vocabulary had been investigated thoroughly; the
above ITlentioned discriITlinate function over the General InquirerITleasures had been subjected to an eITlpirical test; the knowledge of appropriate regularities of propaganda behavior had been successively
acquired and verbally expressed by the analyst on the job.
For exaITlple in V, the basic assuITlption which is iITlplicit in the
interpretation of the series of tests designed to disclose foreign propaganda in the United States refers to the nature of the cOITlITlunication
channels between foreign governITlents and publication agencies suspected to be arITlS of those governITlents.

If a foreign governITlent has

control over the cOITlITlunication channel between the events within its
nation and a publication agency operating in the United States then - so
it could be argued - certain essential ITlessage characteristics should

be expected to reITlain relatively invariant throughout the transITlission
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process.

The analysis consequently focuses on such characteristics

which would very likely be altered if transmitted through a communication channel not under the control of this government.

The decision

concerning the existence of a communication link between a suspected
agency and a foreign government presupposes such an assumption which
takes the place of the requisite information in our sense.
Whether this requisite information is established by empirical
means or assumed on the basis of sufficient intuitive experiences, it
always affects some specific property of the object system.

In order

to show this property more clearly let us take working example VII for
a change.

Leites' knowledge about the Soviet mode of expressing adula-

tion and about the conditions under which political and private intimacy
are expected to be suppressed in public, led him to deduce a rather
simple relation between the number of references to Stalin's Bolshevik
image and the number of references to Stalin's popular image on the
one hand, and the socio-political distance of the speaker to Stalin on
the other.

Suppose the frequency of references to either of Stalin's

images varied independently of the actual distance of the speaker to
Stalin, then their mention could in no way be indicative of this distance.
In other words, if no dependency between the respective variables
could be expected to be persistent, nothing could be inferred from
one to the other.

Persons politically closer to Stalin were not per-

mitted, however, to express personal intimacy to him in public while
those mOre distant felt compelled to use crude forms of adulation.
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The behavior of the persons comprising the object system in question
was confined with certain normative or otherwise accepted limits.
other words:

In

the object system possessed a constraint.

Whenever a system cannot utilize its full combinational possibilities and is compelled to behave within a subset of it; or, whenever
a systeIn possesses some internal structure, some invariant relation,

some persistent regularity, we say that a constraint is present.

The

kind of information that a message analysis presupposes is existentially
linked to the existence of such a constraint.
In working example IV Yule discovered, formulated and applied

a relation symbolically accounting for that constraint which is present
in an author's uSe of his vocabulary.

In V, Lasswell assumed with

sufficient confidence the existence of a constraint concerning communication links within a socio-political organization.

In VI the propaganda

analyst utilized the constraints that persisted in the particular social
situation within which the propaganda analyst operated.

In attempts to

analyze some data as messages it is always a constraint of the object
system that the requisite information represents.
Fisher is probably the first who identified the presence of a
statistical constraint within obtained data with an amount of information that they convey.

Concerned with evaluating research designs

he took the inverse of the sampling variance to "measure the quantity
of information supplied by the experiment of the particular value to
which the variance refers" (63:196).

Thus, if the frequencies are
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equally distributed over the values of a variable, the standard deviation
is infinity and Fisher's measure of information assumes the value zero.
As the experiment yields narrower statistical distributions Fisher's
quantity of information assumes some larger value indicating that some
constraint is present.
Fisher's measure is of course mainly of historical value.

But

the idea of identifying the discovered severity of a constraint with an
amount of information is most certainly not an obvious one.

It has

been utilized in the mathematical theory of communication and will
provide the basis of our information calculus to be further developed
in Chapter Seven.

Discovering Constraints
It can be taken as evident that message analysis presupposes
the object system to possess some relevant constraint, or, to formulate it more pointedly, that message analysts must have available
some adequate representation of whatever accounts for the constraints
present in the object system, a representation that we could identify
with the requisite information.

Consequently, one task of message

analysis in the wider sense is to discover constraints that are relevant
in a particular situation.

In order to accomplish this,evaluative

criteria must be at hand that permit the making of decisions as to
whether or not a constraint is being observed.
As we suggested, no confusion should be made between information and a measure of the amount of information.

Similarly, a
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constraint should not be confused with a measure of its severity, intensity
or strength.

It is only the latter which provides criteria for decisions

concerning whether it is feasible in a particular situation to attempt the
formulation of the regularity that accounts for the constraint observed.
Since the existence of a constraint seems to be a quite general
prerequisite for knowing anything at all about the structure or identity of
a system, the search for constraints and consequently their quantitative
evaluation is most common in all empirical science s.

Most of the

statistical procedures that are used particularly for testing hypotheses
can be considered measures of the severity of a constraint.

Such meas-

ures quantitatively relate a me;;l.sure of the maximum range of freedom
within a system, or at least reference points of it,and a measure of the
actually observed freedom and can be considered specialized interpretations of the following general form:
severity of constraint=f(observed freedom, maximum range
of freedom)

If, for example. frequencies are assigned to the ith category of
a contingency table. a Chi-Square Test "may be used. " as it is commonlyexpressed, "to test whether a significant difference exists between an observed number of objects or responses falling in each category and an expected number based on the null-hypothesis" (177:43).
In the most familiar formulation

=

L
1

( 0i - Ei )
E·1

2
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The differences between observed frequencies
estimated on the basis of the

0i and frequencies

E·1

absence of any constraint show the test

to be a particular case of the above form.

The value of

X2

becomes

larger as the measured constraint becomes more severe.
Pearson's familiar product-moment correlation coefficient also
conforms to the same basic idea assuming, however, linear depend;"ncies
between variables, say X

and Y.

The somewhat lengthy formula boils

down to a proportion of the actually observed covariance (X, Y) and the
maximaily possible covariance computed as the geometric mean of the
two variances of X

and

Y.

The coefficient takes the value one when

the constraint is perfect and zero when no constraint is present in the
data.
In Shannon's mathematical communication theory (175) the existence of a constraint is. indicated in the form of the measure of redundancy.
The name is an unfortunate result of the early engineering orientation of
this calculus during which constraints appeared as a kind of waste of
channel capacity.

At any rate, the severity of a constraint becomes:

identified as the difference between the quantity of information that a
channel can maximally transmit and the quantity actually communicated ..
Statistical constraints are not the only important ones in message analysis and the point has frequently been made that non- statistical
signal characteristics may in certain situations provide more adequate
bases for inferences.

Consequently measures of the severity of a

constraint cannot be confined to statistical measures.

Recently
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Ashby (16) suggested a straight·-forward measure of this property that is
not statistical.

He traced his idea back to Wiener (208) who, already in

1914, identified a relation, previously regarded as somewhat metaphysical, with the set R of those n-tuples in a product set G that satisfied
the relation_

As arbitrary as a relation may be, Wiener's suggestion

makes it at once definite and a subject of formal 6perations _ According
to Ashby "the 'constraint' introduced by a relation R':' is most naturally
. identified with the set G-R _ When G-R the constraint is zero; as

R

shrinks, so does the constraint become more intense" (16:9) (original
symbols replaced) _ We will take up this argument in the following
chapter, but the idea of a constra.int and a measure of its severity now
seems. to be an entirely general one and not bound by some particular
material feature of the object system from which signals are emitted.
Although these and many more
, indices all boil down to measuring some property of constraints which we labeled "severity" for convenience, they cannot always be assumed to be indicative of that
inferential quality of a constraint which the message analyst is ultimately
interested in_

For example, Fisher's measure represents the severity

of a constraint within one variable only_

1£ specific inferences are in-

tended to be drawn from a given text, relevant constraints must exist
and must be represented between at least two variables one of which
represents some text characteristic, the other referring to the prOblem
domain_

239
For exaIT1ple, the successive attempts at interpreting the old Persian language in I was for quite some time a test of various hypotheses
concerning the ITlost productive syntax of the figures carved in stone.

As

long as constraints within these figures were discovered little could be
inferred froIT1 it.

Inferences started emerging when a few syntactically

characterized figures and certain social uses of language could be assumed
to be invariably related, i. e. when constraints could be discovered that
go beyond the data from which specific inferences were intended or, to
phrase it in more conventional terms, when constraints between documentary and extra docuIT1entary data appeared.

As we suggested in

Chapter Four, the constraint that finally led to inferences from these
carved figures to historical events of the old Persian Empire was one
that held between the old Persian writing system and a ITlodern language
in terIT1S of which the history of that empire was represented.
Thus it is always a constraint between at least two sets of independently observable variables that needs to be discovered and
decided on by means of some suitable measure of the severity of the
constraint.

Multiple correlation coefficients, ITleasures of multivariate

information transmission, Ashby's conception of a constraint defined
in a ITlany-product set, etc., provide such indices for the inferential
quality of constraints which ITlessage analysis in the narrower sense
utilizes.
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Formulating Regularities
When appropriate measures indicate the existence of a sought
constraint, the problem still remains to formally represent what introduces the constraint in a system:
larities.

relations, dependencies, or regu-

The measures discussed above only indicate the strength of

a constraint or its potential usefulness for a particular problem of
inference but they do not discover the precise nature of a constraint.
Ultimately, what is needed for making specific content inferences is
not a measure of a constraint's severity, but a formal repre sentation
of the regularity, lawfulness, relation, etc. that accounts for such a
constraint.
In this sense the wqrks reported in working example X cannot

be considered as complete message analyses as far as their current
development is concerned.

Although the efforts are assertedly geared

toward inferring a person's emotional state or pathology from his
speech, Mahl has not gone very much further than to show the correlationbetween level of anxiety and certain speech disturbance measures; while Feldstein, Jaffe, and Caroll are still struggling with the
attempt to find variables of recorded speech that correlate with
various psychopathologies.

And yet if there are sufficient reasons

to assume linear dependencies between these psychological variables
and measures of speech characteristics then correlations provide a
limit for the possibility of formulating relations that the intended
inferences presuppose.

241
When actually formulated, the relations that are finally used in
message analysis sometimes take rather simple forms.

For example

the one-to-one relation between the statistical measures over the vocabulary of a set of documents with the identity of their authors in IV is so
simple that it too easily escapes notice.

But the formulation must never-

thelessbe definite in order to allow the making of the intended content
inferences.
In working example VII the relation, although it was not obtained
from the empirical analysis of a constraint but deduced from some
generally known regularity, has been given the form

D "

N(popular)

+ 1/2N(ambiguous)

N(popular) + H(ambiguous) + H(Bolshevik)

This formulation of a regularity is a well defined function that accepts
frequencies of references made to Stalin's Bolshevik image; frequencies
of references to the popular image of Stalin; frequencies of references
to an image that is ambiguous with respect to the two; and also produces
distances D of the writer of the document to Stalin.

It might be argued

that this function assumes the existence of too severe a constraint and
that its single-valuedness may not be justified, but the formulation even
allowing for some variance, would be considered as being well defined.
In IX the regularity formulated to infer suicidal intentions of a
letter's author was formally quite similar to the one above.

Here too

a few elementary algebraic operations were applied on three frequencylike scores that came out of a General Inquirer analysis of the texts.
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Again the question might be raised as to whether this formulation accounts
for all the variance that writers in this situation may exhibit although the
empirical test indicated that it comes very close to it.
Of quite a different nature was the constraint with which the cryptoanalyst in III had to struggle.

He knew in advance that the Vignere

Tableau in conjunction with the key "COMPLETE VICTOR >';" which he
had to dis cover, define a mathematical transformation of letter s of the
ciphered message into those of the clear.
Most of the few explicitly formulated regularities that have
emerged out of content analysis and are potentially relevant in message
analytic situations are represented in'natural language terms.

For

example Lasswell argues that
" ... an increase in discus sian of CENSORSHIP or TYRANNY
will lead to an increase in reference both to FREEDOM and
to LIBERTY" (113:56).
On another occasion, he found that changes in the frequencies of
political symbols reflect major policy changes (108).

Pool also states

the re sult of his analysis in words:
Those nations which have at any given moment dominated
the world scene have generally said little that was adverse
in 'prestige papers' about the other powers. The insecure
or unsatisfied powers, on the other hand, have generally
. had editorials full of hostile judgements of foreign states
(159:62).
North put forth numerous propositions concerning international crises
among which the following appear:
The higher the tension, the greater the redundancies of
communication, the heavier the overload of channels,
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and the less the ability of decision-makers to assimilate
the incoming messages (142:165).
The higher the tension, the stronger the tendency of agents
in the field to report - consciously or unconsciously - that
information which they perceive as desired or expected by
decision-makers at the center (142:170).
Such verbal formulations often even suggest certain hidden generalities.

Compare, for instance, North's proposition concerning international

crises:

The higher the tension, the stronger the tendency to rely
on habitual images and stereotypes (142:l74).
with Osgood's hypothesis concerning human speech behavior:
The greater the motivational level under which language
encoding occurs, the greater will be the stereotypy of
choices (148:298).
But, there are serious limitations attached to the use of informal verbalizations as a mode of representing message-relevant regularities.
Firstly, if the formulation refers to some regularity concerning
the social use of language - which is indeed often the case - and is represented in the very same medium, then object-language and metalanguage may become easily confused and lead to well-known paradoxes
and limitations.

A representational system must always be "more

powerful" than the object to be represented otherwise a constraint
may remain unrecognized.
Secondly, although such propOSitions, theoretical statements
or simply "knowledge" may indeed be supported by empirical evidence,
the way they have been established is often irrecoverably lost.

This
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is the result of an intuitive use of natural language favoring the tendency
of statements to become independent of the events they purport to express.
Hence, it is difficult if not often fallacious to derive filtering procedures
from verbally represented constraints. ,
Thirdly, as many authors have shown; it is almost impossible
to handle more than two or three simultaneou!3 relations in verbal logic
(178).

Therefore, more complex constraints of object systems can

hardly be represented in the verbal mode of scientific discourse.

The

verbal propositions listed above may represent only inadequately simple
structures of object systems simply because natural language is most
capable of dealing with them.
Fourthly, it is very difficult to transform such verbal statements
into rules of inference because verbal reasoning is not only replete
with logical gaps and with ceteris paribus assumptions, but also with
considerable operational ambiguity.

Thus, while a statement conCern-

ing an existing constraint might be intuitively convincing, it is often
difficult to use this statement as an inferential operator on statistically
represented texts.
Unlike many empirical efforts in the social sciences which are
directed toward and generally end with testing verbally stated
hypotheses, in message analysis the methodologically similar task
of discovering relevant existing constraints and formulating regularities
that account for them is only an intermediary step.

As such,the repre-

sentation of a regularity need not enter verbal discourses but it must
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be inferentially applicable on future data, signals Or their derived representations.

In the light of the above listed difficulties with the uSe of

verbal formulations for inferential purposes of the kind required in message analysis, it is therefore quite suggestive to simply omit the attempt
of idealizing a discovered constraint in the direction of a natural language
proposition in favor of representing respective regularities directly for
USe in content inference and filtering.

Although the vividness of the

interpretation of relevant regularitie s in intuitively more meaningful
natural language terms may be lost this way, the validity of the outcome
of message analysis might gain considerably.

Two Further Constraint Analyses
Examples of constraint analyses that are geared to represent
regularities in a form adequate for future content inferences have
already been given.

Many of them take the form of psychological eX-

periments of which working example X and perhaps Osgood's work can
be considered representative.

Some formulations that have been used

effectively such as Leites! work in VII are, as has already been
mentioned, logically derived from some more general regularity known
to the analyst.

The two examples to be reported in the following,exhibit

formal structures that are relatively uncommon in message analyses
reported so far.

In addition, the first one is interesting because in it

an automatic discovery procedure was used that is suggestive for
future developments.

The second one is included and developed because
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it deals with some non- statistical constraint of s orne complexity which
had not been adequately tackled before.
The first example is an outgrowth of the work reported in IX.
The attempt to find constraints that distinguished real from simulated
suicide notes culminated in the joint use of two computer programs:
(a) the General Inquirer simply mapping words and short phrases that
appear in texts into sets of tags and answering retrieval questions concerning the distribution of specific tags, and (b) the Concept Learner
asking enough retrieval questions and deciding whether they are relevant
for differentiating the texts according to some attribute outside those
texts.

The Concept Learner thus operates on very many variables and

stores the rather complicated constraint it discovers in the form of a
decision tree.

An illustrative example is provided by the comparative analysis
of arguments for and against two legislative proposals in California
from which sentences containing such obvious differentiating phrases
as "vote no" were omitted.

After the General Inquirer had tagged the

texts its retrieval part was coupled with the Concept Learner.

Without

going into the procedural details - - one of the most simple constraints
that the Concept Learner discovered within 21 sentences was accounted
for by an ordered set of distinguishing characteristics depicted in
Figure 10.
The verbal interpretation of such a regularity would be that
those opposed to the proposal are apparently preoccupied with its
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economic costs, represented by the two distinguishing text characteristics

l1

quantitative-verbl! and "economic-verb,

11

while those in favour

emphasize non-economic aspects of the issue.
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I
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Discriminate Function "discovered" by the Concept Learner
Figure 10

The constraints that the Concept Learner discovered without any
human aid exhibit two important properties: first, the program is
capable of considering many valued relations quite dissimilar to the
type of relations that are usually encountered when such indicants as
product-moment correlation coefficients are used as in the case of
working example X.

In fact the above depicted tree includes a quaternary

relation.
Second, the represented relation takes a form that can be directly
converted into an ordered set of decisions.

Thus, if the relation that

the Concept Learner finds successfully discriminates between complex
data or texts (here sentences containing specific references) according
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to a set of attributes (here the pair "pro" and "con") outside those data,
the decision structure into which the above tree can be converted at once
can be used to infer such attributes from other data Or texts that are obtainedunder similar conditions.

In this example the ope ration of form-

ulating a relevant regularity that can be considered to account for the
discovered constraint becomes in a sense an operation complementary
to content inference.
Although the joint use of these two computer programs as presented by Stone and Hunt (190) is capable of discovering constraints,
formulating relevant regularities and making what are in fact content
inferences, the drawback that needs to be mentioned is that the inferences amount to a simple decision between two attributes.

Thus the

quantity of information these computer programs find and utilize is
exactly one bit.

While this is a rather severe limitation it may not

be an a bs olute one.
The material for the second example is takan from Goodenough's
influential "componential semantic analysis" (78) illustrating an anthropological approach to "empirical semantics" by the study of Truk kinship terms.

The work not only provides evidence for a quite complex

constraint that may have to be utilized for making content inferences
but moreover demonstrates some of the differences in the task of content analysis and message analysis.
It is quite obvious that cultures impose constraints on the situational use of their kinship terminology, thus encouraging the formulation
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of regularities that can be considered to account for such constraints.
To represent these regularities Goodenough made use of a hypothetical
construct that is identical with Janis' conception of content (91) and has
in reference to' Morris' theory of signs {l38) been phrased the structure
of signification.

It involves identifying basic dimensions of meaning

or semantic components along or according to which the observed and
recorded differentiations within the kinship terminology can be represented.

It is assumed that this hypothetical construct accounts for a

native speaker's signification habits.
Goodenough's representational system consisted of the well
e sta blished linguistic notations plus notations he had to develop for
representing the "contextual elements" of utterances, i. e. the kinship
relations denoted by a speaker.

The notations had to make as many

differentiations as conveniently possible.

In its terms an English·in-

formant would use the expression "my. cousin" to denote what is
transcribed here by FaBrSo (father's brother's son), Fa$iSo, FaBrDa,
FaSiDa, FaFaSiSo, FaMoMoBrSoDa, etc.

With the addition of Sp

(spouse) this notational scheme can represent a very large number
of familiar kins.hip relations, certainly more than can be expected to
be culturally significant.
The anthropologist's preliminary task .is to gather all expressions whose denotata make it appear that there may be some common
element in their significata.

Goodenough found that whenever a person

was denoted by one of 14 single utterances, called lexemes, it was
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also 'tefej' to the speaker, here called " eg O.

II

Hence,. 'tefej' was taken

to define the universe of lexemes and denotata considered.

After this

first analytical step, each lexeme can be viewed as imposing a partition
of the recorded denotatain the universe.

For example, the kinship rela-

tions denoted by 'neji' were found to be the following:
So
Da
ChCh
BrCh
SiCh
MoBrCh
MoMoBrCh
FaBrChCh
MoSiChCh
FaSiSoChCh
FaSiDaSoChCh
FaFaBrSoChChCh
Etc.
The structure of signification now becomes manifest in the distribution of lexemes in the universe of possible denotata.

Oninspection

this distribution revealed to Goodenough among other things that the
Truk's concept of generation does not coincide with the usual genealogical schema.

For instance,

the denotata--oI IIne-ji l ,. :-.includepeYs6:hsin: -tower-generations-than ego's, excepting persons in ego's father's matrilineal
groups and children of men in these matrilineal groups. They
also include the children of any men in ego's matrilineal kin
groups together with their children, and the children of any
children of men of ego's father's matrilineal group (78:205).
E. g.

Ch, BrCh, SpSiChCh are included as well as FaBrCh, and

MoFaFaSiCh although the latter range over generations higher than
ego's while the former do not.
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Such observations render sufficient support to the analyst's conviction that the native differentiates among the denotata within the universe according to some consistent principle which he hopes to formulate
in terms of a few semantic dimensions or components of signification.
The denotata of 'neji,' for example, were characterized by the two
component values

1) being 'tefej' to ego and 2) being of·junior genera-

tioninthe Trukese sense of "generation height."

The denotata of the

kinship terms could be similarly characterized according to generation
height as well as according to such dimensions as Sex of relative, sex
relative to ego's sex, symmetrical or asymmetrical relation.

Good-

enough's task was to construct a system of signification for Truk kinship
terminology which he presented in the form of two simple paradigms.
In it each lexeme is assigned a location that represents its relevant
components of signification.
The anthropologist's paradigm is a mapping of a set of lexemes
into a hypothetical construct that is chimed to be a representation of
a native's system of signification.

Goodenough is quite aware of the

hypothetical nature of this system of signification when showing that
more than one such system can be constructed.
The difference between Goodenough and a message analyst
appears in the mode of validation to which the analytic results are
amenable.

While the mapping of lexemes into the hypothetical signif-

ication is well defined in Goodenough's paradigms, the relations between these significata and their observable denotata is not explicated
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at all and requires an intuitive interpr",tation which is far fro:m obvious.
Thus if the anthropologist receives so:me kinship term he can find its
signification according to his paradig:ms but has no way other than his
intuition in order to infer what kinship relation is being denoted by the
speaker.
struct.

Face validity is the only justification of this hypothetical con·
In analogy to Ogden and Richards' symbol/interpreter/referent

triad (145 )Goodenough' s result :may be depicted in Figure 11.

Significata

"

""

:mapping induced
by pa radig:m

""

""

intuitive
'interpretation

""-

""-

"" ,
"
__________________--')

Lexemes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Denotata
t~

______________________

~r-

___

v

I~":<~'

It·,

extensive but inco:mplete protocol

Triadic Interpretation of GO'Qdenough's Results
Figure 11

What a message analyst would need to make inferences :more ex·
plicit is either (a) a formal "tate:ment of the relation between significata
and denotata in case of which the lexeme' s references could be inferred
fro:m its hypothesized signification, or (b) an explication of the regularity
that accounts for the constraints observed and recorded in the notational
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terms of the protocol and is stated as a relation between denotata and
lexemes.

If the latter is given, inferences from a de nota tum to the

lexeme appropriate in that situation can be made as well as inferences
from a lexeme to the set of denotata that constitute its refe renee.

If

the former relation were given, inferences from denotata to lexemes
cannot be made effectively because the relation from significata to
lexemes is not single valued as far as Goodenough's conception is concerned.

The relations that are needed to fully account for a native

speaker's competence in the situational use of his kinship terminology
can be depicted as arrows (a) from significata to denotata 'and (b) between denotata and lexemes in both ways.
In the above situation the mess.age analyst's task is rendered
difficult by the fact that the sets of denotata tend to be very large and
in many cases even non,-denumerably large (note the obligatory "etc."
after each list of a lexeme' s denotata).

As it would be unreasonable

to assume that the native speaker has acquired his familiarity with
kinship terminology by something like "pair-learning" it is hardly
possible to expect adequate results from a contingency analysis of the
kinship protocol.

Rather, it may be assumed that such non-denumerably

large sets are recursively enumerable by a few formulas, a set of which
is associated with each lexeme in question.

1£ this is the ca.se we can-

not search for components of signification that seem intuitively satisfactory but for recursive formulas that account for a native's recorded
competence in using kinship terminology.
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In search for suitable grammars of natural languages Chomsky
(43) (44) suggested and investigated several generative processes of
which a simple type, a "phrase structure grammar, " seems adequate
for representing the regularities of our conCern.

The rules governing

this generative process can be applied in reverse and accept just those
strings of symbols that can be generated by them.

In terms of the above mentioned generative process, our formulae which are in effect reversible rules of inference become sets of
rewrite or substitution rules that generate all appropriate denotata (in
notational form) for each kinship term.

In this set of rewrite rules,

lexemes provide the natural initial symbols, capital letters are used
for the non-terminal symbols, and Goodenough's notation for kinship
relations are the atomic terminal symbols.

A typical rewrite rule

"r6: . X--BrZ," for example, is to be read as "X may be replaced
by BrZ." Another rule may replace

Z and so forth until the string

of symbols contains the description of a denotation.

Taking again

'neji' as an example, the rewrite rules depicted below recursively
enumerate its denotata as far as is evident from Goodenough's report.
(For the sake of simplicity the terminal symbols So and Da are
collapsed into Ch).

Z55
rl:

neji

,-

Z

r8:

Y

•

FaY

r

:

neji

•

X

r9:

Y

MoY

r3:

neji

..

--

SpX·

rIO:

Y

..

BrZ

r4:

X

FaYCh

rll :

Y

....

SiZ

r5:

X

MoY

rlZ:

Z

•

ChZ

r6:

X

BrZ

r 13 :

Z

..

Ch

r 7:

X

Z

..
...
-

c·

..

SiZ

On the basis of the rules formulated above, one of the possible inferences
from 'neji' can be generated as follows:

r3:
r 4:
r9:
r ll :
r13:

neji

~

SpX

l

SpFaYCh

~

SpFaMoYCh

•

SpFaMoSiZCh

•

SpFaMoSiChCh

It should be noted that the formula for each individual kinship
term cannot be viewed in isolation from the rest as it has been done here
for purposes of demonstration.
rules overlap somewhat.

It must be assumed that the sets of their

However, r

lZ

and r

13

as terminal rules

leading to Ch, ... Ch, ... ChCh, etc. and r 4 and rS which ensure that
decendants of the children of ego's father's group are included but not
those of ego's mother's group, are not likely to be found in any other
formula.

Therefore, these rules represent in a different way those
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aspects of the signification into which anthropologists such as Goodenough
may want to inquire without attempts at making inferences ..
It can well be imagined that some definable constraints.exist that
limit the set of denotata of 'tefeji'inte·rms of the maximum "kin-distance"
between ego and relative,

Such a con'straint has not been mentioned by

Goodenough who primarily focused on components of signification.

Such

a constraint would require a limitation a's to the number of times a recursive rewrite rule can apply.
In this discus sion no claim is meant to be made concerning the

simplest symbolism for the formulas.
just for convenience of presentation.

Goodenough's notation was used
In addition this elaboration is not

meant to be a contribution to the study of kinship terminology.

Good-

enough's data was merely used as a convenient vehicle to illustrate
the formulation of a regularity that is much more comple« than

is

thought. Constraint analyses may have to locate constraints which are
much more powerful than those discovered by correlational methods
or by the Concept Learner's method, i. e. constraints which are
appropriate for systems that possess a significant degree of organization.

We cannot go further into the discussion of various possible

structures of constraints that maybe relevant to some content inferential tasks.
In summary then, constraint analysis operates on suitably
represented data, filtered texts, or measures of relevant characteristics that are found in data with the goal oLobtainingformulations of
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regularities that account for observed constraints and can be utilized for
making inferences to a given problem domain.

Technical prerequisites

for the discovery of constraints are measures of a constraint's severity
and inferential power which serve as evaluative criteria of a given data,
text, or signal for inferences intended. Though formally similar, hypothesis
testing aims at the recruitment of evidence to test a given statement while
constraint analysis aims at the recruitment of a formalization accounting
for a discovered constraint that is suitable for specific content inferences
from given data.

Filtering
The primary purpose of this constituent part of message analysis
becomes at once apparent when one considers the sheer volume of data
that has to be processed in most of the cases,
working examples I and Ill).

(For exceptions See

In conjunction with the analysis reported

in working example V, for instance, Lasswell writes:

The Bookniga and Transocean cases involved great quantities
of printed and unprinted matter. Four periodicals, 76 books
in the English language and 132 books in the Rus sian language
were examined in connection with the Bookniga prosecution.
Particularly detailed analysis were made of the periodicals.
Four kinds of material were relevant to the Transocean proceedings: "Gables" to Germany from America; "Transmissions" to South America from America; English news service
to Arn.ericans; and German news service to AITlericans ...
(111:177).
If one is willing to consider the number of propositions, not to

speak of words, that had to be read, recorded, categorized, measured
and subjected to some kind of computation, the problem of drastically
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and rigorously reducing the complexity in the data to a manageable form
becomes a major problem in most :r:'-essage analyseso.
Rigorous reduction and simplification of data while an obvious
prerequisite of many such analyses cannot be the sole criterion for the
procedure in question.

In fact one of the criticisms that had been made

in chapter one is that content analysis often simplifies the data too much .
. When relying on simple frequency characterizations, structures of which
the textual units are constituents are counted away. and those within the
units are treated as whole entities.

If structural characteristics of

text that are significant for further analysis simply disappear during
computation, the analysis defeats its purpose.
What the filtering process should accomplish is not simplifica·tion

~ ~

but a purposeful reduction of the available complexity.·

The

specific purpose of this complexity-reducing transformation cannot,
on the other hand, be established without reference to the message
analytic situation as a whole and the component structure of the analytic
procedure in particular.
Referring again to the diagrarnatic presentation of the message
analytic procedures in the introduction to this chapter, filtering
appears in two slightly different positions.

In one case it takes an

intermediate position betw"en recording and content inference, in the
other between recording and constraint analysis.
When filtering mediates between recording and content inference the purpose of filtering is well established: given a specific
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prOblem domain and available regularities accounting for previously discovered constraints in the object system, filtering has to produce just
those representations of data that will lead via content inferences to
appropriate selections within the problem domain.

By replicating those

transformations that lead to the observation of constraints, irrelevant
information in the text or noise is suppressed.
"Noise" in this formulation is not to be understood in the very
specific sense of statistical random variation.

The noise that filtering

is to suppress is delineated by the purpose of message analysis and is
of two kinds.
Firstly, a text can be represented along dimensions irrelevant
to anY'known regularity of the object system, i. e. dimensions, variables, components, etc. that do not or have not been found to relate to
any other dimension, variable or component of the object system.

Such

dimensions of the text's representation do not contribute to any con-.
ceivable inference and cannot be considered carriers of content.
Statistical noise is a special case of this irrelevant information that
filtering .is to eliminate.
Secondly, among those dimensions of the text's representation
that pertain to available regularities not all will lead to selections of
content within the problem domain.

They may lead to inferences other

than those delineated by the ll1essage analytic situation.

Hence, this

source of irrelevant inforll1ation does not result froll1 the regularities
available but froll1 a projection of the problem domain through those
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given regularities onto the data representations needed.

Thus, while

the first kind of noise is rooted in the explicated "past experiences" of
the analyst, the second type stems from the particular problem under
consideration.
When filtering mediates between the recording process and con-straint analysis the specific nature of the complexity-reducing transforma,tion is not known in advance.

While filtering here too has to

eliminate what does not lead to the discovery of constraints of potential
use in content inference, the relevance of representational dimensions
which filtering produces can only be established after the accomplished
constraint analysis.

Thus, when constraints are sought any conceivable

filter may be used until the relevant constraint is found, but when
specific content inferences are intended only those filters can be
utilized that are known to produce desired text representations, that
are standardized on the available regularities and delineated problem
domain.
Often complexity-reducing transformations are used and even
defined as indicants.

Janis and Fadne r

I S " coefficient

of imbalance"

(93) reduces a whole text to just one variable whereby it is not at all
clear what this c?efficient exactly indicates.

The one-to-one relation

that is claimed to hold between an indicant and some other variable is
so simple that the implicit inference is often overlooked.

For analyti-

cal purposes we have to clearly differentiate between some computational formula i. e., representing the filtering procedure; the various

261
states of "imbalance" i. e., the contents inferred; and the empirical
generalizations that are needed to go beyond the characterization of a
given text, i. e., the established regularities.
To give a brief illustration of the role of filtering consider
Mahl's "exploring emotional states by content analysis" (124) reported
in working example X.

He argued that our cultural standards stress

concealments of a speaker's emotional states and that language training
and communication habits tend to focus awareness more on lexical characteristics of speech than on its non-lexical features (existing constraint).

To obtain information about an individual's emotional states

(problem domain) it is advisable to seek out those attributes of his
speech that are most free from linguistic and social control (characteristics that a filter needs to maintain) and discard those speech characteristics under conscious control of the speaker (dimensions carrying noise
with respect to problem domain).

Mahl furthermore showed the high

correlation between certain types of speech disturbances and the individual's state of anxiety (relevant constraint) and suggested a set of
speech disturbance measures (standardized filter) as an inferential
basis for individual anxiety.

Here the existing constraint and the de-

lineated problem domain justified the computational reduction of the
complexity of speech.
Our conception of a filter must not be confused with a frequency
selective network as it is traditionally conceived of in communication
engineering.

This conception appears narrow indeed when viewed
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against the background of Wiener's theory of smoothing and prediction of
time series (210) and Shannon's theory of statistical information (175).
And even this recent development appears too specialized for our filter
problem. ,Message analysis is not yet so well formalized.

What Wiener

and Shannon have shown, however, is that in order to reduce a certain
amount of statistical noise in a signal, a certain amount of statistical
information is required that is equivalent to the amount of noise to be
removed from that signal.

In Wiener's theory, dealing specifically

with filter problems of continuous and stationary signals with additive
noise, the designer of a filter must know the auto-correlation function
and cross-correlation function of the input and the desired output.

If

he knows less he cannot design the filter and if he knows more he cannot make use of the additional information. ,
Very shnilar conditions exist for the designer of the filter in a
message analytic procedure.

The problem domain must be delineated

and some formulated regularities accounting for observed constraints
must be available to him.

Only then is he able to evaluate the possible'

inferential paths that would lead him to appropriate selections within
the problem domain and only then can he specify the transformation
that was antecendent to the formulation of the relevant regularities and
which can now be applied on the given data.

The choice of the filter is

thus' absolutely determined by the available constraints and the specifiedproblem domain.

If the filter designer has knowledge of the

problem domain only, he cannot adequately select a filter and is trapped
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by the content analyst's dilemma.

If he knows only the regularities of

the object system, no problem of message analysis exists thereby making
inferences vacuous.

Filtering procedures vary greatly in complexity.

Simple selec-

tions among the elements of the data qualify as filter as well as such
means of reduction as sampling procedures, categorizations, enumera. tions, elementary algebraic operations and even such sophisticated
computational techniques as factor analysis.

All accept the notations

of one representational system and transform them into those of another
more convenient form whereby the structure of data that are relevant
for content inferences are carried over and those that are irrelevant
are eliminated.

In other words filtering is a mapping of one representa-

tional space into another which separates relevant from irrelevant information; it is a homomorphism maintaining significant structures
that appear in the data or text to be analyzed.

Much methodology in

the behavioral sciences goes into the design of filters in our sense
and the study of their properties.

Kaplan uses the term "derived meas-

urements" to refer to computational techniques that are applied on
"fundamental measurements" which presuppose no other measurements
(97: 188).

Derived measurements and filtering procedures are by and

large synonymous.
For the most elementary examJlle of the filtering process consider two measurable text variables in a traditional content analysis:
the total amount T of printed space in a newspaper and the amount S
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devoted to a particular issue.

Suppose the analyst knows that S varies

proportionately with T and T is for some reason irrelevant to the analysis while a third variable affecting S linearily carries the desiredinforHere some function like SIT could provide an adequate filter

mation.

eliminating the effect of T on S and represent the relevant variable in
an adequate form, say. in percentage.

The example illustrates in the

most simple form that (a) filter processes are irreversible, (b) the
justification of a particular filter requires some knowledge about the
relations between the observed variables or presupposes at least assumptions about them, and (c) filters operate only on characteristics
measurable on the data itself, i. e. represent only syntactic not
semantic features.
That filtering is irreversible does not need a detailed demonstration.

The reversal of a many-one tt:jlnsformation is not single

valued and always leaves some indefiniteness.

After a set of cate-

gories is lumped into a single class nothing can be said about the
original class membership of its elements.

Percentages do not

represent anything. about the magnitudes on the basis of which it
was computed.

Any summation irrecoverably loses information in

this sense, etc.
That filtering Presupposes some knowledge about the relations
that hold between the observed

vaf~aples

is less obvious.

The pre-

vious example make s evident that if S were not dependent on T, the
filter would not produce any significant representation of the text.
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But suppose we wish to sample from the available text.

The implicit

assumption that would justify such an attempt is that the text is either
composed of statistically independent elements or that the dependencies
that may be observed between those elements are irrelevant for the
analysis.

If this assumption cannot be maintained, any sample taken

from the text would be biased, misleading or at worst represent only
noise.

While a categorization process irrecoverably eliminates a

certain amount of specificity in the data, the enumeration of occurrences
allocates equal weights to each categorized unit regardless of their
position within a text.

If, for example, something like "attention" is

to be inferred from a text and this variable is expressed by the size of
headlines and the relative position of the feature text within a newspaper page, then an ordinary frequency count of specified references
would not contain much relevant information for it discards
variables observable in the text.

contributory

Gerbner's "news value index" (76:

II-D-4) tries to maintain some such relations by considering frequencies
of references to a topic in both headlines and feature text.

Osgood's

"contingency analysis" (147), for example, discards the individual
frequencies with which differentiated units appear in a text in favour
of co-occurrences.

Osgood!s interest in assessing a writer 1 s associa-

Hon structure clearly justifies such an omission but if it were shown
that individual frequencies are related to the association structure of
a source then the analysis would have to be said to eliminate too much
relevant information.
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Filtering procedures - whether merely categorizing text characteristics Or computing numerical values for representing features of
a text - generally have very little to do with analyzing the "meaning" of
a mes sage or its "content" in the conventional sense of these words.
This has been consistently overlooked by traditional content analysts
who claim to analyze the content of communications by mapping a complex text into some measure of permeation.

On intuitive grounds the

original text maybe quite meaningful to a competent user of the respective language, but the transformed version of this text need not be.
If the product of a filtering proce S8 is meaningful to someone - in
whatever sense - it is so either through some familiar semantic clue
that happened to·be maintained during the transformation process or
due to some interpretations of these results that are based on information other than that contained in the transformed version of the
data itself.
For example, Osgood in his contingency analysis of Goebbels
Diary reported of a negative contingency. between ENGLAND and
GERMAN SUPERIORITY as a race, significant at the 5 percent
level (147:71).

While the two categories into which various instances

were grouped are labeled in an intuitively comprehensible manner,
the meaning of the negative contingency between them can only stern
from information other than that provided by the analysis.

The con-

tent analyst may, for example, rely on an intuitive reading of the
original text or know from other sources about the ideological conflict
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that existed for the Nazis when differentiations between allies and enemies
did not correspond with their racial conception of the war aims.
How little filtering has to do with a semantic interpretation or an
analysis of "content" will become even mare evident from the following
pilot study:

To determine the applicability of factor analysis and "to

understand and interpret the inter,-acting forces that were identified by
,theoreticians" of international relations, O'Sullivan Jr. (154) designed
a content analysis in which Richard Snyder's Deterrence, Weapon Systems
,and Decision Making was chosen as source material.

The document was

based on some 150 recent writings dealing with arms control concepts,
particularly those dealing with stability and deterrence and was therefore assumed to be representative of the field.

Forty variables and six

degrees of relatedness were defined that led to generic assertions of
the form "A affects B" in terms of which the text could be represented.
Among the variables were "credibility of threat, " likelihood of accident, "
11first strike premium,11 !'decentralization of decision process, 11 !!sta-

bility of deterrence."

The degrees of relatedness ranged from "in

certain situations induces" to "is directly related to."
A factor analysis, "the principal purpose of (which) is to reduce
a matrix of correlations to the

sma~lest

pas sible number of dimensions

in the interest of parsimonious description of the interrelationships
between the variables," (156:377) yielded six factors.
by the investigator:

They were named

stability, decision making conditions, rationality

of decision, credibility, eXl?loitativene s s.

For one of the factors no
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satisfactory name could be found.
The kind of reasoning that goes into interpretations of the factors
discovered by factor analysis is symptomatic for results obtained by
means of a statistical procedure that is far removed from being commonsensical and reveals the non- semantic character of the filtering
process.

Suggesting "exploitativeness" as a characteristic quality of

his factor no.

VI, O'Sullivan Jr. argues:

This factor has moderate negative loadings in constraints
on the decision process, likelihood of containment of
limited war and ability to engage retaliatory. systems.
There are marginal negative loadings in the pace of arms
race and agressors' uncertainty over defenders' specific
tactics or weakness in weapons and marginal positive
loadings in diversification and versatiling of weapon systerns. This appears to be a power-grab situation, or a
factor relating to the degree to which the situation is
subject to exploitation by one of the parties (1~4:8).
The argument illustrates what Peak observed elsewhere namely
that "considerations other than the procedures of factor analysis must
enter into the interpretation of the meaning of the factors discovered"
(156:278).

While this statistical tool is certainly explicit and deter-

minate, it is hardly conceivable that another investigator could interpret
the semantically highly ambiguous results of the above analysis in the
same way.

Although the five factors named by the researcher seem

indeed to be intuitively important in the process of international decision making,so are very many others.

In addition, it should be men-

tioned that the nature of correlation on which factor analysis is based
eliminates all the dynamic properties of the international system that
may have been described by writers in the field, and the reliance on
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binary generic assertions does away with all higher order relations that
may have been felt to be of theoretical significance.
presents factor analysis

as~

The above example

a means to reduce the dimensionality of the

text in such a way that the new dimensions account for much of its variance.

But the statistical procedure neither processes nor analyzes

"content, " nor does it help "to understand and interpret the inter-acting
forces that were identified by theoreticians ... " as it was stated at the
onset of the investigation.
At this point someone may wish to argue that all statistics can
qualify as a filtering ?f data.
tainly not the case.

This is correct, but the reverse is cer-

Someone interested in analyzing a particular for-

mal theory. as a message about an object system is not very likely to
get very far by applying some statistic on the symbols appearing in
propositions that are deduced from that theory.
most probably produce nothing but noise.

~

Such an attempt would

If one were to succeed in

devising a suitable filter that would uncover the formal structure of
that theory from propositions deduced from it, the filter will not say
anything about the empirical content that theory may have.
Summarizing this section, we can say that filtering is a homomorphic mapping, a many- one transformation reducing the variety in
the data by eliminating variables in its domain that are irrelevant with
respect to (a) the available regularities (or constraints to be discovered)
and (b) the problem domain of a mes sage analytic situation.

Filtering

has little to do with processing content although it may have to operate
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on structures of data that are meaningful to someone.
tion for using a particular filtering process

s:t~-ms

The sole justifica-

from its having ex-

hibited a constraint of the object system that is to be utilized for a
particular content inference.

Recording
When data are given to a message analyst they may appear-in a
_form which is not amenable to the kind of analytical processes he can
-handle explicitly.

particularly written text, visual images, musical

creations, etc. which possess an unmanageably large variety of
structures and forms and may appear meaningful to the analyst on
entirely intuitive grounds - cannot be subjected to scientific analyses
unless some notational scheme is available in terms of which the data
can be transcribed.

The process by means of which given data, signals

or texts are translated into the primary notations of a message analysis
may be called recording.
Although the sensory organs of an observer already impose
some kind of notations or at least a structure on the received data,
their "records" are rarely directly communicable to other observers
and therefore lack inter-analyst verifiability.

And if such records

were indeed communicable they may not be in such a form that they
can be subjected to the analysis intended.

Recording produces a

representation of the given raw data in an analyzable form.

In Kaplan's

terms recording provides "fundamental measurements" (97: 188), that
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presuppose no other measurements.
In content analysis the procedure by means of which a text in an
observational space is recorded in terms of the categories of a representational system is often called "coding."

The use of this term for

the categorization process by content analysts seems to be quite misleading in view of the existence of an extensive body of literature on
coding (including:

encoding, decoding, recording and transmission)

dealing with the subject in an explicit and well defined way, but in an
entirely different sense.

To take only a relatively simple but per-

fectly adequate definition of a code consider Chomsky and Miller's
formulation made in the context of formal analysis of natural language,
which necessitates the use of the concatenation
strings.

'1--0.1'

of symbols to

They define a code C as a l: 1 mapping G of strings in V

into strings in A

such that if Vi'

Vj are strings in V

then

G(vi~Vj)

G is an isomorphism between strings in A; strings
in A provide the spelling for strings in V" (45:277).

A typical

example of a code is the mapping of letters of the English alphabet
into the strings of dots and dashes of the morse alphabet and reverse.
Working example III dealt with finding the key. to a code in order to
decode a chipher.

Being a l: 1 mapping, codes are reversible and have

little to do with p:rocesses of coding as understood in content analysis;
nobody would require Berelson (working example VIII) to reverse his
coding.instructions that supposedly yielded a tabular representation of
fictional characters to obtain the short stodes in which they occ"rred.
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Only if the original could be reproduced from its coded version could he
be said to have employed a code in the technical sense.
It is not coding in the technical sense but rather some simplified
description of the data which is the aim of recording.

In this sense re-

cording resembles much of content analysis itself in as far as it has been
explicitly stated by Janis (92:55) and Miller (136:95).

This characteri-

zation, cited earlier, required content analysis to be a mapping of a
. large variety of symbolic data into sets of fewer categories involving
human judges.

Here symbolic data include anything that is presuITled

to have some meaning e. g., sign vehicles, words, visual forms, texts.
Sets of categories are used synonymously with dimensions, variables,
an attribute space, in short a notational scheme for representing the
raw data, signal or text.

While one feels inclined to identify content

analysis with the process of recording, this identification would easily
be ITlisleading for (a) the term is unfavorably loaded with the ITlethodological dilemma that is inherent in the analytical pursuits signified by
. it, and (b) content analysts typically feel that they are not limited by the
explicitly stated recording procedures and often claim much more than
the analytical technique can accomplish.
While it seems obvious that the notations in terms of which raw
data are recorded have to provide for adequate representation of those
data, determining this adequacy of representation is by no means a
siITlple matter as we shall see later.

But regardless of its representa-

tional properties the explicit analysis of data as messages imposes on
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a primary notational scheme a formal requirement:

the notations have

to be well defined and neither lead to contradictions in the subsequent
analytical process nOr allow syntacticambiquities to arise.

Strictly

speaking, the notational scheme has to be a formalized language that
the explicit message analytical procedure can accept as input.
Abstracted from a particular problem there seems to be no
other requirement on the notation of a representational system.

Con-

sequently the representational systems actually used can take many
different forms.
system~

The most elementary structure of a representational

is found in a set of independent categories, a slightly more

complex one in the conjunction of a fixed number of such categories
constituting what is often called an attribute space.

Because of their

emphasis on relative frequencies that can be obtained most easily on
the basis of such a scheme, attribute spaces of this kind have been
preferrec\ by traditional content analysts.

The generally accepted

requirement that the categories be mutually exclusive shows the
attempt at formalization which ensures that subsequent analysis does
not produce spurious results.

We can easily omit examples for this

type of representational scheme.
O'Sullivan Jr. 's (154) analysis of writings in international
relations, already referred to, employed a representational system
that included in addition to notations for forty categories, notations
for six degrees of relatedness.

If C il

C. are categories and
J

r
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a certain degree of relatedness, O'Sullivan could record observations of
the type

"CirC j ."

In Osgood, Saporta, and Nunally's evaluative assertion analysis
(151), the relation between concepts is provided by verbal connectors, c,
the numerical value of which can range from -3 (strongly dissociative)
to +3 (strongly associative).

Differentiations among concepts are made

between "common meaning terms,

11

cm~

and !1attitude objects,

I'

AO .
i

The emotive valence of common meaning terms ranges from -3 (strongly
unfavorable) to +3 (strongly favorable)"

and is assumed to be generally

accepted among the speakers of a language, while the evaluation of
attitude objects has the same range but is as sumed to be situation dependent.

The notations of the analysis represent assertions in the

following formats:

"AO·cAO·"
1
J and "AO·ccm."
1

North et al. discusses a set of notations that have been developed for a computer analysis.

A manual editing phase that is pre-

paratory to programed data processing.introduces these notations into
the text.

Although defined semantically, these notations subscript

fractions of a text that are treated in the subsequent analysis as syntactic differentiations.
/1
/2
/3
/4
/5
/6
/7

The se notations a re defined as follows:

the perceiver and incorporated modifiers
the perceiver other than author of the document and
incorporated modifie rs.
the perceived and incorporated modifiers
the action and incorporated modifiers
the object acted upon (other than actor-target) and
incorporated modifiers
the auxiliary verb modifier
the target and incorporated modifiers (142:137).
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The following is an example of an edited sentence from a study
of the Cuban crisis:

"Kennedy /1 Premier /2 Khrushchev /2 announced

that, 'the Soviet Union /3 may /16 withdraw /4 the offensive /5 missles
/5 from Cuba /7" 1 (142:138).
A slightly more complex system of notations has been used by
Piault (157) to analyze answers to open ended questions concerning relations between foreigners and natives in Ghana.

The structure of the

notational system appears in the following general outline:
a)

Objective data of the interviewee such as age, religion, marital

status, number of dependents, occupation.
b)

Identification of the source of judgments made.

The sentence "for-

eigninterviewee says that natives say that foreigners are dirty" would
be recorded as
c)

"X-Y~X"

Type of predicate.

with X denoting foreigner and Y native.

The assertion "foreigners are avaricious"

could be recorded as "avarice (X)" and "natives help foreigners" becomes "help (Y /X)" in the formal notation.
d)

Twenty eight categories of syntactic relations between X and Y

each of which may be assigned separate indices: (F)
(P)

product or consequence or

factor or cause,

(N) neuter or non-causal relation.

e) A list of 675 concepts divided into 28 classes to represent semantic
characteristics of the text once the individuals, source, predicate type
have been recorded.
analysis of the data.

These notations were designed for a computer
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To conclude our examples of representational systems we may
cite the formal notations Goodenough (78) used to record the denotata of
kinship terms which constitute a mathematical group providing a nondenumerably large set of categories.

We referred to this notational

scheme in the previous section of this chapter.
With the rare exception of one to one identifications, recording
reduces the variety in the raw data:

it has filtering properties.

That

recording into the notational schemes described above omits much of
the specificity that is present in the raw text is quite obvious.
us turn to one more example.

But let

Contingency analysis, for instance,

provides both a computational apparatus with which we are not concernedin this section and a notational scheme for recording the raw
text.

During the recording process evaluative attributes, qualifiers,

predicates, etc. are discarded and even the nature of relations expressed between concepts for which categories are provided are not
differentiated by the formal notations.

The notations of contingency

analysis are capable of representing only co-occurrenCes of specified
concept categories in the raw text.

Osgood exemplified this method

by an analysis of Goebbels' diary.

The reported findings give anim-

pression of the nature of the recorded data.

He describes his findings:

References to GERMAN GENERALS were significantly
contingent upon references to INTERNAL FRICTIONS
(in the inner circle about Hitler) at the 1 percent level;
references to GERMAN PUBLIC were associated with
those to BAD MORALE at the 5 percent level, as were
contingencies between RUSSIA and EASTERN FRONT;
negative contingencies significant at the 5 percent level,
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were obtained between RUSSIA and BAD MORALE, between references to ENGLAND and references to GERMAN SUPERIORITY as a race, and between references
to the GERMAN PUBLIC and references to RUSSIA
(147:69).
While the imaginative reader familiar with the political situation which
Goebbels' diary depicts will undoubtedly be able to explain some of these
contingencies, he will also realize how much information has been removed from the original text when recording in order to apply a con-tingencyanalysis.

Osgood's primary interest in assessing the writer's

association structure clearly justifie s this drastic reduction of the complexity in the original text but other interests may not permit the same
procedure.
The variety reduction induced by recording procedures suggests
problems of evaluation that are similar to those of filtering.

If record-

ing is used in the course of attempts at finding constraints and formulating regularities little a priori criteria can be formulated.

If recording

is used to enter a message analysis in the narrower sense i. e., geared
to make specific content inferences, (a) recording instructions must be
standardized in precisely the same way. as filtering.

That is, the result

of their application must lead to regularities intended to be used for
content h:tferences.

In the case of contingency analysis this standard-

--

ization was based on psychological experimentation in the course of
which association structure as a hypothetical construct was defined
operationally.

(b) The elimination of variables due to recording raw

data can only be justified in terms of known regularities and a given
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problem domain.

Osgood's declared interest in inferring the association

structure of the source defined many intricacies of the text, except cooccurrences, as irrelevant to the problem.

So did Piault's problem

impose a simple structure and a particular unitization of the raw data
that would otherwise not appear acceptable.
One is almost inclined to identify recording as a filtering process.
Although these processes do indeed have several characteristics in cornman, they differ in two related respects.

One source of differentiation

lies in the non-formalized nature of the raw data to which recording but
not filtering applies, and the way representativeness can be assured.
The second difference appears in the kind of operations that go into recording but not into filtering, and the kind of empirical problems that
are associated with it.

We will consider both differentiatingfeatures

separately.
First, while filtering (whether accomplished by a set of standardizedanalytical operatio!l3orby a computer program) can be described
as a well defined and explicit transformation of one representational
system into a more simple second one, the domain of recording procedures is typically not so.formalizable.

Film, painting, visual dis-

plays, much of music and to some extent speech has largely resisted
formalization so far.

Alphabetical transcripts of human verbalizations

lose many non-formalized expres sions in the original.

Even though

the textures of such signals may be copied and reproducably stored
ona one-to-one basis by photographic means or sound recording
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devices.

Respective equipment for recording such data in a way amen-

able to message analysis is rarely available.

If the raw data were

already given in formalized notations and a mapping could be defined
from those data into the notations needed, then the problem would be
reduced to that of filtering and would not concern us here,
Not only is it logically impossible to explicate the translation of
non-formalized raw data into formal notations but also very little is
known about how the observational space of a human judge gets represented in the notational terms an analysis requires.

What is known,

however, is that often this translation can be accomplished quite
accurately.
In the absence of the kind of definiteness filtering exhibits, the
only evaluative criteria concerning the representativeness of the records
obtained is a measure of reliability defined as the consistency with which
judges record raw data or the degree to which a recording process
approximates the ideal of a mapping.

The measure is completely. ab-

stracted from the nature of the representation of raw data in formal
notation and concerns only. its degree of definitiveness.

This critical

property of reliability has already been elaborated in Chapter
Measuring reliability presupposes at least some formal distinction between elements in the raw data.

Otherwise observations con-

cerning whether something is consistently represented by a certain
notational term cannot be made.

Thus, if any attempt is made to

assess the accuracy of the formal representation of data or the
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consistency of the recording process as a whole, raw data must be at
least unitizable or, in other words, partially formalizable.
These problems do not occur in filtering.

The motivation for

making use of recording .procedures almost always derives from the nonformalized raw data that constitute the domain of a message analysis.
Second, even if raw data were given in formalized notation, it
may not always be possible - for whatever reasons - to explicitly define
the operations for translating raw data into the notations needed.
such cases we will also speak of recording.

In

The operations that can

go into a recording procedure may range widely.

The most elementary

recording process seems to approximate a one-to-one identification of
directly observable characteristics in the raw data.

It is most prob-

ably these physical-syntactic characteristics of raw data to which
Gerbner refers when stating that the non-randomness or structuredness
of a signal, its "built in quality, " is to be recognized in order to assess
meaning (72: 180).

In its most simple form identification could make

use of an extensionally defined catalog of terms.

For example, in the

case of colors, each color in the catalog would have to be matched with
the ones appearing in the raw data where measures of resemblance
determine the appropriateness of a particular notational term.
However, judges in content analysis or observers of social
situations are rarely ever limited to identification in the above sense.
Moreover, they are frequently expected to estimate the meanings a
text may have for a particular audience and categorize them according
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to intentionally defined notations.

It is this kind of identification that

takes place within the semantics of a non-formalized natural language,
some terms of which provide the formal notation of the analysis.

This

later characterization would be a "semantical content analysis" accord~ing

to Janis while the former would be a "sign-vehicle analysis" (92:57).
Recording may not be limited simply to a semantic interpretation

of the text.

For example Shneidman requested his judges to record the

missing premises that must be supplied to a political argument in order
to make the assertions logically conclusive (176).

Here notations do

not represent semantical interpretations of a text but certain inferences
accounted for by a well defined hypothetical construct cast in formal
logic terms.

The underlying operations of such a recording process

are quite complex and require considerable training on the part of the
judge.
It is probably safe to suggest that the further the operation of
recording is removed from simple identification, the lower the reliability that can be achieved.

Although such a proposition has not

been subjected to an experimental test so far, its intuitive acceptance
seems to provide the motivation for many researchers to push the
explicit analysis as far "down" as possible such that fewer intermediate operations are necessary to obtain formal notations whereby
recording becomes ideally equivalent to an identification.

This ideal

is achieved, for example, in Stone's General Inquirer computer program (188) which simply requires the text to be punched on machine
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readable cards or,in Cassotta, Feldstein and Jaffe's Automatic Vocal
Transaction Analyser (40) operating directly on tape recorded psychodiagnostic interviews.
On the other hand, as the recording process increasingly resembles that of identification or even becomes eliminated as a significant analytical component of message analysis, it is to be expected
that processes of filtering and content inference demand a large amount
of requisite information which would otherwise be supplied by intuitive
interpretations made by the judge during the recording process and
become increasingly complex and costly.

Hence, a particular message

analytic situation may define an optimal mixture of the unaccounted
complexity that goes into the recording process and increasingly reduces reliability, and the accounted complexity that goes into filtering
and content infe renee and increasingly incurs costs.
Thus, while filtering treats recorded data - whatever they may
represent - syntactically, it does mt go outside those data, and hence
has little to do with processing tlrneaning, It ttcontent, 11 or 11sernantic

features" of the original text; the informal use of the capabilities of
human individuals for formally representing only partially formalized
raw data allows semantic interpretations and certain informal processes to enter the recording process.

Therefore, information may

be supplied during recording which would not be able to find its way
into the filtering procedure.
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As far as the typical empirical problems are concerned, recording resembles most closely the process of content analysis.

As men-

tionedabove we avoided the term for its ambiguous connotations and
methodological insufficiencies elaborated in Chapter Two.

Content Inferences
Inference commonly refers to a process of reasoning by means
of which propositions are derived from other known propositions.
Traditional logic contrasts essentially two kinds of inference:
and induction.
~tion

deduction

Deductive inference proceeds from a general proposi-

to particular instances implied by it.

The classical Aristotlelian

syllogism illustrates this mode of reasoning.

Inductive inference on

the other hand leads £rom less general to more general propositions
orin Aristotle I s terms from individuals to universals.

For this reason

induction and deduction have often been said to be "inverse

operations."

Content inference does not fit either characterization.

For ~in-

stance, deduction presupposes complete availability of information.
As the working examples have amply demonstrated message analytic
situations are existentically linked to the partial observability. of an
object system.

Consequently the message analyst!s efforts are

typically constrained by the lack of complete information.

On the other

hand, the working examples show no sign of attempts at generalization.
The inferences that are made in message analytic situations are always
directed toward a rather specific problem domain, are pointed rather
than universal.
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Many logicians maintain that this contrast between inductive and
deductive inference is not the most fruitful one.

The distinction should

rather be one according to whether the inference is logically conclusive
Or not.

Induction clearly goes beyond its premises in the sense that the

conclusions do not completely follow from the antecedents, while deduction certainly remains within its premises.

And yet, in the light of the

recent advances in inductive scientific methodology these distinctions
are not altogether happy ones either.
The prominent method of inductive or predictive sciences as
they are often called, is statistical inference or inductive statistics.
Briefly, the method provides a rationale for deriving statistical generalizations concerning a population or universe - as it is interchangeably termed - on the basis of empirical knowledge obtained from a
sample drawn from that universe.
a.bilistic one.

The argument is a strictly prob-

The certainty with which evidence obtained from an

analyzed sample can be considered to confirm or disconfirm sets of
hypotheses concerning a universe is a function of two probabilities:
(al the probability. that a sample of a given size represents a certain
universe, and (b) the probability of obtaining the differences observed
within or the scores measured on the sample by chance.

Thus, the

apparent logical inconclusiveness of the basically inductive argument
is replaced by a probability calculus providing a measure of certainty
assigned to a generalization which accounts for incomplete observations.

This measure is founded on the fundamental assumption that
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the universe is composed of statistically independent individuals and that
the degree to which sample statistics represent the parameters of a universe is solelY,a function of the relative sample size and the nature of
the sample statistics.
Overtly, the situation in which inductive statistics is applicable
seems similar to that of the message analytic situation for both methods
pertain to incompletely observable objects, i. e. object systems, populations or universes, and both attempt to go beyond their direct access,
::---c....--..

i. e. beyond the data, signals, texts or observations.

The methods

must however be kept strictly separate since the assumption upon which
inductive statistics rests is incompatible with those required for content
inference.

Inductive statistics rests -as we have said - on the assumption
of statistical independence of the individuals in a particular sample
and those in the population toward which the generalization proceeds.
Message analysis is based on the recognition of possible dependencies
between the individuals in a sample (data, signal) and those in a universe (unobserved components of the object system) to which content
inferences lead.

If the data obtained can be shown to be independent

of the unobse;cved components of the object system, attempts to treat
this data as a message would be in vain.

If the sample turns out to

be dependent on the rest of the population, inductive statistics leaqs
to fallacious generalizations.

Since inductive statistics presupposes

the assumption of statistical independence of the sampled components
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of an object system or universe, it must discard any communication
between sample and univer se, it can in no way account for the communication structure that an object system may possess unless this communication structure is decomposable into independent components
and is adequately represented in the sample.
This differentiation is not meant to suggest that inductive
statistics has no place at all in message analysis.

For example, if

sampling from a given text is theoretically possible and practically
feasible, inductive statistics may become an unavoidable method for
reducing noise during filtering.

Or, generalizations of statistical

regularities formulated on the basis of samples requires inductive
statistics for evaluating the gene·ralizability of such formulations for
content inferences.

But the calculus for justifying statistical infer-

ences from a sample to its universe requires assumptions entirely
different from those of content inferences proceeding from signals
to contents.

Since many content analysts habitually apply tests of

significance (developed according to the assumptions of inductive
statistics) on data lcoown to be the outcome of complex communication
structures, one can hardly give enough warning .against improper
usages of such methods by emphasizing the incompatibilities of
their basic assumptions.
With the aid of known regularities of the object system, content inference proceeds from given data or signals to those unobserved
components of an object system that are represented in the specific

287
and often rather limited problem domain.

Traditional logic would say

. that it proceeds from particulars to particulars, leaving universals completely out of its consideration.

A logical scheme that seems to come

closest to content inference has been described by Johnson (94), as
leading from instances to instances, and has been given the technical
te r1TI.

11

eduction.

',1

Johnson demonstrates this mode of reasoning by using.a rather
simple example:
Mars is a solar planet
the earth is a solar planet
the earth is inhabited
mars is inhabited
and argues:
Here the only point of agreement between mars and the earth
is that they are both solar planets, and from this very slender
relation of agreement we infer with the lowest degree of
probability tha:t mars is inhabited,. because we know the earth
to be so. The probability of this conclusion is strengthened,
the greater the number of characters in which mars is found
to agree with the earth; e. g. its being near the sun, and having
atmosphere and vapour. It would be still further strengthened,
if other solar planets besides the earth were known to be near
the sun, to have atmosphere and vapour, and to be inhabited.
The more complete process of eductilOn thus exemplified may
be represented in the following scheme:
(1) s is-characterized- by PI and P2 and ... Pm'
(2) PI and P2 and ... Pm characterize sl and s2 and.;. sn'
(3) sl and s2 and ... sn are-characterized-by p,
s is-characterized-by p.
Thus, in eduction there are three summary premises, containing (a) the summary term "PI and P2 and ... Pm" which
is adjectival; and (b) the summary term"sl and s2 and ... sn"
which is substantival; besides the substantival terms "s" and
the adjectival term "p" which occur in the conclusion
(94:45-46).
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It is quite clear from this formulation that Johnson deals here with

an object system "s" and that the data Pi in terms of which it is represented are incomplete.

From given knowledge about other object systems

which are in many ways similar, possible properties of "s'" that are not
accessable are then "educed." His premise (1) represents what the incomplete observation of "s" yields while his premises (2) and (3) represent the knowledge already possessed about objects "s. and s2 and ... sn'"
.

1

The knowledge that is brought to bear in the situation can be formulated
by putting the premises (2) and (3) together in the following way:

"s 1

and s2 and ... sn" are characterized by both "PI and P2 and ... Pm" and
"p." Although Johnson did not think in terms of constraints and therefore does not make it very clear exactly which of the possibilities are
excluded by assuming "PI ·and P2 and ... Pm" and "p" to hold, the conjunction',induces a constraint in our sense.

Johnson's motivation for using the two summary terms in the
eduction scheme most probably derives from the stated intent to develop
a rationale for accepting eductive inferences.

According to his argu-

ment the number of objects in "sl and s2 and ... sn" provides him the
basis for weighing previously obtained knowledge, i. e. the basis for
assessing the certainty with which an established regularity can be
assumed to hold for an object system, regardless of its inferential
use, while the number of properties "PI and P2 and ... Pm"in which
both "s" and "sl and s2 and ... sn" agree provides him the basis for
weighing the eductive conclusiveness of a specific inference, regardless
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of the nature of the object systeul.

In an appendix Johnson goes on to

suggest corresponding probability ll1easures with which we are not concerned here.
Statistical and eductive inference both show that it is obviously
pos sible to elill1inate the seeTIling arbitrariness of inductive conclusions
by accepting certain assull1ptions concerning the nature of the object
systell1.

Inductive statistics aSSUll1es statistical independence of an

object systell1's eleTIlents.

Johnson's eduction aSSUll1es SOll1e sort of

stable contingencies between the properties of objects: theTIlore objects
are known to agree in a certain set of properties, and the ll10re the incOll1pletely assessed properties of another object agree with the forTIler
. the TIlore likely. is the latter object to possess properties of the forll1er
not assessed with regard to the latter.

On the basis of any of those

assull1ptions definite calculi for specialized forll1s of induction TIlay be
forTIlulated.
Since content inferences by definition go beyond i=ediately
observed evidence, they. are specialized forll1s of inductive inferences
and require certain justifying assull1ptions.

Based on constraints dis-

covered in the past, content inference derives its justification on the
assull1ption of the perTIlanence of these constraints in an object systell1.
Osgood (147) talked about a general law relating the nature of the source
with the nature of the TIlessages produced; Yule (217) assull1ed the
relative invariance of a writer's use of his vocabulary, and Leites
et al. (118) justified their inferences by pointing to the history of the
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Soviet use of political symbolismo

If regularities fonllulated in the past

will not account for future constraints any content inference that is justified in terms of such regularities is bound to produce invalid results

0

Since there can never be absolute certainty of the invariance of a constraint, the assumptions that need to be made to justify content inferences
can only be heuristic ones o
The argument that seems to prevail is that the longer the time
period during which constraints have in the past been found to be invariant, the less likely they will be expected to change in the future

0

This heuristic assumption is of course analogous to the one contained
in the usual argument that the amount of evidence provided in support
of a theory. is proportional to the degree to which this theory can be
acceptedo

Although Hume' s scepticism fully applies to this situation,

to make such heuristic

as~urriptions

.about the nature of the constraints

that are utilized in content inferences is probably the only way that
information acquired in the past can be transformed into predictions;
that certainty about unobserved parts of an object system can be gained;
and that content inference can be justifiedo

This as sumption ought to

be regarded as a policy in the Peircean sense which has to be discarded as soon as it does not produce valid predictions

0

Content inference can take many different forms depending on
the nature of the constraints discovered in an object system and ultimately on the type of regularity that has been formulated to account
for these constraints

0

It cannot easily be forced into a simple
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syllogism, L e. into a traditional scheme of logical inference particularly
since the content inference need not be single valued which means that the
content inferred may not reduce the uncertainty perfectly.

Es sential to

content inference is a representation of the data obtained from suitable
recording Or filtering procedures, an adequately formulated regularity
from which rules of content inference are derived, rules matching data
representations with the arguments in the rules of content inference that
determine which of the rules are applicable in a given situation, and
ultimately the content within the dimension of the problem domain.

A

diagramatic presentation of the typical elements of content inference
may be presented in Figu:re 12:

".

Regularity
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/

/

Matching/Rules

Rules of Inference

/

/

/
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/

/

Signal---'..... Data Repre sentation

Content

Diagram of the Process of Content Inference
Figure 12

The examples that can be given to illustrate content inferences
exhibit structures that are far less complex than those of filtering.
This fact is quite understandable in view of the long history of using
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derived measurements, L e. filtering in our sense, in the physical and
. behavioral sciences and the only recent interest in communication and
the analysis of messages in particular.

The formal characteristic of

content inference has already been implicitly referred to when discuss. ing the empirical problems of formulating relevant regularitie s.

Here

we will give only a few more detailed examples that demonstrate the
pOints mOre clearly.
A more explicit example of content inference, although involving
only a binary choice of possible contents, is one of Yules final arguments in working example IV.

To recapitulate:

in one of his analyses,

he eliminated from the texts in question all grammatical structures,
frequencies, rank orders, etc. and represented the documents solely
by the set N.

of nouns that appeared in theith work.

1

domain was just one ;"ariable, the set [Gerson,
authors.

A constraint analysis yielded the set

J

< Nk' it Kempis,>

it

The problem

Kempis] of pos sible

f< Ng,

Gerson;>,

of couples representing the author by his name

and his writing vocabulary by N i .

The Imitatio was subjected to the

same filtering procedure and became represented by the set N s
nouns.

The rule of matching involved an "association quotient, "

-1"

"+l

Qij

defined as follows:

=

#((NiUNj)-(NiflNj))' #(Nl1Nj) - #(Ni-Nj)' #(Nj-Ni)
#((NiUNj)-(NiflNj))' #(N/1Nj)

+ #(Ni-Njl'

#(NrNi)

of
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The rule of inference that was derived from the above regularity
simply determines the selection of that author the vocabulary of whom
resembles most closely that of the unidentified document;i. e. has the
highest association quotient.

Yule's content inference is diagrammed

in Figure 13:

",--,

f <N I,
~

/

Gerson~,

"

\

<N k ,

~

a Kempis.>}

a Kempis
Imitatio

(is the Author)

Diagram of Yule's Content Inference
Figure 13

Lasswell's attempt to provide evidence to the courts about
propaganda links between U. S. publications and foreign governments,
described in working example V, could be formalized similarly to
Yule's inference.

As we suggested in the section on constraint analy-

sis, the regularity that must have been assumed by Lasswell can be
stated as t1whenever communication between two parties exists, SOITle
transmitted signal or message characteristics are typically invariant. "
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Assuming certain types of characteristics that are maintained when a
foreign government has control over the channel between its nation and
a U. S. publication, an inferential rule can be derived as follows:

"if

measures of certain specified signal characteristics show a suspected
publication to exhibit above chance resemblances with information
sources of a foreign government in question, then the suspected publication can be inferred to possess a link to that government." It should be
mentioned that "chance resemblances" obtain a special non- statistical
meaning .in this context and is measurable in comparison with a publication which is known not be to under control of that foreign government.
The content inferences that are built into evaluative assertion
analysis (151), already referred to on several occasions, are of a
different kind.

Here inferences are made as to a writer's affective

evaluation of a particular attitude object AO I from the associative or
dissociative bands to other attitude objects A02 and common meaning
terms cm the affective evaluation of which is already known.

The

rules of inference are presented in the form of a calculus that derives
from Osgood's congruity principle (150).

Briefly, the congruity prin-

ciple states that initially affective-neutral AO l ' s obtain their favorable
evaluations as they are associatively linked to favorable A02's and
cm's and dissociatively linked to unfavorably evaluated A0 2 's and

c-mls.

The rule for inferring the evaluative direction of a particular

AOI makes use of the algebraic convention that assigns a positive
value to the product of two numbers with equal signs and a negative

Z95
value to the product of two nUll1bers with unequal signs.
ciat:\ve band between AOI

Thus, an asso-

andAO Z or Cll1 to which a plus is assigned

gives, ll1ultiplied by the positive valence of anAOZ

or

Cll1, a positive

valence for AOZ and ll1ultiplied by the negative valence of anAOZ or
Cll1,

a negative valence for AOZ.
Dissociative bands are handled analoguously.

affective evaluation of an AO I

The intensity of an

is sill1ilarly inferred by weighing the in-

tensity of AOZ's and Cll1'S with the strength of association or dissociation respectively.

Thus, Osgood's congruity principle which absorbed

considerable experill1ental work in psycholinguistics provided definite
and forll1alized rules of content inference froll1 the co=on ll1eaning
terll1S appearing in a text to a particular attitude object according to
the net bands that link thell1.
A less forll1alized but nevertheless ill1portant exall1ple of content
inference has been described in working exall1ple VI.

The British propa-

ganda analyst had discovered a sudden gap in retaliation propaganda
which was followed by a watering down of propaganda cOll1ll1itll1ents on
reprisal.
regularity:

His ll10de of reasoning was based on the following observed
"references to reprisal usually occurred either in propa-

ganda diatribes against Allied air raids or in conjunction with propaganda efforts to solve the poor ll10rale of the Gerll1an public ll (71:148).
Put into the terll1S of a rule of content inference:

lIif no other ll10re

ill1portant event overshadows the references to reprisal weapons,
their absence allows us to infer an absence of Allied air raids on
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Germany and/ or an improvement in German morale, and/or interferences
with the preparation of the weapon referred to."

The analyst knew that

no other important event superseded the reprisal talk, that air raids
did not cease in intensity, and that the situation was such that German
morale had no reaSOn to be improved.

Only when these possibilities

were successively ruled out, was it possible to infer quite specifically
that something had happened to the preparation and scheduling of the
retaliation weapon, a fact that could be later confirmed.
George called the methods of drawing inferences from such propaganda messages as the one presented here "indirect" ones for they use
the conventional meanings of the propaganda only as a vehicle to get at
a speaker's purpose or propaganda goal and finally to the events in the
problem domain.

Diagramatically the inferential steps and known reg-

ularities of the previous example can be depicted in Figure 14.
By this multiple- step inference which involves consideration of
the lexical use of language, the propaganda objectives and techniques,
as well as information of situational changes, the propaganda analyst
systematically eliminates the possible denotations and antecedents a
given propaganda message may have under situations other than the
one given.

These multiple-step inferences seem to be neces'sary when

object systems possess some intelligence, i. e. desseminate messages
according to some objective.
The example illustrates moreover how many inferential possibilities are simply omitted or how results easily become misleading
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Signals,
Data

Inference 1

Lexical use
of language

Propaganda
Technique
Inference 2
Propaganda
Objectives

Knowledge 0
the situation

Inference 3

Content

Example of Inferential Steps for Inferring Content
by George's "Indirect Method"
Figure 14
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when simple frequency counts of manifest references are made in such
situations.

Traditional content analysts would be able to only scratch

the surface, if not possibly themselyesbe subject to manipulation by
this highly instrumental use of c;ommunic;ation.
Mahl had a good point in arguing that if human individuals use
their speech instrumentally, and psychological states of interest to the
psychodiagnostician are very likely to be suppressed consciously, the
speech characteristics not under the direct conscious control of the
speaker are more likely to carry the desired information.

He thus got

around the problem of treating communications. instrumentally by relying on direct indicators of an unconscious kind.

Yule's authorship

identification in IV, Lasswell's detection of propaganda channels in V,
Leites' analYSis of political distances of members of the pOlitburo to
Stalin in VII, etc., all disregard the possible instrumentality of messages.

They make use of some content inferential procedures pre-

. supposing the assumption of the o1;>ject system as a basically purposeless one.

George Seems to present the' only large scale effort to make

content inferences from partly observable object systems that are
considered as having some teleological properties.
Psychological theories of meaning too are of little help in suggesting more definite rules of content inference for the analysis of
data derived from a source which is purposive.

This is most obviously

. true for Skinner's conception of meaning as a conditioned constraint on
the stimulus response pattern a person can exhibit (181).

But Osgood's
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theory of meaning which represents the significata of words in a metric
"semantic space" having psychologically relevant dimensions (152) does
not corne closer to the instrumental use of meaning either.
Only very recently algorithms have been studied that describe
inteUigent behavior although still of a rudimentary type.

Most promi-

nent among those approaches is Newell, Shaw, and Simon's Logic
Theory Machine.

The machine "was devised to learn how it is possible

to solve difficult problems such as proving mathematical theorems,
discovering scientific laws from data, playing .chess, or understanding
the meaning of English prose" (141:109).

The authors demonstrated

that it can be programed to prove theorems in elementary symbolic
logic.

In this case, the machine was given the five aJd"ms used in

the Principia Mathematica, three rules of inference, and the theorem
to be proven.

The machine generated sequences of logical expres-

sions', evaluated each step heuristically according to whether the subgoal or goal was approached.

It terminated when a sequence of trans-

formations linked axioms with the expression to be proven.
With a little imagination, the procedures that lead to proving
a theorem seem tobe overtly similar to the reasoning a propaganda
analyst. emPloys incoming to a conclusion concerning the existence
of reprisal weapons talked about by an opposing power.
few very important differences .should be noted.
logic is a formalized system of mathematics.

And yet, a

Firstly, symbolic

Although the propa-

ganda analyst'S reasoning can surely be described as logical in his
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own terms, the "logic" of propaganda, of political mobilization or of the
manipulation of war-moods - if one can speak of "a logic" at all - is
certainly not formalized at this point.

Secondly, the "constraints" in

the system of symbolic logic are imposed by very few axioms and rules
of inference.

The constraints a propaganda analyst has to rely on are

numerous and typically incomplete.

This leaves the analyst uncertain

about the adequacy of his representational system and thus leads easily
to inconsistencies, indeterminacies, etc.

Thirdly, the system of

symbolic logic is deductive and not inductive in the sense that axioms
and rule s of inference provide all information a bout the permis sible
states of the system.

On the other hand, content inference is inductive.

The formulated regularities are assumed to account for the constraints
of the object system and in the light of the heuristic assumption of the
temporary invariance of those constraints messages obtain specific
interpretations.

Although the Logic Theory Machine does not provide

a mechanism for the type of inferences needed in message analysis,
it illustrates a. few of the procedural requirements for Simulating

some kind of intelligent behavior.
A machine program which "understands natural language" at
least in the domain of simple kinship relations has been described by
Lindsay (120).

The motivation for developing such a program sterns

from various sources.

Information retrieval as currently applied

to numerous library problems usually processes items of information without considering their meaning in any of the possible senses.
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High-speed computers have been employed to scan very long lists for
key words, count their frequencies etc. and although abstracts, biblh,graphies, subject matter identifications have been made in this way,
they are anything but those produced by a human being "understanding"
the meaning of the text.

Machine translation has mainly been approached

by devising syntactic rules and extensive dictionaries for converting
sentences of one language into the other.

Native speakers then have to

refine such translations by supplying information which may. indeed
account for what he "understands" the text to mean.

Simply adding to

each stored word its idiosyncratic usages or how it is to be understood
in each of its possible contexts multiplies the memory space required
of a machine and becomes quickly unrealizable.
Lindsay identified the problem of understanding as one of £ind. ing ways of storing and using large amounts of detailed knowledge
while keeping the amount of memory capacity required within realizable limits.

By calling such ways of storing information an "infer-

ential memory" the relevance of his work for content inference is
even more suggestive.
The filter of the machine which "understands ... " is a syntactic analysis or more specifically, a sentence-parsing program
making use of Chomsky's phrase structure grammar (44).

The

sentences it accepts are those included in Ogden's Basic English,
. a system of grammar and a vocabulary of about 1700 words.

The

program constructs a phrase structure diagram for each sentence
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with the component words as terminal elements and stores them with their
syntactic description.

In this way the enormous number of relations that

are expressed in the text are reduced to a manageable size and only those
of interest are maintained.
Lindsay's subsequent semantic,analysis program does not completely distinguish between constraint analysis and content inference for
reasons which will become clear immediately .

The first step is to take

all nouns appearing in the text and search for all subject-object combinations whose main verb is some form of "to be." Words in such combinations are then marked "equivalent" and their modifiers grouped together.
Next a search is made for the eight words which Basic English
provides to discuss kinship relations;
ITsister, 11

"father," "mother," "brother,"

l1brother-in-law, II 11 s ister-in-law, 11 and "married. 11

If any of

these relations oCCurs in the sentence, their modifiers are examined to
discover proper names appearing as possessive adjectives or objects
of a proposition, as for example "Jane's brother" or "the father of
John."

The sentences are thus reduced to a set of word triplets con-

taining two proper nouns and a relation word which connects them.
Now family trees are constructed.

The computer memory is

organized as a list structure in which items in one list can be associated with items in another list.

Each list is reserved for one family

unit leaving places for the names of "husband, " "wife, " "offspring, "
"husbands' parents," "wife's parents." Suppose the triplet "Jane
married John" appeared in the sentence, the two names are then
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written 'inthe respective places of husband and wife of say, family unit 1,
The triplet "Jane's father Bill" would then be stored in the following way:
Bill is written in the place of husband in, say, family unit 2 and the Jane's
family unit 1 gets the entry "family unit 2" in the place of wife's parents.
In this way lists representing family units are used to represent more
and more complicated kinship relations as texts are read into the memory.
Lindsay also describes how the order of presentation of the input
data has a crucial effect upon the efficiency of memory allocation, even
when dealing with simple kinship relations.

For example, if the machine

is first told that X has offspring A, B, C, and D it must construct an
elaborate organization to handle this information, places such as for
the spouse of X being left blank.

If the machine is then in.formed that

Y has offspringE, F, G, and H, it must construct another such structure,
unrelated to the first.

Finally. it may learn that A and H are brothers.

This permits (neglecting multiple marriages) a collapsing of the two
structures into a single organization representing the implied.information much more compactly.

Such collapsing of severarlist structures

into a simple scheme could - permitting an analogy to subj",ctiveexperience - very well account for the so-called "aha-experJ.ence."
The contribution of such inferential memories to message analysis is quite obvious although its rear significance may not appear when
e><;emplified only by storing kinship relations.

But, the inference of

X being Y's spouse from knowing the regularities of kinship and
"reading" that A and H are brothers is at least as simple as the
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propagandist's reasoning concerning inferences as to the planned use of
reprisal wea pons.
Suppose the explicit structure of the memory, i. e. the overall
regularity of the object system, is adequate for representing relevant
implications implicitly, a message analyst may wish to build up an inferential memory during the history of his dealing with an object system
as the propaganda analyst did concerning Goebbels' propaganda habits,
the behavior of a decision making-elite and of large masses of people
under stress.

Given a further piece of information, a signal, (either

linking several structures in an hitherto unprecedented way or simply
replicating an event while perhaps other structures have been modified,)
a problem- solving program of the type Newell, Shaw and Simon used
for their Logic Theory Machine could now be employed to search for
the implications a signal has for the problem domain or to trace a path
through the memory.

1£ enough inferential information is available an

automatic message analysis can be accomplished that is at least in
the domain of intelligent object systems and infinitely more promising
than traditional content analyses.
Lindsay realizes of course the extreme simplicity of kinship
relations which were chosen only to demonstrate the technical possibility of constructing memories for storing definite implications implicily since the required memory capacity increases too rapidly when
storage is explicit.

But the demonstration quite clearly supports his

main point that machines exhibiting some human-like intelligence in
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handling natural language presuppose some memory with inferential
capabilities because otherwise meaning and understanding - whatever
they may. be - cannot be adequately processed.
Concluding this section we wish to contrast inference with filtering in message analysis in the narrower sense.

Since both procedures

are derived from discovered constraints or from formulated regularities
they are apt to be easily confused.

Filtering has been characterized as

a mapping, as a mathematical function, or as a computational procedure
reducing the complexity of data and representing it in the terms in which
relevant regularities are formulated.

Content inference on the other

hand neither needs to be nor usually is a mapping, i. e., it is not required to be everywhere defined and single valued.

Filtering reflects

the way regularities of an object system are formulated.

More specif-

ically, it is either identical with or a projection of the mapping that
leads to the discovery of a relevant constraint.

A regularity could

also be said to be a partial model of the object system.

The rules of

content inference that derive from an adequately formulated regularity
then become equivalent to the operating rules in the object system's
model.

Hence, content inference can always be regarded as interpr'et-

ing a given message by applying relevant operating rules of the object
system on suitably represented data· yielding specific contents within
a problem domain.

Filtering remains within the data to be analyzed.

Content inference goes beyond their formal representation requiring
the assumption that the object system's constraint, on the basis of
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which rules of content inference were formulated, remain invariant.
As we have emphasized in Chapter Four the content so inferred
subsumes the traditional concept of meaning, whether it be connotative
Or denotative.

It may take the form of causes or effects, of antecedent

conditions of data or its consequences, of logical implications, or of
imputed goals.

The working examples identified content in our sense

with deciphered messages, predicted political actions, inferJ;"ed social
distances or communication structures - in any case-with events other
than those manifest in the physical characteristics of a given Signal,
data, text or representations thereof.

A classification of .types of

inferences can lead to a set of distinct models of content inference.
The task of formalizing such models goes beyond the scope of this
work and must be postponed for a later paper.

Validation
There really can be no justification for any message analysis
unless there are sufficient reasons to believe that its outcome has
some factuality; unless some evidence can be provided to sub~tantia te
its results; _unless the content ultimately inferred has an acceptable
degree of validity.

The goal of "optimizing valid content within a

problem domain" has been suggested as a definitional requirement
of message analysis.

Optimizing valid content is meant to be

synonymous with minimizing the uncertainty within a problem domain
where the source of this uncertainty may stem from incomplete knowledge within that domain or from the lack of confidence concerning
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whether the content inferences made will stand empirical tests.

Valida-

tion in message analysis then is the process by means of which the
procedures of message analysis in the narrower sense are jOintly evaluated with respect to their ability to yield reliable information about an
object system's unobserved components which are of declared interest
to the analyst.
Validation has obtained its highest degree of formalization in
the statistics of psychological testing.

This methodology attributes

validity to a measuring instrument when referring .to the degree to
which this instrument measures what it purports to measure.

Thus

an intelligence test may be said to be valid to the extent the scores
obtained are indicative of the subject's intelligence.

The example is

not as simple as it sounds for intelligence is not directly observable.
Thus, the validity of a measuring instrument is usually assessed by
comparing its sCOres with those obtained from another measuring
instrument independently of the former, the validity of which is
already established.

A suitable example is the General Inquirer

measures, . presumed to be indicative of international tension, which
have been shown to correlate with the Dow-Jones average of Industrial Securities (84).

The extent to which these two measures

correlate expresses the degree to which the validity established for
whatever the Dow- Jones Average is indicative of can be transferred
to the General Inquirer measure.

It is evident that the validity of a

measuring instrument can never be higher than the validity of those
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instruments by means of which it is validated.
In traditional content analysis, validation is an extremely difficult problem.

Not only is the meaning of "meaning" hardly understood,

as we have seen in Chapter Two, the term "content" is not always explicated either.

Thus, it is not altogether clear against which criteria

results of content analysis are supposed to be validated.
We cited Janis' suggestion that "semantical content analysis" be
identified with a classification of the "signifying responses" to given
"sign-vehicles. "While this does not provide an immediate basis for
validation, Janis suggests the measurement of a related characteristic
called "productivity" which would lead to some kind of indirect validation of content analytic results.
A content-analysis procedure is productive insofar as the
results it yields are found to be correlated with other variables. Whenever there is a substantial correlation between two variables, one variable maybe regarded as an
indicator of the other, because it is possible to predict,
within known limits of error, the value of the second variable from the first. We may say, then, that a technique
is productive to the extent that the results it provides
serve as indicators of other variables. Thus, a contentanalysis technique would be highly productive if its results
served as indicators of such variables as, (a) intentions
of the communicator to produce favorable attitudes toward
a foreign country, (b) periods of severe frustration for the
pOlitical organization within which the communicators are
affiliated, (c) 'unconscious' guilt feelings on the part of
the speaker, (d) changes in attitudes toward democratic
practices on the part of an audience, and (e) feelings of
insecurity about the future on the part of the audience,
etc. (92:65-66).
Janis goes on to say that although the validity of semantical
content analysis cannot be established directly, it may be inferred
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frolll the measurable productivity on the assulllption that "relationships
alllong various observable aspects of the cOlllmunicative proces s are
lllediated by signification responses,

Different signification responses

tend to have different behavioral causes and effects; similar signification responses tend to have silllilar causes and effects" (92:70),

The

conclusion drawn from such considerations is that "every content
analysis study, therefore, is required to provide some evidence of
validity.

This means that, for the present, research projects which

intend to provide purely descriptive information about content - without
testing any relationships exhibited by the content data should be
avoided" (92:78).

This advice, however, has been rarely taken.

It is not difficult to see that correlations between hypothetical

signification responses and other variables which according to Janis
are necessary to infer the validity of a content analysis, are indicative
of a constraint similar to the one we presupposed for content inferences,

The correlational measure of productivity purporting to

establish relations between these variables is nothing but a measure
of the severity of a linear constraint.

In fact Janis supports our view

partially, via the discus sion of the empirical problem of validating
the analytical procedure that the only methodologically acceptable
way to analyze data as messages is one that includes content inferences of some sort, although he does not formally state such requirelllent.
In the light of Janis' discussion of the validity problem in
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content analysis we should like to make an additional remark.

We can

regard such content analysis results as being only arbitrary hypothetical
constructs.

Since descriptions of the conventional meanings of symbolic

data, their semantic representation, etc., cannot be validated directly,
they cannot in themselves lead to predictions, have no theoretical or
practical consequences.

Such hypothetical constructs for significata

are arbitrary in the sense that almost always several ways of description can be found as Goodenough has amply demonstrated with his
semantic analysis of kinship terminology (78).

The arbitrariness of

these constructs becomes restricted, however, if taken in conjunction
with specific inferences that are claimed to be validly drawn from
them.

In this sense the results of message analysis represent aspects

of the unobserved components of an object system and are subject to
direct validation while the results of content analysis remain hypothetical and are indirectly valida table only. in conjunction with an
additional hypothetical construct that relates signification to other
measurable aspects of the object system.
Numerous schemes for differentiating types of validation have
been suggested by various authors.
"indirect" validation.

Janis mentioned "direct" and

The American Psychological Association con-

cerned with the clinical use of tests identifies and defines "content
validity,

!I

'tpredictive

validity" (197).

validity~

11

t'concurrent validity,

11

and !'construct

Content validity is solely based on the informed

judgement of the investigator, predictive and concurrent validity are
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both established by some correlation either between simultaneously
occuring variables or between variables distinguished along a time
scale,. and construct validity bestows validity not only upon the outCOme of the test but also upon the theory underlying the construction
of the test.

Selltiz, Jahoda, Deutsch and Cook (173:154-166) felt

that there were only two basic types of validity, "pragmatic validity"
as an answer to such question as rldoes this rneasur'ing instrument

work? ".and "construct validity" characterized as above.

They also

mention "face validity" as a self-evident measure.
In message analysis problems of validation are not always

identical with those of psychological testing.

For one thing, the

stimulus conditions that are typically standardized in test situations
are rarely accessable in message analysis;or, psychological tests
can often be regarded as a more economical shortcut to the assessment of personality characteristics such as through

·aptitude tests

for particular jobs in order to ensure efficient labor.

In message

analysis, the components of the object system that its results claim
to represent are often impossible to observe.

This necessitates modes

of validation which are quite different from those used in psychological
tests.

Thirdly, psychological tests make use of relatively general-

izable psychological constraints such as manifestations of intelligence,
aspiration levels, psychopathologies, etc., while message analysis
. is more often based on relatively situation specific regularities that
are often hardly generalizable in the same way the empirical domain
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of psychological testing seems to permit.

Finally, message analysis is

often bound to operate in situations that are less controlled than those of
psychological testing but nevertheless requires methodological examination and evaluation.
In spite of the obvious differences validation in message analysis

can take any of the above mentioned forms.

Whether only the product of

a content inference is validated against some external criterion (pragmatic validity in Selltiz et aI's sense) or whether external criteria are
chosen to validate the theory underlying the analytic procedure (construct validity) in all cases some evidence other than the one utilized
for processing the data has to be made available.

We therefore wish to

leave the question open as· to whether the message analyst gathers
additional data to confirm his inferences or whether he employs such
information to validate the theoretical constructs that went into the
design of the analysis.

Hence, we suggest a differentiation of modes

of validation according to the nature of information utilized for such
ends.

Without insisting too strongly on the terminal names for types

of validation, the diagram in Figure 15 intends to depict the suggested
distinctions and to outline the subsequent discussion.
The left-to-right order in which the five types of validation are
presented in the above diagram suggests an order of increasing certainty that could be claimed on the basis of the kind of information
utilized.

Although the certainty each type of validation can render is

also limited by the amount of validating evidence available, logical
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validation tends to provide the least certainty concerning the content inferred, predictive validation the m.ost.

The m.essage analyst of course

is not free to choose at will am.ong the types of validation.

His choice

is dependent on the kind of information that the message analytic situation m.akes available to him.

Logical Validity
If no information is made available other than the one already
utilized in the message analytical process, the justification of the content inferred rests solely on the logical conclusiveness of the m.ethod
em.ployed and on the certainty associated with the assumption that the
relevant constraint still holds for the object system under consideration.
True, this situation seems most uncertain but it m.ust be considered
the m.08t frequent situation in which a m.essage analyst finds himself.
Indeed, if he optimizes the content in the specified problem. domain,
he should be expected to have utilized all available resources leaving
nothing for additional validation.

Yet, the redundancy of available

information and the stability of the constraint observed during the
history of dealing with the respective object system, as well as the
conclusiveness of the procedures, certainly does give weight to the
content inferred.
For example, historians have traditionally dealt with inferences from documents to events although no extensive methodology
.has emerged from this pursuit.

Only recently Dibble (51) devoted a

paper to the explication of some general syllogisms that historians
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tend to use implicitly to evaluate the reliability of a document whether
it bea testimony, a product of' social bookkeeping, or considered as
correlates or direct indicators of events.

Such attempts toward a

methodology for content inferences in history are not very highly
developed.

By referring to the correct use of such syllogisms his-

torians attempt to provide logical validity to the results obtained.
Another case in point has been described in working example
V where Lasswell tried to substantiate the suspicion that certain
publishing agencies were controlled by a foreign government.

The

validity of his inferences rested solely on his definition of propaganda;
the assumptions that went into the identification of "links to a foreign
government" and specified characteristics in texts; and the reliability
with which the statistical analysis was executed.

Reporting on such

matters justifies the result in the light of the conclusiveness of the
investigative technique.

It provides a logical validation.

Similar justifications seem to have been required from the
war propaganda analyst in working example VI.

George reported

that in writing their weekly reports the FCC analysts included their
mode of reasoning in support of the inferences made.

Reporting

these explicit reasonings was most probably intended to give weight
to the results of the analysis by exhibiting their logical conclusiveness.

No information external to the message analytic procedure

was provided.

Only.its internal structure could be exhibited to those

making use of the inferences.

(This apparent requirement incidentally
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enabled George to reconstruct many of the models of the situation propaganda analysts made explicit use of).

Fa c e Validity
Most content analyses, while required to be explicit concerning
the procedures employed, do not attempt to provide explicit external
information to validate their results.

Such results are accepted or re-

jected according to whether they seem plausible or not to the analyst.
Variously referred to as plausibility or content validity, this mode of
validation involves - as we have mentioned -the intuitive judgement of
an informed investigator.

This is the most critical type of validation

since the plausibility of an analytic result is not communicable; it can
only be intuitively evident to the one who assesses the validity of the
result and is based on implicit competencies.
The most general example of this mode of validation is the use
of relative frequencies of references appearing in newspapers, for
example, to measure public attention to the respective referents.
This identification has been accepted for over 50 years without recruiting empirical evidence in its favor.

Although it is not difficult

to find sufficiently many examples where identifications of this kind
seem invalid, the plausibility of such measures seems so strong to
content analysts that they have never seriously been questioned.
Another example for face validity is Gerbner's definition of
his "news value index" (76:II-D-4) the values of which are presumed
to measure the llnewsworthiness rr of a topic to a ll1ass llledia
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institution.

Gerbner accepts this measure on the basis that it Seems to

be intuitively plausible without providing further evidence.

Similarly

Berelson's equation of the disproportionate representation of U. S.
minorities in fictional stories with "constant deprivation" is - as plausible as it may appear to him - simply accepted "on the face of it" without further justification.

A somewhat mixed example is provided by

the General Inquirer measures obtained from documents pertaining to
international issues and plausibly. interpreted by Holsti, Brody and
North (84) as measuring international tension.

The example states

an attempt at predictive validation although the idea of such a measure
does not seem to have been conditioned by such an attempt at validation.
That face validity cannot be communicated and rests solely on
the intuition of the individual judging the results of a message analysis
has already been mentioned.

Another critical characteristic of face ..

validity. and concordance validity as well, lies in the fact that it involves some knowledge of the probable content prior to the date the
analytical results are assessed.

Thus, results may be rejected if

they do not seem plausible or do not confirm the prior knowledge held
by the investigator.

Such a validation can easily lead to setting up a

procedure in support of already established beliefs about incompletely
observable systems, often without the investigator becoming aware
about the circularity of the validating process involved.

The history

of science is tull of examples where face validity failed to accept
analytical results that turned out to be acceptable at a later time.
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Concordance Validity
Concordance and face validity have in common the characteristic
that information utilized to validate the results of a message analysis is
available to the analyst concurrently with the information used to accomplish the intended content inferences.

While face validity refers to an

informed judgement of the investigator, we wish to reserve the term
"concordance validity" for a systematic and explicit attempt to validate
inferences on the basis of their coherence, consistency or at least lack
of contradiction with other information about the partly observed object
system.

A more thorough analysis of the process involved may render

both modes of validation the same with the exception that the former is
characterized by intuitive judgements, while the latter by more explicit
formal rigor.

Hence, the evidence of concordance validity is commun-

icable while that of face validity is not.

Although the borderline between

these two types may not always be easily drawn, the two extremes
should be distinguished.
All analyses of messages from object systems having existed
at some point in the past history are absolutely bound to be evaluated
at best on the basis of concordance validity.

Consider Yule's statistical

analysis of literature describe in working example 1.

There is no hope

of obtaining direct evidence from the object system studied; the authors
of the documents cannot be intervewecL Inferences as to the authorship of the unsigned document can only be justified on the basis that
they are not contradictory to the information that had been accumulated
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about the authors, their works, . . and some generalizations concerning the
statistical properties of their writing styles.
The use of the concordance criterion as a basis for validating
message analyses can be illustrated by almost any content inference
made from historical documents.

Working example I, the decipherment

of the hitherto unreadable old Persian script, may suffice.

In the cause

of this analysis none of the numerous hypotheses that had emerged concerning the semantic interpretation of the cuneiform characters, their
grammar, or their phonrtic values were rendered acceptable until some
consistency with known historical events of the old Persian Empire
could be d.efuonstrated.

It was only after a century of trying and test-

ing that some of the inferences suggested by scholars emerged as not
only being.in conformity with known historical facts but moreover explained several events in a coherent way.

This refers particularly

to the medieval Persian use of titles which provided the key for the
names of consecutive kings whose periods of reign were consistent with
the use of the three distinct writing systems, etc.

So content infer-

ences from documents were systematically validated by testing their
concordance with the transmitted history of the culture until all contradictions were eliminated.
Concordance validity as a mode of evaluating content inferences does not of course lead to absolute certainty about inferences.
Householder (85) has investigated some of the peculiarities of the
"semantic mapping" as he calls it.

He could easily demonstrate
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that given a syntactic description of a text, the words of which are some
coded version of English, there are almost always several distinct ways
of interpreting the text semantically, i. e. consistent with the semantics
of the English language, making perfect sense to a native English
speaker.

The number of possible inferences that can be drawn from

a given text without violating known language universals decreases as
the length of a text increases but no theorem is known concerning the
minimal length of a text that will receiv'e an unambiguous semantic interpretation given the semantic structure of a language (85: 183).
Recently

a~tention

has been focussed on the problem of grammatical

ambiguity where the situation is similar to the above, given the knowledge of a grammar.

The"problem becomes particularly acute in a

very different case of grammatical ambiguity when an attempt is made
to construct a grammar for an unknown language from given texts of
"insufficient" length which support a number of hypothesized grammars.

Structural ambiguities may easily lead to semantic ambiguities,

(99) i. e. to several content inferences that are equivalent under the
criterion of concordance with the information available.

Thus it is

•

not implausible that the old Persian script could have been interpreted
in an entirely different way without being inconsistent with what was
then known about Persia.

It is' equally possible that the information

in conjunction with which the inferences were evaluated had been distorted during the process of transmission through history and had
therefore .affected the deciphering process, etc.

Although concordance
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validity as a criterion for evaluating accomplished content inferences
has certain recognizable pitfalls, it is certainly the best method that
can be employed if the information used for validation is concurrent
to the information used in the inference.

Pragmatic Validity

1£ the information used for validating message analysis is a
posteriori to the information which went into the content inference,
the validity may be established indirectly on the basis of information
about the consequences that derive from it.
will be called pragmatic.

This type of validation

It should not be confused with the same

term used much more broadly by Selltiz et. a1. (173: 157).

Prag-

matic validity is to be understood as being only indirectly assessed,
quite similar to the way Janis wanted to have the validity of content
analytic results inferred from what he called productivity.
In many situations the problem domain of the message analyst
is set up in such a way that the inferred content implies sequences of
·decisions, leading ultimately to specific actions directed toward the
unobserved part of the object system having observable consequences.
Such a situation existed for the cryptographer in III.

His deciperment,

although having at once a considerable degree of face validity and
concordance validity could not gain further certainty until its consequences were put to test.

If the cryptographer's interpretation of

the cipher was correct, then certain military operations would have
to lead to certain predictable results.

Similar was the situation for
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the war-propaganda analyst in VI.

Here the problem domain was specif-

ically delineated to satisfy the informational needs of the policy makers
with the primary objective of recommending effective military strategies.
Much of the case studies that George (71:125-250) describes were in fact
concerned with only pragmatically confirmable inferences such as about
anticipations concerning the success of planned military operations;
elite expectations concerning the viability of the Axis or concerning
Allied actions and possible preventive measures, perceptions concerning morale and public confidence in leaders.

Unfortunately the practical

consequences that may have been derived from such propaganda analytic
results were not reported in this work.

That the mass communications

of Allies, opponents, and neutrals were monitored by all major powers
during World War II and intensively analyzed by quite elaborate and
specialized organizations suggests at least a considerable amount of
pragmatic validity as sociated with their re suIts.
The psychodiagnostic attempts in X to adapt message analytic
procedures for therapeutic ends may serve as a third illustration for
the pragmatic validation of content inferences.

As mentioned before

the psychodiagnostic inferences which are hoped to be obtainable from
analyzing a patient's speech do not generally represent the person's
internal states, unobservable as they are, but psychotherapeutic constructs that have been evolved in the context of the patients' behavior
toward specific treatments.

Here message analytic products imply

recommendations of possible causes of treatments which will lead
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to desirable and accessable results provided that the analysis is valid.
Hence, the validation of message analyses in the domain of psychodiagnosis is dominantly a pragmatic one.
The nature of pragmatic validation is such that inferences can
only

be

rendered invalid but can never be positively judged as being

valid inferences, i. e. if content inferences do not lead to the consequences implied by it, the message analysis must be rendered invalid.
While if the implied actions lead to the expected observations, these
consequences may have been due to causes other than those induced
by the action.

Hence message analysis can be said to become prag-

matically validated only insofar as no information becomes available
according to which the content inferences would have to be rendered
invalid.

Predictive Validity
The validation of message analysis may be based on information pertaining directly to the problem domain and received a posteriori
to the analysis.

Such validation is called predictive validation and is

differentiated from pragmatic validation by the absence of any need
for actively interferring with the behavior of the object system to
produce the validating evidence.
cludes APA's

Predictive validity in our sense in-

concurrent validity.

Assessing the predictive validity

of a message analysis requires establishing agreement of the content
inferred with a posteriori information obtained within the problem
domain.

This case of validation which is formally the most simple
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was taken up in chapter four in order to define the amount of valid information conveyed bya signal, the evidence for "valid information" having
been given as the "validating signal" first introduced in Chapter Three.
The assessment of predictive validity by an external observer of the
message analytic situation had been shown to be a prerequisite for determining whether some procedure satisfies the goal of message analysis.
The simplest example for a predictive validation has been
described in working example IX where the task was adopted to develop
a mechanical procedure for predicting whether or not a set of letters
had been written by persons intending to commit suicide.

After rele-

vant constraints had been formulated and found to distinguish between
such letters, the sources of which were known to the researchers,
the predictive validity of the analytic procedure was tested.

To this

end another set of letters of unknown identity was subjected to message analysis.

Only after the predictions were made was the identity

of the writers

revealed to the research team.

That the psycho-

logical state of the writer had been inferred correctly for seventeen
out of eighteen pairs of notes was used as an argument for the predictive validity of the message analytic procedure.
After World War II, the validity of content inferences from
war propaganda was assessed and the performance of the propaganda
analysis operation of the Federal Communications Commission
evaluated.

This could be accomplished by matching a large sample

of inferences against relevant information contained in official German

325
war records, diaries~ rneTI1.oirs~ captured documents, interrogation-

reports, etc.

Since most of the predictions concerned issues reflected

in domestic propaganda which was subject to instructions of the Ministery of Propaganda, Goebbel's diary proved to be the most significant
source of providing validating information.

For example, a prediction

concerning anticipations of an opponent's actions:
FCC analyst:
Hence, it may be deduced that Berlin is convinced either
that there will be no early invasion attempt along the
Atlantic, or that any such attempt will be repelled (CEA
#14, April 16, 1943, p. B-7).
Goebbels:
In the West only diversionary maneuvers will in all likelihood take place, assuming that the secret reports of our
agents are correct. Personally I consider this plausible.
I don't believe that the English and the Americans will
attempt to break in on us in the West as they know only
too well that they will bleed to death there (Goebbels Diary,
Aprilll, 1943, pp. 324-325) (71:196-197).
And an example of an inference concerning changes in military
ope ra tions:
FCC analyst:
Apparently to prepare for a (Getman) retreat from the
Kuban bridgehead, there is detailed and comparatively
large-volume reporting on the fighting in that sector.
There is some reporting of (German) successes, especially in losses inflicted (on the Russians) but there
is clear avoidance of any indications that the Germans
intend to hold there indefinitely. Nor do the (German)
propagandists ... any longer inflate the importance of
the bridgehead as a 'potential springboard' ... as they
formerly did in the apparent effort to get the Russians
to divert as much as possible of their strength to that
sector (CEA #36, September 16, 1943, p. C·-I).
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Order froITl Hitler to the Army H. Q. involved:
In order to free forces for other tasks, I have decided
to evacuate the Kuban bridgehead and to withdraw the
17th ArITly across the Kerch Strait to the CriITlea (U. S.
ArITlY, A. G. 0., DepartITlental Records Branch,
T.A.G.O.,: .. p. 89) (71:240).
As illustrated by the cOITlparisons cited, George ITlatched each
inference in the saITlple with the validating inforITlation now available
and found about 80% of the FCC inferences to have been in fact accurate.
As already noted, he found also that the accuracy increased as the
analysts accuITlulated more and more inforITlation about the object
systeITl.

Although the situation did not perITlit the application of

statistical techniques for assessing the predictive validity, the unusually high percentage of accurate predictions could not have been
due to lucky guesses and were in fact not solely the result of gifted
intuition.

Thus a considerable predictive validity could be associated

with the inferential methods used.

An atteITlpt has been made in this chapter to outline the ITlacrostructure of ITlessage analytic procedures.
diagraITlatically in Figure 9.

An overview is presented

This figure also depicts the differentia-

tion of ITlessageanalysis in the narrower sense which is basically
concerned with ITlaking specific inferences as elaborated in Chapter
Four and ITlessage analysis in the wider sense which includes certain
procedures that must precede such inferences.

The most distinguish-

ing procedure of ITlessage analysis in the narrower sense is content
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inference.

Constraint analysis provides the informational foundation of

content inference and is hence a prerequisite of message analysis in the
narrower sense.

Recording and filtering may lead either to content in-

ferences or to constraint analyses and may therefore serve different
ends with profound empirical implications that would justify a nominal
differentiation.
sense.

Validation succeeds message analysis in the narrower

It evaluates the antecedent analytical procedures as a whole.

A brief comparison of the goals, major problems and evaluative
criteria of these five component procedures of message analysis is
presented in tabular form in Figure 16.
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Goal

Recording

Representations
of data, adequate
for analysis

Filtering

Transformed
representation'
of data amenable for content inference
or discovery of
constraints

Major Problem
Raw data not acceptable to explicit
processes by being
non-formalized or
in unsuitable notational terms

Reliability of recording
formalized character
of notational scheme,
j

maintenance of informati on relevant with
respect to subsequent
processes

Quantity_and complexity of data
exceed limits of
computability and!
or contain too
much irrelevant
info r rna tion

Maintenance of informati On in data relevant
to available regularitie s
and given problem
domain

Detection and
formally accounting for suitable
constraint among
large numbers of
variables

Severity of constraint
ha ving infe rential
qualities,

.'

Constraint Formulation of
Analysis
regularities with
inferential
capabilities

Evaluative Criteria

Accuracy of executing
the formal operations

adequacy of formalization

Content
Inference

Selections of
contents in unobserved problem
domain

Validity
Trans fe ra bility of
regularities to
present situation
and their infe rential
use

Validation

Assessment of
the message
analysis procedure in terms
of the quality of
its results

Application of information not
already consumed
by message analysiE
procedure

.

'.

-

Summary of Problems and Procedures
Figure 16
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CHAPTER SEVEN

SOME FURTHER INFORMATION MEASURES

The previous chapter discussed some empirical problems of message analysis.

These problems are far from being solved.

The analyt-

ical procedures described therein can be considered as no more than a
bare outline of what is typically required when scientific analysts attempt
to treat available observational data as messages about unobserved components of the system of their attention.

At several points in the discus-

sion intuitive notions of information were used that had not been explicated
in Chapter Five.

In this chapter we wish to formally define some of those

notions that were introduc"d in Chapter Six merely as a suggestion.
In the first section of this chapter a general measure of the
severity of a constraint is developed which is extended in the 'subsequent
section to a measure of the amount of inferential information that a given
relation contains.

Section three is devoted to how such measures may

be utilized for the systematic analysis of relevant constraints.

The

fourth section elaborates on the notion of content and content inference
which leads in the sixth section to a measure of the amount of information carried by a message, i. e., to a measure that is concerned with
the contellt of a message as well as with the signal carrying it.
fifth section shows how some of the

The

information measures are applic-

able for evaluating the adequacy of filtering procedures in mes sage
analysis.

The chapter is finally concluded with a summary of the
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ll10re significant inforll1ation ll1easures developed so far and an exall1ple
involving a dynall1ic systell10
It should be ell1phasized that the theoretical and ll1ethodological
problell1s posed in the previous outline of the ell1pirical procedures cannot be solved on the basis of an inforll1ation calculus aloneo

But it seell1S

to be of interest, or at least challenging, to ll1ake an attell1pt to see how
far such inforll1ation ll1easures are capable of clarifying SOll1e of the
critical issues of this 1l10de of inquiryo

A Measure of the Severity of a Constraint
Whenever an object systell1 is not free to aSSull1e all of its possible states, cannot follow all the trajectories that are conceivable,
or is restricted in exhausting its full cOll1binatorial possibilities, then
we say a constraint is presenL

We argued in Chapter Six that in order

to discover a constraint a ll1easure of its severity is neededo

Such a

ll1easure is 1l10reover indicative of the POB sibility of forll1ulating a
relation, a regularity, or any forll1 of representation that can be considered to account for that constrainL

Based on the idea of Fisher

(63), we also argued that the ll1easure of the seveTity of a constraint
can under certain cOonditions be taken as a ll1easure of the all10unt of
inforll1ation that is supplied when such a constraint becoll1es kllown or
recognizedo
As has been ll1entioned in the previous chapter, starting froll1
Wiener's idea of identifying a relation R* with the set R
°

of ll1any-

tuples in the product set gZ ° that satisfies that relation, Ashby (16)
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defined a constraint simply and most straight forwardly as the set:

/35/

whereby

R

In conjunction with our information calculus we can most naturally define
the severity of such a constraint as the quantity:

log # R .

/36/

This quantity clearly satisfies the intuitive requirement on a measure of
the severity of a constraint to which Ashby most probably refers when
stating" ... when gZ

=R

the constraint is zero; as R

shrinks, so does

the constraint become more intense" (16: 9) (original symbols replaced).
/ 36/ gives this notion at once a definite quantitative form.

With 10g#gZ

as a measure of the maximum range of freedom and 10g#R as a measure of the restricted range, the expression in /36/ proves to be a particular interpretation of the general form of measures of the severity
of a constraint referred to in Chapter Six.
The left part of the expression /36/ is clearly recognizable as
U Z according to the definition /22/ in Chapter Five.
of the expression may be defined for any subset G

of

The right part
Z, leaving

Z

as a special case, as:

=

log # coGR.

/37/

Thus the more general form of the measure of the severity of a constraint
expressed in /36/ may be defined as:
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=

=

/38/

whereby R may be any subset of any subspace of gZ and

coGR is

consequently contained in the arbitrarily chosen set of dimensions

G.

Capital letters as subscripts will from now On be reserved for subsets
of a state space which satisfy a relation.

The superscripts continue to

denote the dimensions of that subspace to which the measures refer.
/38/ presents the measure of the severity of a constraint again
as a difference of two uncertainties, the uncertainty before and after a
constraint has been induced or the uncertainty before and after a relation R

has become known.

The quantity thus qualifies as a measure

of information analagously t'; those explicated in Chapter Five.

Yet

there is a fundamental difference between the amount of signal information defined in /24/ and the quantity defined in /38/.

The former is a

measure of the amount of information carried by a single signal, the
latter is a measure of the .amount of information conveyed by the
structure of the object system as far as it is manifest in the distribution of possible signals it emits or states it occupies.
Note that while the unconstrained uncertainties of distinct subspaces are additive, the quantity of information introduced by a relation
into one subspace and the quantity introduced by the same relation into
another subspace are additive only under very special conditions and
reHect an important property of the relation which induces the constraint.
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Let G

and H

be two arbitrary sets of dimensions, the deviation d

from the case of additivity be:

d

GUH
R

KIG - H
R

=

KI

=

U GUH -

=

UG - H
R

+

U GUH
R

KIH
R
UG - H

UH
R

U

+

UG - H
R

UH

+

U

H
R

GUH
R

=

Hence, additivity exists only if coGUHR
tions of R

onto G"H and H

is a product of the two cojec-

respectively.

Since the deviation d

can

only be equal to or larger than zero:

KI G - H
R

+

/39/

The condition of non-additivity gives rise to an important information
measure which will be the subject of the next section.

A Measure of the Amount of Inferential Information
We argued in Chapter Six that a constraint analysis has to make
use of measures of that aspect of the severity of a constraint that is
significant for the analytical problem at hand, in our case, for making
content inferences in the context of a specialized message analytic
situation.

Available data may exhibit constraints that are irrelevant
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for any sort of inferences or others that' possess constraints of the type
needed but lead to inferences other than those desired.

At any rate a

specialized measure of the severity of that aspect of a constraint has to
be developed which is to be utilized for specific content inferences.

To

illustrate the indicative power of the information measures so far defined, let us refer to four examples of constraints depicted in Figure 17,
each is contained in the same state space but induced by relations of a
different form.
In Figure 17 the state space
43

= 64

elements.

gE

The subsets Ri, i

gF "

l(

= 1,

gG

=

gEU FuG has

2, 3, 4, are equal in sille,

i. e., have sixteen elements each but differ profoundly in the distribu-

tion of the elements in that state space;

KI~t'FU G

=

UEUFuG

Hence for all Ri:

U~~;FU G

=

10g2 64 -

log2 16

=2

which is an indication of only one magnitude of the four constraints.

bits

Yet,

the measure of this magnitude is obviously invariant to the distribution
of Ri's

elements although it is this distribution which seems to account

for the apparent differences in the properties of the relations.

Rl,

example, shows no constraint on the dimensions denoted by E

and F.

It induces a constraint on G only.

of an element in G

Rl

can be considered a cojection

onto the total state space.

that:

KI EVF
Rl

=

=

=

for

Obits

It therefore follows
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. RZ

F

G

E

Four Different Constraints
Figure 17
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while:

KIEUFUG

Rl

= KI

EUG
Rl

=

KI

FUG
Rl

=

2 bits

The measures thus reflect what is visually quite obvious--that Rl

in-

duces a constraint only on G or that the constraint on G fully accounts
for the total constraint on EuFuG.
R2,

on the other hand, cannot be so analyzed.

The figure indi-

cates that while there is no constraint on the dimension F
on E

and G jointly account for the total constraint.

base of R2
in E

the constraints

The cylindrical

can be obtained by the intersection of the cojection of R2

onto EuG and the cojection of R2

in G

onto EuG.

When apply-

ing our measures we obtain the following:

=

Obits

=

=

1 bit

=

2 bits.

and

=

KI

EUG
R2

This reflects the fact that F

=

+

is unaffected by the constraint and the con-

straint on EuG is composed of two otherwise independent constraints
in E

and in G

respectively.

The additivity of our measures in caSes

of independence indicate s the situation quite clearly.
The cylindrical base of R3, on the other hand, cannot be obtained
by the intersection of cojections of constraints on F
individually.

and G taken
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Hence:
E
KI
R3

=

KI

F
R3

K1G
R3

=

=

Obits

whereby:

KIEVFUG
R3

=

KI

FUG
R3

>

KI~3

This shows that while the dimension E

+

K1G
R3

is not contributory to the total

constraint, the constraint in FuG cannot be reduced further into independent components.

R4, however, induces a constraint that affects

all three dimensions without permitting any decomposition.

On intituitive

grounds R 1 maybe said to represent the least and R4 the most complex relation depicted in Figure 17.

This intuitive notion of complexity

seems to correspond to the decomposability of a relation into smaller
sub- relations.
We argued in Chapter Six that in order for a constraint to supply
the information required for makioclg specific content inferences it must
impose a constraint on the interaction between at least two sets of variables or two subspaces of an object system'" state space.
although both Rl

For example,

and R2 induce some constraint on the state space as

a whole, they do not represent any dependency between E,

F

or G.

Each of these subspaces can be taken independently without loss.

In

fact while measuring some kind of severity of a constraint within a designated subspace in terms of our information measures

KI, these

measures do not in any way measure the quantity of information which
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has to be supplied for making specific content inferences possible.

KI

does not take the relevant distribution of the elements of a subset of a
state space into consideration.

It does not measure the constraint on

the interaction between subspace s.
The additivity of information measures applied on subspaces
that a particular constraint renders as independent can now be utilized
for defining a measure of the constraint-induced dependency between
distinct subspaces.

Let the amount of interaction information intro-

duced by a relation R
is denoted by' i

into a state space of which a typical dimension

be defined as the following difference:

II: i:
R

=

2:

/40/

ie Z

This measure may be interpreted as a measure of the severity of a constraint on the interactions between the components of an object system;
as a measure of the amount of communication between them; or from
the point of view of a message analyst, as the amount of inferential information that can be utilized to make inferences from one set of the
state space's dimensions to a distinct second set.
For purposes of message analysis in the narrower Sense not
all of the interactions that a constraint induce s may contain relevant
information.

Therefore a more specialized form of the amount of in-

ferential information, between just two arbitrary subspaces denoted
by· E

and G, may be mare convenient.

IIE : G - E
R

=

Let this measure be:

/41/
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where

E

may, for example, denote the dimensions within which given

signals are considered and G may be conceived of as denoting the message analyst's problem domain.
The inequality /39/ moreover implies that:

n:i:

i€GUE

R

n E :G - E
R

The difference between these two measures incidentally, expresses a
quantity of inferential noise that a suitable filtering procedure will have
to eliminate, among othe r quantities, when practical me ssage analyse s
are attempted.

Inguiry into the Nature of a Constraint
The idea of discovering a constraint within dimensions of interest
and of the kind that brings the given problem closer to a solution is
always associated with systematically applying appropriate measures of
the severity of the kind of constraint sought.

The previous section sug-

gested that the algebraic relations holding between the information
measures Over various subspaces yield some important properties of
the relation that accounts for the constraint.

Particularly questions

concerning whether and how such a relation may be reduced to its
elementary forms can be answered

on~

the basis of the algebraic rela-

tions between such specialized measures.

Such measures may there-

fore be utilized for systematic inquiries into the nature of a constraint
thereby uncovering significant properties of the complementary relation.
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Ashby (16) suggested a method for discovering the reducibility
of a many-valued relation, which is only apparently complex by analyzing the constraint induced by it.

The method has been presented as a

sequence of set theoretical operations the result of each of which is
submitted to a certain test that implicitly keeps track of the quantities
we defined in /38/.

The outcome of the test determines whether sub-

sequent operations are to be applied and their results tested or whether
the analysis can be considered terminated.
The method starts out with cojecting the subset satisfying a relation on each individual dimension, and tests for the identity of the product
of the constraints on each dimension and the original constraint induced
on the whole state space.

For R2

in FigureJ 7, for example, such a

test would be positive because the total constraint can be considered a
product of the constraints induced by R2

on each individual dimension.

In this case the constraint is decomposable and so the relation can be

reduced to elementary relations holding in this case only in dimensions
G

and E.

For R3

such a test would be negative as far as dimensions

F

and G are concerned.

The next step therefore becomes one of

considering all pairs of dimensions and testing whether they can fully
account for the total constraint.
its projection onto FuG but R4
mOre elementary forms.

R3 would turn out to be reducable to
certainly could not be simplified into

The analysis continues in this manner until

the simplest set of independent sub- constraints are found that fully
account for the total constraint induced by the original many-valued
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relationo

Thus the analysis assesses how an apparently complex many-

valued relation can be reduced in a systematic fashion.

This suggested

reduction of the complexity is achieved without any loss in the explanatory power of the original relation.
In terms of our information measures, Ashby's constraint
analysis would suggest a reduction of the dimensionality of a relation
by holding the value of KIEUFuG
Rl
process.

constant throughout the analytical

Demonstrated on the constraints depicted in Figure 17, the

method would yield the following:
F
KIRl

=

<

KIEvFuG
Rl

=
indicating that the constraint on G alone is responsible for the constraint
imposed on the total spaceo

KI

EUG
R2

On the other hand:

=

=

=

=

=

+

=

KIEUFUG
R2

EuFuG
KIR2

making it clear at once that the total constraint can be viewed as the product of two independent constraints on E

=

KI

FuG
=
R3

KI

F
R3

=

KIEUFUG
R3

=

KI

and on G.
EUF
R3

=

KI

For
EuG
R3

R3:

<

KIEVFvG
R3
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demonstrating that dimension E
be reduced further.

can be simply dropped but FuG cannot

The constraint on FvG takes up the total constraint.

= KIF·
R4

=

KI

EUF
R4

=

KI

EVG
R4

=

KI

FvG
R4

<

KIEUFUG
R4

Thus the constraint induced by R4 can in no way be simplified.
However, as we suggested in the previous section of this chapter,
a constraint analysis for purposes of making valid content inferences from
signals has to focus primarily on the constraint that affects the interaction
between the dimensions of available signals and the dimensions of a de·lineated problem domain.

We indicated that the property of a relation

that is significant for content inferences is not assessed by any measure
KI of the severity of a constraint but by measures II of the quantity of
inferential information that a particular relation introduces between two
distinct subspaces.

Hence, if a constraint analysis such as the one sug-

gested by Ashby is used to inquire into the nature of a constraint that is
relevant for content inferences not some such quantity as

Z
KIR is to be

held constant throughout the simplification process, but the quantity
E:G-E
IIR

where E

may denote the set of a signal's dimensions and G

those of a subspace toward which inferences are intended.
In effect Ashby's constraint analysis can be used to analyze a
constraint with implications for content inferences if the invariance of
the quantity of inferential information is adopted as a test criterion
but not the invariance of the magnitude of the severity of a constraint
as measured by KI

Z
R

The essential tests referred to maybe as follows:
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Test 1:

Is a relation R

contributory to the solution of the in-

ferential problem within the delineated dimensions
answer to this question must be given when

and G?

E

A positive

n E : G - E takes a value
R

larger than ZerO.
Test 2:

Is there a set E-Q of dimensions in E

{G-E)-P in G-E for which R

and a set

provides no basis for the making of

content inferences required by the message analytic situation?

A

positive answer would have to be given if the amount of inferential information introduced by the total constraint is not affected by the reduced constraint, i. e., a positive answer presupposes that:

n E :G - E
R

=

nE-Q:(G"E)-P

and

R

=

Obits.

Test 3: Can the inferential relation in QuP be regarded as
composed of elementary inferential relation in a partition of QuP?
Let QuP = AUBl.iCU ... and A, B, C, ... be non-overlapping sets.
A positive answer to the above question has to be given under the condition that:
E:G-F

IIR

=

+

UBUQ:BUP
R

+

+ ...
where by the coj ection of R

onto A, B, C, ... can be considered ele-

mentary inferential relations that can be taken independently.
The examples depicted in Figure 17 are too simple to demonstrate the simplifications that such a constraint analysis will have to
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suggest.

More elaborate examples for which this analytical method may

. indeed start to become productive beyond what is already visually obvious
must be omitted in this presentation.
One of the roles that we assigned to constraint analysis as outlined in Chapter Five is the finding of a suitable filtering procedure
which is capable of carrying the process of simplifying the relations
further than was discussed here.

We will take up information measures

for evaluating filtering procedures after the next section.

Content and Content Inference
An appropriate definition of the amount of information carried
by a mes sage presupposes an explication of "content" and "rule of content inference" to which this section is devoted.

The notion "rule of

content inference" is also a prerequisite for the choice of suitable
filters in message analyses.

As we have argued all along, the notion

of "content" is the distinguishing characteristic of a message as compared to a signal and is therefore essential to a definition of the amount
of information carried by a message.
Once the irrelevant dimensionality of a relation has been
properly reduced, i. e. the constraint has been identified and decomposed into a set of simple relations, the result has to be put into a
form amenable to the making of content inferences.

Chapter Six

briefly discussed the transformation of formulated regularities of an
object system into rules of content inference.
ference is always of the form:

A rule of content in-
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(s)

where

E

EnG

(s)E

is an observed signal and the set

=

[(S)GJ

(/J

is the set of con-

tents or the set of possible signals not observed, and the arrow denotes
the direction of content inference.

The set of rules of content inference

implied by. a given relation R may not be single-valued as suggested
above and hence may not be a mapping.
To operationalize the set of rules of content inference for our
purposes, let us first consider a

"R-restricted cojection" which may

. be defined as:
G

cOR A

=

/42/

where A may be any set in whatever dimensions of a state space and
R

takes the position of a relation imposing the restriction on the co-

jection.

Applied on a single signal, the R-restricted cojection becomes

analogously:

=

co

G

(co

Z

(s)

E

n

co

Z

R).

The range of an R-restricted cojection onto G

/43/

is the set co

G

R

which can be easily obtained from the definition /42/ as follows:

co

G

Q

R

co

G

Z

(co Q

nco Z R)

=

co

GZ
Z
(Q n co R)

=

co

G

R

The domain of an R-restricted cojection can be considered as partitioned
into two sets.

According to /42/ the R-restricted cojection is every-

where defined only within the set R

or any projections coHR thereof,
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1.

eo, only within the set of possible signalso

Within the set QH_coHR ,

the constraint, however, the R-restricted cojection is not definedo
fore, whenever R

There-

induces a constraint on the domain of a R-restricted

cojection, the operation is not a mappingo

But as long as

R

adequately

represents all the possible states an object system can take, then every
receivable signal is an element of the set for which the R-restricted
cojectionis everywhere definedo

Hence, under the assumption that the

regularities of an object system are known, the R- restricted cojection
is everywhere defined for all possible signals that an object system can
emito
It is evident that the nature of the R-restricted cojection is en-

tirely determined by the nature of the constraint induced by R
arbitrarily chosen domain and range of that operationo

and the

Note that the

set of signals for which an R- restricted cojection is well defined is
identical with the domain of the set of possible rules of inference that
is induced by Ro

Furthermore, the range of the R-restricted cojec-

tion, as far as it is distinct from its domain, contains all possible
contents that are inferrable from the signals in the domain of the Rrestricted cojectiono

We therefore can say that a R-restricted cojec-

tion includes the possible rules of content inferenceo
When applied on a given signal (s)E,

a rule of content in-

ference that is implicit in the R- restricted cojection onto G-E produceos elements in the respective subspace which we must identify. as
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contents

0

Following from the definition /42/:

co

G-E

gG-E.

R

To the extent co G - E (s)E is contained in and not identical with coG-ER
R
we could argue that some selection has been made among those content
elements that remain in gG-E after the object system's constraint has
become known.

Thus, whenever these two sets are not identical, there

is always a set

[(S)C]

of elements in coCR,

CcG-E, for which it is

true that:

co G-E ( s )E

R

=

co

G-E

=

R

and

/44/

c

If this condition is satisfied, the set

co

C

[(s)C]

R

can then be identified with

the set of contents that are being inferred from a given signal (s)E
the basis of some rule of content inference.

If the set

[(s)C]

on

is

identical with the set coCR then it is reasonable to argue that no inferential effort h<,s been made.

In this case we have to consider that only

a signal has been received and not a message, at least <'s far as the
chosen problem domain is concerned.
Thus we can characterize the process of content inference
more fully as any process going from received signals to a set of
possible contents that is smaller than the set of possible contents

348
implied by the relation R

apriori to receiving the signal.

This process

maybe depicted as follows:

c

co c R,

Ene

=:

0

That is, the set of contents inferred must be a proper subset and not
identical with a cojection of the relation R
content.

onto the dimension of that

Note that this process of content inference is implicit and a

special case of R-restricted cojections.
R-restricted cojections can be considered a formalization of
the set of rules of content inference determined by R.

Some such rules

may associate a single content with each given signal, some others may
exhibit no restriction in which case it operates in effect as an unrestricted cojection.

For a quantitative measure of the amount of infor-

mation conveyed by the content of a message it is therefore of interest
to determine how many content elements are inferred from each of the
possible signals.

Or, more specifically, whether and the degree to

which the rules of content inference are single-valued as a whole.
This degree of single-valuedness is important because it can be
thought of as the extent to which certainty can be gained within an unobserved problem domain or the extent to which a message is ambiguous with respect to a certain delineated set of contents; or the extent
to which the content of a message is specific.
If a R-restricted cojection

to the pos sible signals

(s)

E

,

co~-E is single-valued with respect

then the number of elements in the
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domain and range of this operation are related as follows:

=

If this condition is satisfied then the quantities can be written:

#coG-ER

=

which implies that:

log#co

EUG

R

=

log # co

G-E

R.

According to the definition /37/ the above expression is equivalent to:

+

uG- E

=

R

and can be rewritten according to the definition /41/ as:
E:G-E
IIR

=

U~-E

/45/

Thus, whenever a R-restricted cojection is single-valued for the possible
signals in its domain, the amount of inferential information equals the
amount of uncertainty in its range.

The equation/45/ implies that R

provides a satisfactory inferential basis for making unambiguous content
inferences from given signals that totally reduces the uncertainty in the
chosen problem domain.
The uncertainty in the range of the R-restricted cojection or in
the problem domain towards which content inferences are intended is
evidently the limiting value of the amount of inferential information.

1£
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some of the possible signals in the R-restricted Gojection's domain are
multi-valued, i. e. if contents are ambiguous, then:

# co EUG R

>

in this case the amount of inferential information becomes smaller than
the amount of uncertainty in the range of the operation.
U E :G - E
R

o
This shows
iJ;l E

Hence, generally:

uG - E

/46/

R

II~:G-E to be a measure of the extent to which some signal

can be expected to convey content referring to some unobserved

part of an object system in G Or the extent to which signals can be expected to become messages about the states of an object system within
a problem domain.

If the relation between the possible signals and the

possible contents is a one-to-one mapping then evidently;

=

nE :G - E
R

/47/

=

Referring again to Figure 17 for examples

=

=

G

U R3

=

2 bits

which exhibits R3 to be a one-to-one relation between the sets of
possible signals and contents within the two dimensions
This is quite obvi~us from Figure 17.

F

and G.

That the quantities of infer-

ential information introduced by R4 can be similarly obtained:
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UEUF
R4

nE:F:G
R4

=

=

=

2 bits

=

=

=

4 bits

=

nE:G
R4

=

=

Obits

=

nEVF:G
R4

=

=

n FVG : E
R4

The above equations indicate that none of the possible signals
(s)F,

or

=

2 bits

(s)E,

(s)G can be assigned a unique content under R4 when taken

individually.

On the other hand, the R4- restricted cojection is single-

valued if applied to signals

(s)EvF,

or

(S)FUG to which it

assigns a unique content in dimensions not specified by those of the
signals.

For example:

>

U EUF : G
R4

=

Such a condition suggests moreover, that if the complexity of a relation
is increased, more information may be needed at the signal end to allow
for adequate content inferences.

Such is the situation of the jury in

court where the relations to be considered are so complex that a tremendous amount of information has to be processed to make an inference
that yields just one bit of information:

"guilty" or "not guilty."

We

will corne to a measure for the amount of such inferences after the
next section.
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Quantities of Information Relevant for Filtering
The notion of filtering was introduced in Chapter 'Six where it was
characterized as a procedure for eliminating or at least reducing the
quantity of noise in the available data, i. e., the amount of information
which is irrelevant to a given problem of message analysis.

While con-

straint analysis presents a method for systematically dis Ce rning the
nature of a constraint, particularly for identifying the decomposability
of a constraint that is accounted for by a relation which is required for
making content inferences, a filtering procedure may be regarded as a
particular realization of the results obtained by constraint analysis.

A

filtering procedure has been described as a mapping of one representational system into a simpler second one such that relevant regularities
of an object system are maintained.

In other words, a filter in message

analysis is a homomorphic transformation under which relevant inferential information is invariant.
Let the operation of filtering be defined as the homomorphic
mapping:

f:

G

G' such that f co GR

=

co

G'

/.l

R'

I

/48/
whereby R'

= P R.

One of the conditions that a suitable filter must

satisfy has been mentioned above in conjunction with analyzing a constraint: the invariance of the quantity of inferential information.

That
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is, given the signal dimensions E

and the problem domain denoted by

D:

=

II

E"D'-E'
'

R'

In accordance with results obtained from inquiries into a given constraint, one of the operations that is to be incorporated into filtering
is a projection,

This function can be chosen in such a way that those

dimensions of a state space'are eliminated that do not contribute to
the relevant amount of inferential information,

Depending on whether

and how the relation can be decomposed into less complex sub-relations,
the filtering operation may be :regarded as a set of independent operations having distinct ranges and domains,

The constraint analysis

previously discussed provides a rationale for the design of a filter
that can be :regarded as a composite of these two types of reductions
of the apparent complexity,

It does not indicate however, a further

reduction that is due to simplifications within the subspaces of the
total space,

That is, a partition of the state space which discards

the distinctions th'\t are irrelevant with respect to the infe:rential
problem at hand,

Such a simplification can be visualized in Figure 18.

In this Figure two constraints are presented,
already been presented in Figure 17,
R3

One,

R3,

has

As we demonstrated earlier

can be simplified by simply dropping the dimension E

of the

original state space since it does not a£fect the quantity of inferential
information provided by R3.

The transformed version of gEUFUG
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E

Two Constraints and their Simplifications
Figure 18
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shows R3'

to be a one-to-one relation between the dimensions

F' and

G',
The constraint induced by R5, - 'on the other hand, cannot be re.·
duced by eliminating any dimensions in which it is contained,

This can

be easily seen by the distribution of the amounts of inferential information within the subspaces:

nE:F:G

R5

"

n E :F

"

R5

UELIFUG

R5

nE:G

"

R5

nF:G

R5

"

"

" 1 bit

"

,42 bits

"

Obits

The measures moreover indicate that the relation R5 cannot be decomposed into sets of simple sub-relations.

But a considerable reduction of

the complexity can be evidently achieved by partitioning the subspaces
as shown because the distribution of elements constituting the relation

R5 appears to contain a certain symmetry, L e"
a·rrangement

~f

can be regarded as an

identical subsets of R5.

While we have not developed a measure of symmetry, the
examples make it evident that the invariance of the amount of inferential
information cannot be the only criterion for evaluating the adequacy of
a filter.

The quan t 1't y

UEUD
R

must be reduced to a minimum as well.

Therefore a second criterion for assessing the adequacy of a filter in
a given situation has to be found and can be derived from the inequality
/46/.

The inequality states that:

356

equality holding whenever
inference.

If both

co~-E

contains only single-valued rules of

co~-E and co~ contain only single-valued rules

of inference then according to /47/:

nE :D - E
R

=

=

=

which is indicative of a condition that presents in a sense, the ideal of
rules of content inference, rules that are most easy to handle, rules
that assign to each signal a unique and distinct content and not sets
thereof.

A coefficient for the degree to which su<;:h an ideal is approached

may be in place here and can be defined as:
nE:D-E

o

R

1 .

/49/

According to /47/ the coefficient assumes the value of unity whenever the
set of signals are in a one-to-one relation to the set of contents that can
be legitimately inferred from them,
Hence a suitable goal for selecting the homomorphic mapping

p.

defined in /44/ which is to be used as a filte, in message analysis can be
stated as:

nE:D-E
R
nE:D-E
R
EUD
UR

=

IIE"D'-E'
.

R'

/50/

<

- - -....~ 1.
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The arrow denotes the direction of a process converging towards unity.
It is clear that this goal implies that of minimizing noise in the sense
that irrelevant varieties of any kind are absorbed in the filtering process
and do not enter the process of content inference.
In terms of the examples in Figure 18:

UEUFUG
R3

=

logz#R3

=

log 16
Z

=

4 bits

F'UG'
U R3'

=

logZ#R3'

=

log 4
Z

=

Z bits

n EUF : G
R3

=

U FUG
R3

U

n F'·G'
.
R3

=

2 bits

nEUF:G
R3

=

nF':G
R3'

+

E
R3

UEUFUG
R3

=

2 bits

Hence:

and:
n EUF : G
R3
UEUFUG
R3

=

.50

<

1. 00

=

n F'·G'
.
R3'

F'U G'

U R3 '

in which case co G' , is known to contain only one-to-one rules of inR3
ference .for thepos sible signals.
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UEUFUG
R5

=

6 bits

E'UF'UG'
U R5 '

=

Z bits

n EUF : G

=

logzlZ

+

IIE'UF"G'
'
R5

=

logZ 3

+ logZZ -

U EUF : G
R5

=

E'UF':G'
!IRS

R5

log 4
Z

- log Z 3Z
log Z4

=

.58 bits

=

. 58 bits

Hence:

and:
EUF : G
rrR5
UEUFUG
R5
While p

=

.097

<

.79

=

E'UF':G'
II RS '
E'UF'UG'
URS'

can achieve a considerable reduction of R5's

apparent com-

plexity in the original state space, the measures indicate that it is not
possible to bring the rules of content inference into a one-to-one relation.
It should be noted that we have been explicit only concerning

filters that operate on a state space which is conceptuali:?'ed as a product set.

If domain and/ or range of the filtering procedures involve

representational systems that are formally different. from the above,
for example, when statistical properties of an object system are
represented in the range of a filter, then a constraint analysis will
have to focus on different properties of a relation that can be discerned as accounting for the constraint observed,

But in all message
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analytic situations in which filters are selected, the two goals defined
above seem to be prevalent: firstly, the relevant inferential information
is to remain invariant throughout the filtering process or at least should
not diminish below an accepta ble level.

Secondly, the complexity of a

relation, for example, the number of terms needed to specify that relation, is to be reduced to a point at which it is rendered more manageable
or easier to handle in subsequent content inferences.
However, since the filtering procedure p i s conceptualized
here as a homomorphic mapping which maintains all relevant relations
for the intended content inferences, and since neither R-restricted cojections nor the set of rules of content inference need to be mappings,

i. e., since:

?

-1

G'
cOR'

=

P

it does not seem necessary to account for the quantities of irrelevant

information that a filter reduces when we explicate the amount of message information in the following section.

The Amount of Information Carried by a Message
This section tries to develop a measure for the amount of information conveyed by a signal that can be regarded as a message about
some unobserved"part of an object system.

A proper measure for the

amount of message information should include the quantity of informa",

tion conveyed by the content that can be legitimately inferred from a
signal a'S well as the quantity of information conveyed by the signal,
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some constraints on the signal's dimensions being known.

Such a meas-

urewould regard the quantity conveyed by the content alone as a special
case of the amount of message information.

We will develop such a

Ineasure and show some of its quantitative relations t<;> other inforInation
Ineasures of our calculus at the end of this section.
The notion of content inferred froIn a signal (s)E was defined
asa non-empty set {(S)C]
by D

of elements in a problem domain denoted

which does not overlap with the signal's subspace.

We can argue

that the set of contents induces a certain constraint on the subspace
which is not observed.

If the argument is sufficient, then this constraint

can be easily measured by one of our information measures.

For instance:

log # coC Q
#coC[(S)CJ
But the condition under which we can view the subset of the space as the
content of a message requires the set of contents to be a proper subset
of and not identical with the set of elements excluded by the constraint
within the dimensions of the set of contents.

/44/ implies:

For

CcD-E

c:

co

D-E

R .

If the two sets are identical then we argued that in effect no choices
have been made among the possible contents contained in coD-ER
which case the amount of content inferred should be zero.

But,

in
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KI{ (S)c:}

is not zero when

[(S)ej

=

coeR which proves the above

measure to be insufficient as an acceptable explication of the quantity
of information conveyed by the content inferred.

Since:

we can equate;

=

and extend the above measure of the constraint induced by the set of
contents as follows:
D-E
g
log # co
# coD-Eg
R

=

coD-Eg
log #
# coD-Eg
R

=

D-E

# coR g
# co~~E (s)e]

t

D-Eg

+

# cOR
log
# co~~E[(S)CJ

The left part of the sum is nothing but a measure of the constraint induced by R

as defined in /38/.

The right part of the sum comes

closer to our intuition concerning the amount of content:

the right

part is a measure of the amount of uncertainty reduced beyond what
was already known by R.

If this part of the expression is zero, con-

dition /44/ is not satisfied which means that no content is inferred.
If this part of the expression is not zero then some inferred content

can be said to have caused a reduction of the uncertainty that persisted
after the constraint existing in the object system became known.
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Since we want to trace back the origin of this additional constraint
to the set of signals froln which the set of contents are inferred, we can
write the following expressions as:

KID - E
R

=

+

The right part of the SUlnnow expresses what we wish to define:

the

amount of information that a signal carries with respect to an unobserved
part of an object system.

It is the amount of information carried by the

content of a message alone.

The logarithm of the numerator of the

proportion is already known to be

U

D-E
R

The logarithm of the denom-

ina to!' of this proportion may be given the general form:
G

.

UR(···,(s)i'···)

=

log

#Q

co~

/51/

(s)i

This quantity can be interpreted as the uncertainty remaining in G
after signals have been received and content inferences made from
them.

Obviously the definition of U

case of / 51 / in which case

G

( ... , (s)""') in /23/ is a special
1

.

R = gG and the cojection employed in /23/

is unrestricted.

A measure of the amount of information carried by·a signal ineluding .the contents that are inferred from it can be defined as:
G

MIR ( ... , (s)i"")

Where

=

G

UR(···,(s)i'···)

G is again an arbitrary subspace and R

the constraint on the total state space.

/52/

the relation inducing

This measure is to be interpreted
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in analogy to the amount of signal information as a difference between the
apriori uncertainty within G, the constraint due to R

being known, and

the 'uncertaintya posteriori to the reception of a message.

We will call

this measure function "amount of message information. "
The amount of information carried by the content of a message
alone can now be interpreted according to the expression above:

/53/

=

the severity of a constraint induced by the set of contents inferred from
a given signal minus the severity of the constraint induced by the relation R.
The quantity of message information lends itself to various equations that are of interest to message analysis.

For instance, the total

amount of message information conveyed by signal and content jointly,
R

being known, can be expanded as follows:

=

UDUE
R

UD - E
R

=
/54/
Thus the total amount of message information in the dimensions of the
signal and the problem domain can be considered as the sum of the
quantities of information carried by the signal and the content individually

364
minus the amount of inferential information supplied when regarding a
given signal as a message, i,

e"

when making specific content inferences,

The amount of information carried by a signal,

R being known,

can be expanded as follows:

=

+

=

+

=

/55/

=

The above can be interpreted as the difference between the amount of
signal information,

R not being known or ignored, and the amount of

information contained in the constraint induced by R

on the signal's

diInens ions.
Inserting /55/ into /54/ yields the following:

rr E :D - E
R

/56/
This shows that the amount of message information in the dimensions of
the signal and the problem domain,

R

being given, is composed of the

quantities: the amount of signal information minus the quantity of constraint induced by R within the signal's dimensions, plus the amount of
information carried by the content alone,

R

being given, minus the
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amount of inferential information supplied by R.
Numerous other theorems can be derived from the axioms and
the definitions all of which seem highly meaningful on intuitive grounds
but we will focus only on some inequality involving the quantity of message information of the content inferred.

o

According to /46/:

n E :D - E
R

The amount of message information referring to the content of a message has identical limits.

According to the definition of this quantity,

/52/ :

o

But the two quantities are identical only at their extreme values which
.
'
f rom the a b ove an d occurs elt
. h er w h en COR
D-E
is qUlte
0 bV10US
single-valued or when it is not R-restricted, respectively.

is

The funda-

mental difference between the two quantities is that the amount of inferential information is an over all measure of the extent to which a
R-restricted cojection from E

onto D-E is single-valued, given

the set of all possible signals; while the amount of information referring to the message content is a measure concerned with the effect of
only one out of a set of possible signals.

Whenever the measures de-

viate from the two points of equality, they vary relatively independently of each other.

All that can be said is that the amount of infer-

ential information can neither exceed the maximum nor be smaller
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than the minimum of the amount of message information carried by a
member of the set of possible signals.

Hence, putting these arguments

together, we can state:
E D E -'
II R: ...

/57/

According to this inequality we cannot say that the amount of content inferred is absolutely. limited by the amount of inferential information supplied.

This limitation is only.a relative one.

The amount of in-

ferential information also can not be interpreted as an average of the
amount of message information concerning the inferrable content.

This

average, when computed, may take values slightly different from the
amount of inferential information.

But we can say with full confidence

that on the whole the amount of message information that can be inferred

--

from a signal is limited by the amount of inferential information available.
1£ the difference between the nature of overall measures and

measures of individual cases is taken into consideration many more
meaningful limitations and inequalities can be derived.

For example:

the amount of signal information is on the whole larger than the amount
of information that can be inferred from it.

This shows the process of

interpreting messages on the whole as one of only losing information.

Information About a Dynamic System: An Example
The previous discussion limited the representational system of
a message analyst to a product set having many dimensions along which
the states of an object system's components are represented.

From the
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point of view of the analyst such a representational system implicitly restricts the message analytic situation to a kind of diagnostic situation.
This is a situation in which the knowledge of co-occurrences of events
provide3the basis for making .inferences from observations to non-observed
phenomena of which the observations are said to be symptoms.
We claimed generality for our argument, tried to support this
claim by referring to numerous entirely different examples in such and
similar modes of inquiry as content analysis, but restricted the explication of our calculus to just this simple kind of representational system.
Giving just one more example does not of course fully support our claim,
but shows at least that our efforts are not confined to the situation we
assumed at the beginning of Chapter Four.

Moreover it seems that the

extension to other message analytic situations which are in a sense more
complex, shows additional features that are even more interesting than
the one to which we restricted our previous concern.
For example, we mentioned in the requirements for a measure
of signal information that if a representational system is not powerful
enough tb represent the object system in< question, i. e. ,. if the quantities
of signal information turn out to be infinite, then the representational
system has to be altered.

We were mainly concerned with signals that

provide the basis for content inferences, but in addition signals may
convey. information about the structure of the object system itself.
Thus we have to consider that a single signal may simultaneously convey information on three levels: . (a) information concerning the
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adequacy of a representational system.

This information has not been

and may not need to be quantified in this study.

(b) Information concern-

. ing the structure Or regularities of the object system on the basis of
which content inferences may subsequently be made; and finally, (c) information concerning unobserved states of the object system, i. e.,
information that is the characteristic of mes sages.
Let us therefore consider a dynamic object system, i. e., a systern in which attention must be given to changes over time.

Given that

the observer of such a system has access only to a short and even incomplete sequence of signals which may not even pertain to all states
of the object system, one of the questions that may be put to the message analyst concerns how much inferential information is contained in
the observed history of the object system to anticipate its future states.
The an"wer would at once indicate how futile predictive efforts are
bound to be.

Another question may have to do with how much addi-

tional information is needed or how long a sequence will have to be
observed to predict with reasonable certainty the next state of the
object system.

One may also ask whether the most recent signal re-

ceived contributed to the making of inferences concerning unobserved
states, i. e., whether that signal can be regarded as a message about
states of an object system not accessible at the time.
To force the discussion to become more concrete let the following protocol be given which records signals that have been received by
. an observer at successive steps in time.
served" in the dimensions in question.

Dots represent "nothing ob-
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Time t

G

~

1

I
I
I

2
3

0

.

1

I

0

1

0

0

1

1

4
5

0

6

0

1

0

7

8

1

9

0

10

0

0

11

0

1

12

0

1
1
I

•

0
1

1

1

Suppose we were to fail to view the object system as a dynamic
one, i. e., we were to make use of a representational system that does
not consider changes Over time, we would start as follows.
state space of our interest be
With n = 2

gG= {<OO>,

<OL>,

<10>,

components each of which can take k = 2

imum uncertainty would be:

=

=

=

2 bits

Let the

J.

<11>

states, the max-
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and the accumulative amount of signal information would be:

Time

1

SP«S)l)

=

1 bit

2

SIG ((s)1,(s)2)

=

1 bit

3

G
SI ((s)1, ... ,(s)3)

=

2 bits

4

G
SI ((s)1, ... ,(s)4)

=

00

Without even attempting any. inferences we would at least at time 4 discover that the representational system gG is not powerful enough to
adequately represent the object system of which we have obtained the
protocol.
However, a dynamic system can be said to follow some trajectory
within a representational system of its possible states.

Let us there-

fore take another representational system into consideration which represents not states, but all possible sequences of states s·uch an object
system may follow - provided that it behaves in a determinate manner.
Let us begin with a behavior space

B

Q

· that contains all possible

trajectories generated by mappings of the type

gG,..!..-. gG, t+l, where

Q denotes a finite sequence of steps 1, 2, ... , t,

in time.

If

such a behavior space again leads to contradictory signals then another,
more powerful representational system will have to be employed.

As

has been stated before, to determine the adequacy of a representational
system is the first use that we can make of a signal.
Given the behavior space, each set of signals
cojected onto Q

(s)t can now be

whereby a constraint is induc;ed that hopefully becomes
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successively more severe uptothe point where just one trajectory remains in the space.

The maximum uncertainty that has to be eliminated,

the maximu:m a:mount of infor:mation a set of signals :may be able to convey, now beco:mes the logarithm of the nu:mber of possible trajectories.
Again for

n = k= Z

"

=

log Z 196 = 7.61 bits.

(kn - v - w)!

Now the a:mount of infor:mation a given set of signals conveys about the
structure of an object system, i. e., the quantity it introduces into the

Q
t
behavior space can be measured by 81 ( ... , (s) ).
to which a signal maybe put.

This is a second use

We will give the :measures of a:mount of

signal infor:mation referring to the structure of the object syste:m shortly.
At the initial state of the analysis, where nothing is known about
the object syste:m, when all possible trajectories are equally likely, any
attempt to :make content inferences would be futile.

It is only after

some signals have beco:me known that so:me behavioral property of the
object syste:m :may appear which :manifests itself as a constraint on the
conceivable behaviors the syste:m :may follow.

The behavior space into

which the signals are cojectedwas defined as the set of trajectories
that are generated by all possible :mappings gG, t
us now define the set R

,

gG, t+l.

Let

as a subset of g Gl
, )( ... G Gt
' KG G,t+l"
: _ ...

which at each state t accounts for the possible trajectories in the behavior space.

Thus,

R

can be considered a representation of those
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trajectories that are left in BQ after the set of received signals ha,ve
been cojected into it.
The constra,int which R

induces on the possible mappings now

provides us with the basis for content infeTencesfrom the signals, it
provides us with the necessary inferential information.

Inferences

from available signals to unobservable states is the third use to which
such signals may be put.

The quantities conveyed by the signals as

messages about some other states can now be measured by MI~' t((s)).
We will present SOme such measures in a table to follow,
With the first signal (s)l = <0,.>
system's initial state is either

<0,0>

it becomes known that the

or

<0,1>

of G

G

.

Thus, not

all four but only two of the possible initial states have to be considered
whereby the number of possible trajectories reduces from 196 to
exactly half that number.
of information.

Therefore,

(s)l

The cojection of (s)l and

conveys SIQ((s)l) = 1 bit
(s)2 causes a further

shri!lkage of the set of poss'ible trajectories to 64.

And so the process

continues, hopefully, until the last uncertainty, is removed and the
structure of the object system is perfectly known to the analyst.

The

successive elimination of trajectories is depicted in Figure 19 and
the amount of accumulated information due to this process tabulated
in Figure 20.

It can be seen that at time

t=9 perfect certainty is

gained where every additional signal is merely redundant.
The amount of message information that signals upto time t
convey about the object system's state at time t+l is evidently related
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Time

o

The possible paths the system may have
followed a t time t
(broken lines lead to an anticipated but
disconfirmed future state, the whole set
of signals considered at that time).

1

11

2

°r~~~~:~~"II
............... .....

Number of
trajectories:
(196 )

01

( 98)

/I\~~>,

o

( 64)

\

"-"-

\

3

O?

'01

( 17)

00 /~1

7)

II

,

4

00

6

8

9

10

,

/

/I~
I
I

10~11

5

7

~I,'ll

01

10

I
I
00
I
11

I

I

I
I

I
I

1'0

1'0

10

I

II

II

3)

10

2)

I

I

11

II

I
I

I

,

I

10

10

10

12

II

2)

1)

1)

O(

II

5)

o.

I
I

I)

1)

Successive Changes of the Content Inferred from
Accumulating Signals

Figure 19

Q

t
( .. , (s) )

Sp, t((s)t)

MI~' t+1 ((s)t)

MI~: t+l ((s) t~ 1 (s) t)

MI~'

t

(s)t

I

<0, .>

1. 00

1.

0

0

1.

2

<0, .>

1. 61

1.

0

0

0

3

<. , 0>

3.53

1.

0

0

0

4

<1,

.>

4.81

1.

0

0

0

5

<. , 0>

5.29

1.

.42

.42

.42

6

<.

,1>

6.61

l.

l.

2. =U G , t+l

l.

7

<. ~ .'>

6. 61

0

0

2.

l.

8

<l,l>

6.61

2. =U G , t

1.

l.

1.

9

<0. ,)

7.61=U

1.

1.

2.

2.=U G ,t

10

<0. ,)

7.61

1.

1.

2.

2.

II

< 1, . >

7.61

l.

1.

2.

2.
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<. , 1)

7.61

l.

1.

2.

2.

S1

Q

Quantitative Changes of Information as a Function of Accumulating
Signals
Figure 20
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v.>
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375
to the amount of information that can be supplied at each interpretive
stage.

The table shows that it is hardly possible to say anything .about

the next state of the system until a relatively large amount of information
about its structure has been accumulated.
The table moreover shows that the amount of signal information
within a state space affects the predictability of the next state.
signals at time t

are considered as messages about the subsequent

state, no perfect certainty can be reached at time ttl
protocol shows.

If only

as far as our

If however, signals of two preceding time periods are

taken jointly, the lack of information due to incomplete observability
. during a single time period may be compensated by the additional quantity
that a longer observational history provides.

As the table indicates, the

message information conveyed by two successive signals is always at
its maximum from time t = 9 onwards

0

One of the columns shows in addition the quantity of message
information that a signal at time t
state of the object system.

conveys with respect to the initial

As Figure 19 already demonstrates, this

content cannot be perfectly inferred before time t = 9.
A few conc.luding observatioDSshould be mentioned at this point.
We specified numerous paper and pencil machines, made themincompletely accessible in various ways, and investigated the different
quantities of information signals convey.

This was frequently quite

painstaking since the variety within a representational space increases
exponentially as a few variables are added.

But this makes the need for

376
some powerful information calculus even more urgent.
Intuitively acceptable and clearly supported by our experiments
was the hypothesis that a higher degree of incompletenes s indeed requires
a longer time period of observation before reasonable quantities of message information do appear.

This is already seen in the previous example.

If some variables are not accessible at all, it is possible to

specify the maximum quantity of information needed to make the desired
inferences, and this quantity may indeed correspond to the maximum
amount of communication that may take place from the unobserved components to the dimensions of the obtained signal.

But very little can be

said about the direction of such communication.

1£ a system is observed incompletely before it reaches its
equilibrium, uncertainty as to the initial states of that system may
remain no matter how long the system has been observed and how
accurate predictions as to its future states may become over time.
Cases where the observed part of an object system is relatively
small and the communication between that part and the rest of the
system is very rich, require consideration of very long histories of
such systems, very powerful representational systems and constraints
and considerable information processing capacities.

This is the situa-

tion in which the majority of practical message analyses take place,
a situation in which information from the past history of an object
system must be utilized more effectively and economically in order
to corne to content inferences with reasonable certainty.

To reduce
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such complexity is a considerable challenge.

To measure the quantities

involved is just a first step towards meeting that challenge.

Summary of Terms
At this point a brief summary is in order.

In Chapter Six we

developed a conceptualization of the empirical procedures of mes sage
analysis.

In that chapter an outline of four such processes were depicted

in Figure

9.

Chapter Seven was primarily devoted to some informa-

tional aspects of mes sage analysis and developed explicit definitions of
the procedures in question.

The procedures are adequately defined

for use only in representational systems that are many-product sets.
But the basic nature of these procedures, it was claimed,. is general.
Figure 21 of this chapter provides an over-view of the terms used as
far as they refer to processes, products and operands.

Following the

diagram in that figure is a brief summary of the definitions of various
quantities of information that pertain to our calculus.
significant definitions are included.
these terms are not repeated here.

Only the more

Equations that hold between

I
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Primary Definitions
The uncertainty within a state space

QG denoted by the set G

of its products or dimensions, a constraint induced by the relation R
being given or known:

=

log # coG Q
R

/37/

With U G defined in /22/ as a special case in which no constraint is
present and the subscripts are accordingly omitted.
The uncertainty in QG after a set of signals have been introduced
or become known, the relation R

u~ (... , (s)i'

being given and considered:

/51/

=

... )

With U G ( ... , (s)i' ... ) defined in /23/ as a special case in which no relation R is considered.
The uncertainty in QG as in U~ ( ... , (s)i' ... ) but of signals
or inferences that are verified according to a validating signal (v) Z:
G
Y R(""

(s)i""

With yG( ... , (s)i"

// (v)

.. // (v)Z)

Z

/58/

)

as a special case analogous to the above.

Secondary Definitions
The severity of a constraint within QG or the amount of information introduced by a relation R
G

KIR

=

into a state space:

/38/
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The amount of inferential information contained in the relation R
sub-spaces of gZ denoted by the sets

between two destinct

E

and G

of their dimensions respectively:

nG:E

/41/

=

R

The amount of message information, i. e., the amount of information a set of signals and/ or the contents inferred from it conveyes:

u~ (... , (s)i'

G
M1
( ... ,(s) .... )

R

1

/52/

... )

The amount of signal information can be regarded as a special
case of the amount of message information in which the relation R

is

either not known Or ignored:

SI

G

( ... ,(s)i"")

/24/

=

The amount of redundancy conveyed by a set of messages or the
degree to which a set of signals and/or their content are superfluous
with respect to what they convey:
G
R1R ( ... ,(s)i'···)

=

~

G
MI R {.·· ,(s)i"") /59/

1

The amount of redundancy contained in a set of signals ignoring
the e'ldstence of a relation R

is a special case of the above:

-

G
SI ( ... , (s) i' ... )

/25/
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The amount of valid message information:

Of which the amount of valid signal information is again a special case:

G
Z
G
VSI ( ... '(s)i •... //(v) ) = U -

V

G

Z
( ... ,(s)i''''//(v)),

/31/
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